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| Identifier: | 04VILNIUS1454 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04VILNIUS1454 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Vilnius |
| Created: | 2004-11-30 13:47:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV UK LH HT13 |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VILNIUS 001454 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/NB E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2014 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UK, LH, HT13 SUBJECT: UKRAINE: RUSSIANS REPORTEDLY BLAME U.S. FOR UNREST; ADAMKUS EXPECTS RETURN MISSION TO KIEV REF: VILNIUS 1450 Classified By: Ambassador Steve Mull. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary ------- 1. (C) Adamkus expects to return to Ukraine with Kwasniewski and Solana before December 3 to continue mediation efforts, according to a senior adviser. Kwasniewski predicted privately to Adamkus November 30 that Ukraine would likely turn into "another Georgia" within a few days. A November 26 conversation with Kuchma convinced the Lithuanians he would throw his support to whomever offers him a better "deal" in retirement. The Lithuanians strongly condemn Russian efforts to exacerbate separatist tensions in Ukraine and reported that Russian parliamentary speaker Boris Gryzlov pointedly told Ukrainian leaders and European mediators in their November 26 meeting that the U.S. is orchestrating street protests in Kiev. The Lithuanians strongly welcome high profile U.S. activism on Ukraine as an important impetus for a democratic outcome. But they worry about the EU ) Solana was poorly prepared, said Adamkus's adviser, and report worrying indications of an accommodation between Putin and key Europeans to safeguard Russian equities in Ukraine. Domestic political support for Lithuania's involvement in mediation efforts remains high, including now from the previously skeptical Prime Minister Brazauskas. End Summary Nov 26 Talks ------------ 2. (C) Ambassador called on Adamkus's chief foreign policy adviser Edminas Bagdonas (strictly protect) November 30 for a debrief of the Adamkus mission to Kiev with Kwasniewski and EU foreign policy chief Solana on November 26. Bagdonas said the principle achievements of the session were the agreements to foreswear violence and to form a small decisionmaking body comprised of Kuchma, Lytvyn, Yanukovych, Yushchenko, and some supporting staff to chart a political solution to the crisis. Bagdonas reported that Adamkus and he had a private meeting with Kuchma before a plenary session with the other international mediators. It was clear to Adamkus at that meeting, said Bagdonas, that Kuchma was already having doubts about the wisdom of continued support for Yanukovych, leading the Lithuanians to predict that Kuchma would ultimately support the candidate who offered him a better "deal" in retirement (presumably immunity from prosecution and protection of privileges, said Bagdonas). 3. (C) Russian Duma Speaker Gryzlov and Russian Ambassador Chernomyrdin had attempted to exert heavy pressure against compromise at the talks, said Bagdonas. Gryzlov said at the outset that Russia only recognizes one "legal" President ) Yanukovych ) and that the U.S. was responsible for secret efforts to stir up street protests in Kiev. He called on the group to band together to limit American influence on the process. Bagdonas said Adamkus and Kwasniewski had particularly harsh views of Russian and Yanukovych efforts to play the separatist card. They agreed it was a serious strategic blunder on their part that would only strengthen Yushchenko's prospects, as indicated in the reported resignation of the chief of the Central Election Committee in protest. 4. (C) Bagdonas frankly described Kwasniewski as the true motor of the mediation process. Showing off his fluent command in Russian, Bagdonas said that the Polish leader's pragmatic, energetic and problem-solving approach drove everyone to abandon rhetoric and focus on cooperation during the November 26 talks. Return to Kiev -------------- 5. (C) Bagdonas said Adamkus would join Kwasniewski and Solana on a return trip to Kiev before December 3. During the Ambassador's meeting with Bagdonas, Kwasniewski called Adamkus to discuss options, and the two planned to hold a conference call with Kuchma on the late afternoon of November 30 to coordinate a return trip. During the call, Kwasniewski told Adamkus he was concerned that the rising temperature of street protests would likely lead to "another Georgia" within a few days. Adamkus and Kwasniewski agreed to hold off announcing a return trip to Kiev until after conferring with Kuchma. Praise for U.S.; Doubts about EU -------------------------------- 6. (C) The high U.S. profile in rejecting results of the November 21 elections and repeated calls for a peaceful legal and political settlement had provided a huge impetus for the mediation process, Bagdonas said. U.S. statements, particularly from Secretary Powell, had shaken Kuchma's support of Yanukovych and gave Putin second thoughts about pressing too hard on the issue. 7. (C) Bagdonas shared deep concerns about Solana, whom he described as clearly unprepared to engage substantively in the mediation process, and for the EU in general. He said Kuchma had complained bitterly to Adamkus that Solana had never shown serious interest in Ukraine before ) "Why should I bother talking to him now?" Bagdonas quoted Kuchma. More worrying, said Bagdonas, are indications of Putin's success in winning quiet accommodation with Chirac, Schroeder, Berlusconi and possibly Blair, in protecting Russian equities in Ukraine in efforts to resolve the crisis. Lithuania encourages a continued high U.S. profile on the issue, Bagdonas said, as a means of keeping pressure on for a democratic outcome. Strong Support at Home ---------------------- 8. (U) Meanwhile, popular political support for Lithuania's mediation mission remains strong (reftel). Prime Minister Brazauskas, who had earlier scolded eager parliamentarians to avoid meddling in Ukrainian affairs, warmly praised the Adamkus initiative on November 30 as strongly in support of Lithuania's interests. He blamed his earlier grouchiness on annoyance with conservative parliamentarians who had argued in favor of using the Ukraine crisis to mount greater pressure on Russia. MULL
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