US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA2183

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KABILA NOV 29: OTHER TRANSITION SUJBECTS

Identifier: 04KINSHASA2183
Wikileaks: View 04KINSHASA2183 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kinshasa
Created: 2004-11-30 13:35:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: ECON PGOV PINR PREL KCOR CG
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 002183 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2014 
TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PINR, PREL, KCOR, CG 
SUBJECT: KABILA NOV 29: OTHER TRANSITION SUJBECTS 
 
REF: A) KINSHASA 2178 B) KINSHASA 2168) 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROGER MEECE.  REASON 1.4 (b/d) 
 
1. (C) President Kabila met November 29 with the Ambassadors 
from UNSC Perm 5 countries, Belgium, South Africa, Angola, 
and Nigeria, plus UN SRSG Bill Swing primarily to discuss the 
situation in eastern DRC, as reported ref A.  After the 
discussion, Kabila also noted current debates  regarding 
designation of executives to run key state-owned companies, 
and leadership of security services, including the 
immigration service, (DGM) and the DRC National Intelligence 
Agency (ANR).  In both cases, there are major political 
fights underway among the parties and groups that form the 
transitional government. 
 
2. (C) Starting with the issue of the state companies, Kabila 
noted that DRC Vice President (and Congolese Liberation 
Movement, MLC,  President) Jean Pierre Bemba had written the 
International Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT) 
asking for CIAT intervention to resolve the political impasse 
over allocation of the state companies' senior positions. 
The CIAT last week issued a communique on the subject (ref 
B), which declined to recommend specific appointments but did 
emphasize principles of professional, apolitical management; 
the need for full transparency; and avoiding use of the 
companies for campaign or other political purposes. 
Smiling, Kabila asked if the communiqu constituted the 
CIAT,s official response to Bemba,s letter, or if something 
more would be forthcoming.  SRSG Swing, speaking on behalf of 
the Ambassadors present, (all of whom are CIAT members), 
affirmed that the communique constituted CIAT,s answer. 
Kabila did not comment further, although Presidency Chief of 
Staff Boshab recommended that, for form,s sake, a letter be 
sent to Bemba referencing the communique to answer formally 
Bemba,s letter.  The CIAT members present agreed. 
 
3. (C)  Kabila also asked if the CIAT had been briefed 
regarding another impasse over security services, and the 
current "government" (comment: meaning Presidency) position. 
Presidency Special Advisor Kaputo intervened that such a 
briefing had not been provided, and proceeded to spell out 
Presidency thinking.  According to Kaputo, Bemba,s MLC and 
the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma) both insist 
that they appoint a new director for Congo,s immigration 
service (DGM).  Both are willing to have the "ex-government" 
(i.e., Kabila,s PPRD party) appoint the ANR director, but 
neither will budge regarding the DGM.  Kaputo said that, in 
an attempt to break the logjam, the Presidency has proposed 
that none of the three former principal belligerents (MLC, 
RCD-Goma, ex-government) appoint directors for either agency. 
 Instead, the "civil society" component of the government 
would appoint the ANR director, and the "political 
opposition" component would appoint the DGM head.  Expanding, 
Kaputo said RCD-Goma would appoint a deputy to the ANR 
director, and the MLC would assign one to the DGM.  The 
"ex-government" would assign deputies to both.  Kaputo 
additionally outlined allocation and control of various 
internal office director positions, e.g., RCD-Goma in charge 
of "External" services, Mai Mai to get the "Administration" 
branch, etc.  Kaputo said that all parties agree to the 
formula, with the notable exceptions of the MLC and RCD-Goma, 
who both continue to insist that they appoint the DGM 
director. 
 
4. (C) Kabila concluded the meeting by reiterating his 
readiness for the "Espace Presidentiel" (the President and 
four Vice Presidents) to meet again with the CIAT as soon as 
possible.  He noted, however, that two Vice Presidents, 
Ruberwa and Z,Ahidi Ngoma, are not currently in Kinshasa. 
 
5. (C) Comment: The Presidency is probably largely satisfied 
with the CIAT communique, as it can be interpreted as siding 
with the basic Presidency position asserting that state 
companies are not subject to the same politically-based 
division as other transition institutions.  In fact, the Sun 
City Accord is somewhat ambiguous, explicitly listing 
criteria such as integrity and morality for these positions, 
but leaving ambiguous the formula to be used to fill the 
jobs.  The current fight is really largely over an effort by 
the various parties to tap into the companies as cash cows 
for individual and party activities.   The immigration and 
security services are a different issue.  Whatever the 
outcome, we suspect the ANR stands to lose further ground as 
an influential body for the remainder of the transition 
period.  The fight over the DGM position probably boils down 
to money.  RCD-Goma needs access to the potential revenue 
flow that the immigration service holds, and undoubtedly the 
MLC would like to control that revenue source itself. 
RCD-Goma might also secondarily want to try to augment its 
influence over eastern border controls, although in fact the 
ANR now has a better national infrastructure and staffing at 
border points than does the DGM.  End comment. 
MEECE 

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