US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1937

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001937 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS AND DS/IP/SA 
NSC FOR DORMANDY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINS, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: GSL RESPONSE TO LTTE HEROES' DAY SPEECH 
CRITICAL, COMMITMENT TO CEASEFIRE REASSURING 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 1924 
 
     B. COLOMBO 1913 
 
Classified By: James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of Mission. 
Reason 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary.  The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL)'s 
response to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)'s 
annual "Heroes' Day" speech criticized the Tigers' call for 
an unconditional return to the peace talks as not conducive 
to "good faith negotiations," and reiterated the GSL's 
readiness to discuss an interim authority, in tandem with a 
permanent settlement, in accordance with the December 2002 
pro-federalist "Oslo Declaration."   The GSL also reasserted 
its commitment to the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA), which was 
seconded by the Sri Lanka Army's assertion to DAO that it 
will not respond to LTTE provocation.  Norwegian Ambassador 
Brattskar traveled to Kilinochchi December 2 for a meeting 
with the LTTE.  The GSL's renewed public commitment to the 
CFA is reassuring, especially in light of the JVP's recent 
statements (however unlikely) about returning to armed 
insurgency if the GSL cedes to Tiger demands for an interim 
administration.  The Tigers are likely to use the conflicting 
signals from the GSL and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), 
President Kumaratunga's main coalition partner, to reinforce 
their familiar argument that the south does not have the 
consensus or will to come back to talks.  End Summary. 
 
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Government Responds to LTTE Heroes' Day Speech 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
2. (U)  On December 1, the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) 
issued a statement from its Information Department responding 
to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Leader Velupillai 
Prabhakaran's November 27 "Heroes' Day" speech, in which the 
Tiger leader demanded that the GSL return to talks based on 
LTTE proposals for an Interim Self-Governing Authority 
(ISGA). In its first response to Prabhakaran's speech, the 
GSL characterized the LTTE's "threatening language" as 
"scarcely conducive to good faith negotiations."  The 
statement also conveyed the GSL's readiness to discuss an 
interim authority in tandem with discussions about a 
permanent settlement, in accordance with the agreement the 
LTTE and the GSL made in early peace talks in Oslo in 
December 2002.  (Note: Known as the "Oslo Declaration,"  this 
agreement proposes federalism as a potential solution to the 
conflict. End note.)  The GSL's statement also reiterated its 
firm commitment to the "strict maintenance of the Cease-Fire 
Agreement (CFA)," and condemned "all violations and actions 
jeopardizing the prevailing ceasefire," which, the GSL 
asserted, are "leading to the undue rupture of the sensitive 
balance of ethnic groups presently maintained by the 
Government..." 
 
3. (C) Finally, the statement advised that the GSL is 
communicating with the Government of Norway (GON), which is 
facilitating the peace negotiations, about "future steps to 
be taken in the peace process."  Norwegian Ambassador Hans 
Brattskar told DCM December 1 that he would be going to LTTE 
administrative center Kilinochchi December 2 on a "low-key" 
visit to see LTTE Political Wing Leader S.P.Tamilchelvan. 
Brattskar will brief donor co-chairs on his trip December 3. 
 
4. (C)  Jehan Perera, Director of the National Peace Council 
and longtime mission contact, told poloff that he viewed the 
GSL response to Prabhakaran's speech as positive because it 
communicated the GSL's willingness to return to negotiations. 
 However, Perera criticized the GSL for offering discordant 
responses to Prabhakaran's speech, i.e. statements  made by 
GSL coalition partner Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna JVP) in 
Parliament November 30 threatening a return to armed struggle 
should ISGA be granted, and ongoing harsh characterizations 
of the LTTE in government-owned media.  Perera surmised that 
the GSL has finally realized that peace negotiations are 
partly a propaganda war, and that mention of talking with 
Norway was included in the statement to mollify critics who 
see the GSL's reluctance to return to the peace table as 
political situation in the south--not peace talks with the 
Tigers. 
----------------------------------------- 
Army Committed to Ceasefire, Trinco Calmer 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C)  Meanwhile, the CFA is holding, despite Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) Chief Trond Furuhovde's recent 
comments to the media that it is under pressure.  The Sri 
Lanka Army (SLA), for its part, continues to resist LTTE 
provocation.  In a  December 1 meeting, SLA Director of 
Operations K. Silva told DAO, other defense attaches, and 
diplomats that the SLA will not break the CFA--regardless of 
the intensity and repetitiveness of LTTE provocation. 
 
6. (C)  After a week of tension, including a November 29 
LTTE-called hartal, or general strike and the killing of two 
Sinhalese men (Ref A), the situation in Trincomalee is 
calmer.  Deputy Inspector General of Police for the East 
Neville Wijesinghe told poloff that the December 1 funeral 
for one of the Sinhalese victims passed without incident.  He 
discounted rumors about ongoing conflict between Tamil and 
Sinhalese communities.  Wijesinghe speculated that it would 
take another one or two days for the situation to quiet down 
completely.  Unlike in recent days, there was no curfew in 
Trincomalee December 2.  The AID/OTI office, which closed 
early on December 1, has re-opened and is fully staffed. 
 
7.  (C)  On December 2, the LTTE called another hartal in 
Vavuniya and Mannar, ostensibly to protest the security 
forces' disruption of Heroes' Day week celebrations in those 
areas (Ref B).  According to SLA spokesman Daya Ratnayake, 
shops were closed and public transport halted, but only a 
small number of people protested.  However, the entry (and 
exit) points from GSL-controlled to LTTE-controlled areas 
(i.e. Omanthai on the A9 near Vavuniya and Uyilankulum near 
Mannar) were closed, because International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) monitors could not travel to the border to 
patrol the no-man's land due to the hartal.  The SLA's 
Ratnayake commented that thousands of people who cross the 
borders daily were unable to do so.  Meanwhile, according to 
press reports, a soldier attached to SLA intelligence who was 
reportedly attacked by LTTE cadres in Jaffna on November 26 
died in Colombo of his injuries. 
 
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Comment 
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8. (C)  The GSL's reiteration of its long-standing position 
that resumed negotiations with the Tigers must be based on 
both interim and permanent solutions to the conflict is not 
surprising.  Moreover, the GSL's renewed public commitment to 
the CFA is reassuring, especially in light of the JVP's 
recent provocative--if highly unlikely--statements 
threatening a return to armed insurgency if the GSL concedes 
to Tiger demands for the ISGA.  Given the conflicting signals 
from the GSL and JVP, the Tigers are likely to use the GSL 
statement as reinforcement for their familiar argument that 
the south does not have the consensus or will to come back to 
talks. 
 
 
LUNSTEAD