US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE3140

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003140 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/NCE FOR SILKWORTH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2014 
TAGS: AORC, PREL, TU, HR, RO, CY, BU, EUN 
SUBJECT: EU/TURKEY: DUTCH COMMENT ON DECISION DRAFT 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Daniel Russel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  On November 29 the Dutch circulated draft 
conclusions on Turkey to EU partners (subsequently leaked to 
the press) in advance of the December 17 Council meeting that 
includes strong, but predictable, language on accession 
(e-mailed to EUR/ERA and USEU).  Turkish officials in The 
Hague have indicated, both to the Dutch and to us, that they 
will likely accept the Council language as long as it 
contains a clear "yes" and a date for starting negotiations. 
The Dutch are watchful for any indication that negotiations 
on the date for Turkey could be used by Member States to get 
what they want on the other candidate countries, Romania, 
Croatia, and Bulgaria.  End Summary. 
 
DUTCH STRATEGY FOR GETTING TO "YES" ON TURKEY IS ON TRACK 
 
2.  (C)  Engineering a "yes" on December 17 was the essential 
act of the Dutch Presidency,  Pieter de Gooijer (MFA, 
Director European Integration) told DCM on the evening of 
November 30.  It was too early to relax, but that thus far 
the Turkish accession process was going exactly as he had 
hoped.  The Dutch circulated draft Council conclusions on 
November 29, after resolving an GONL internal dispute over 
whether to keep the draft secret.  They concluded that a last 
minute attempt by Heads of State to deal with previously 
unseen texts could precipitate a disaster worse than the 
negative reactions an early release might provoke.  De 
Gooijer said that he had just spent four hours November 29 
with EU DirGen Marnix Krop, PM Balkenende Advisor Rob 
Swartbol, and visiting Volkan Boskir (Turkish Deputy U/S for 
European Affairs) reviewing in detail the Presidency's draft 
Council conclusions on Turkey.  The Turks pushed back on 
multiple points but de Gooijer was finally left with the 
impression that they seemed prepared to live with all the 
conditions and caveats as long as they got a clean "yes" with 
a date.  Ambassador Ildem separately told the DCM the same 
evening that there was a lot that Turkey had not liked in the 
draft - particularly on Cyprus.  After a lengthy discussion 
of the Ankara Protocol, Ildem finally clarified that he felt 
Turkey would move on Cyprus (presumably by agreeing to the 
protocol) "at 1:00 a.m. on the morning of December 18th after 
we are sure of what we are getting."  He admitted that their 
other complaints about the text as it now stands "were not 
deal breakers." 
 
3.  (C)  De Gooijer categorically rejected the Turkish public 
claim that the circulated draft conclusions were just a 
"first stab" that bore little or no resemblance to what would 
ultimately come out of the Council meeting.  The Dutch hope 
no one will reopen the unbracketed parts of the draft, since 
they felt it could come entirely unraveled.  De Gooijer noted 
that the Heads of State and Government alone can resolve the 
bracketed portions on December 17, which contain four open 
decisions: the "yes," the date to start negotiation, the 
"process" (he did not elaborate), and the clarification that 
the goal of negotiations was full membership.  He said he had 
"a paragraph on each in his back pocket," but it remained for 
the Heads to work on them. 
 
4.  (C)  Finally, de Gooijer reported that a lower-level 
meeting among EU mission reps in Brussels on November 30 had 
gone quite smoothly and augured well for the COREPER meeting 
December 1.  (There was only one more COREPER and the 
December 13 GAERC before the Council, he noted.)  The main 
issues raised had to do with (a) whether to pair or delink 
the Bulgarian and Romanian candidacies (the French wanted to 
pair, he revealed), and (b) whether to give Croatia a date 
(as the Germans want) or make negotiations conditional on 
surrendering General Gotovina to the ICTY (as the UK wants) 
(reported septel). 
 
EFFECT ON THE TURKEY ISSUE OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR OTHER 
CANDIDATE COUNTRIES HARD TO PREDICT 
 
5.  (C)  Jochem Wiers (MFA European Integration Department 
and principal drafter on Turkey) told Poloff November 30 that 
the Dutch are beginning to "discern the outlines" of a 
negotiation strategy in which dates for Romania, Bulgaria, 
and Croatia are packaged in complex quid pro quo deal making 
in the late hours of December 17 (septel).  While he did not 
include Turkey in the calculation, he pointed out that in the 
end, the importance of the Turkey consensus would necessarily 
affect and be affected by discussions of the other three. 
Wiers revealed no knowledge of any deal brewing in Brussels 
involving Turkey and Cyprus, but he said it would help the 
Dutch now if Turkey could find a way to positively 
acknowledge Cyprus before December 17.  He pointed to 
Turkey's handling of Cyprus recognition issues at the signing 
of the Rome Treaty of Constitution as a model for December 
17.  Confirming what Ildem and de Gooijer had told the DCM, 
Wiers said the Dutch sense a readiness to be flexible at 
"high levels" in the Turkish government, but only "in 
extremis." 
 
6.  (C)  Looking ahead to the Dutch delegation to the closed 
Council negotiations, Wiers expects it will include PM 
Balkenende, joined by advisors Webke Kingma or Rob Swartbol, 
plus a note taker (three is the maximum for any Member 
State).  Pieter de Gooijer and a small number of other senior 
staff will be in a side room nearby. 
RUSSEL