US embassy cable - 04GUATEMALA2985

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GUATEMALA 002985 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, KCRM, SNAR, ASEC, GT 
SUBJECT: UN OFFICIAL'S VISIT TO GUATEMALA SPURS ACTION ON 
CICIACS AND OHCHR 
 
REF: (A) GUATEMALA 2868 (B) GUATEMALA 2840 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Hamilton for reasons 1.5 (b) & (d) 
 
1. (U) Summary:  The Government of Guatemala sent UN SYG Kofi 
Annan a letter reaffirming its commitment to CICIACS and 
outlining interim measures it is taking to pave the way for 
CICIACS.  The letter was prompted by the visit to Guatemala 
of UN U/S for Political Affairs Kieran Prendergast to 
Guatemala.  The "Human Rights Coalition Against Clandestine 
Structures" issued a press release criticizing the GOG's 
letter to Annan and, more broadly, the GOG's failure to 
dismantle organized crime.  On a separate but related matter, 
GOG officials have told the Embassy they are on the verge of 
reaching an agreement with the UN High Commissioner on Human 
Rights to open an office in Guatemala.  End summary. 
 
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GOG LETTER TO THE UN 
-------------------- 
 
2. (U) Acting President Eduardo Stein's November 19 letter to 
UN SYG Kofi Annan reaffirmed the GOG's commitment to CICIACS 
without identifying a strategy for overcoming congressional 
and judicial opposition to elements of the CICIACS concept. 
As a "supplement" to the GOG's efforts to install CICIACS, 
Stein's letter said the GOG would establish a Special 
Prosecutor to combat organized crime and would ask the UN to 
provide international experts to help staff the office.  In 
the letter, the GOG also committed to push for congressional 
approval of new laws against organized crime, including a 
witness protection law and the establishment of a National 
Forensic Institute, and made reference to GOG efforts to 
obtain wiretapping authority.  (Embassy notes that a few days 
earlier, visiting German FM Joschka Fischer announced the FRG 
would provide some funding for the National Forensic 
Institute.)  The letter said the GOG would form a High Level 
Commission with representatives from the Vice Presidency, the 
Ministry of Interior, the MFA, and the President Human Rights 
Commission, the Congress, the Human Rights Ombudsman, the 
Courts and the Prosecutor's Office to coordinate GOG efforts 
against organized crime. 
 
3. (U) The Human Rights Coalition Against Clandestine 
Structures (HRCACS) issued a November 23 press release 
criticizing Stein's letter to Annan as "rhetorical 
subterfuge" to mask the GOG's lack of commitment.  HRCACS 
pointed out that Guatemala already had a number of Special 
Prosecutors who had proven ineffective in tackling problems 
such as money laundering, narcotrafficking, corruption, and 
attacks against labor leaders, journalists and human rights 
activists.  Some of the special prosecutors had international 
experts working with them to no avail.  The communique also 
questioned the GOG's commitment (conveyed in Stein's letter) 
to increase funding for police, prosecutors and the courts, 
noting that the GOG,'s recently approved 2005 budget 
continued a downward trend for the criminal justice system. 
HRCACS signatories included prominent NGOs such as the Myrna 
Mack Foundation, the Rigoberta Menchu Foundation, CALDH, GAM 
and ODHAG. 
 
4. (SBU) On a separate but related matter, GOG officials have 
told the Embassy they are on the verge of reaching a new 
agreement with the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, 
which would presumably meet congressional concerns, in order 
to open an office in Guatemala.  MFA U/S Marta Altolaguirre 
made this point to several embassy officers in the last week 
as did Presidential Human Rights Commissioner Frank LaRue. 
------------------- 
PRENDERGAST'S VISIT 
------------------- 
 
5. (C) The GOG's latest efforts on CICIACS and the OHCHR 
appear to have been prompted by the November 15 visit to 
Guatemala of UN U/S for Political Affairs Kieran Prendergast. 
 Prendergast told the Ambassador that he had met with VP 
Stein, who had expressed frustration that the MFA had not yet 
reached an agreement with the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights for the opening of an OHCHR office in Guatemala. 
Stein thought the remaining differences were a matter that 
"could be resolved in ten minutes."  Stein claimed to have 
given Guatemala's new permrep to the UN, Ambassador Jorge 
Skinner-Klee, a deadline of November 17 to strike a deal with 
Geneva, at which point he would take over the OHCHR 
negotiation. 
 
6. (C) Prendergast noted that Skinner-Klee had recently paid 
him an introductory call, during which Skinner-Klee's opening 
gambit had been to feign an air of grievance for having been 
assigned to replace the popular and highly respected Gert 
Rosenthal as Guatemala's permrep to the UN.  Skiner-Klee then 
segued into "preemptive truculence," asserting that his 
predecessor had had an easy job at a time when Guatemala 
enjoyed smooth relations with the UN, whereas Skinner-Klee 
expected he would have to deal with "problems." 
7. (C) Prendergast said he was aware that Skinner-Klee was a 
cousin of Antonio Arenales-Forno, the leading congressional 
critic of the OHCHR and CICIACS initiatives, and thought that 
Skinner-Klee shared the same nationalist objections to UN 
"intrusion" into Guatemalan affairs. 
 
8. (C) The Ambassador noted that FM Briz at a lunch the 
previous week had said the GOG was not opposed to having the 
OHCHR office report on Guatemala as long as it did not become 
the High Commissioner's report.  Prendergast said he 
perceived some flexibility on the High Commissioner's part, 
too.  But he also noted that he had no mandate from Geneva to 
negotiate on behalf of the High Commissioner and therefore 
had not been fully briefed on the issue.  Prendergast advisor 
Martha Doggett said the High Commissioner required in the 
agreement a written reference to the office's mandate to 
observe and report on Guatemala. 
 
9. (C) Prendergast said both Stein and Rosenthal had 
recommended that the OHCHR office should be prioritized ahead 
of CICIACS, since CICIACS was a tougher challenge. 
Prendergast indicated he agreed with pursuing them in that 
order.  In response to the Ambassador's question, he said it 
was not clear to him who had the GOG's lead for developing a 
new CICIACS proposal.  Doggett noted that Guatemalan Attorney 
General Florido had called on Prendergast's office in New 
York to flog his own request for technical assistance and 
funding but did not appear well-versed on CICIACS. 
 
10. (C) In response to questions by Prendergast, the 
Ambassador noted that the Berger administration had 
demonstrated earlier in the year its ability to push 
legislation through the Congress with its all-consuming 
effort on the tax package.  The Ambassador also noted that a 
CICIACS-type unit within the Public Ministry might still be 
able to achieve some of its original objectives even without 
the autonomy envisioned under the proposal that was shot down 
by the Constitutional Court. 
 
11. (C) On November 16, Frank LaRue, head of the President's 
Commission on Human Rights (COPREDEH), told the Ambassador 
that VP Stein had convened a working group about CICIACS on 
November 13.  LaRue, who participated in the meetings, said 
that the group had developed a strategy that entailed asking 
the UN to designate a Special Envoy to continue negotiating 
CICIACS with the GOG, lobbying Congress anew in January 2006, 
and seeking another judicial opinion once a new 
Constitutional Court is seated in April 2006.  In the 
interim, the GOG would request UN assistance for Guatemalan 
prosecutors to investigate organized crime and clandestine 
groups. 
 
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COMMENT 
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12. (C) As outlined above, the GOG wants its Special 
Prosecutor proposal  to be seen as complementary to its 
efforts to establish CICIACS.  The HRCACS's concern is that 
the Special Prosecutor, once in place, will become an 
inadequate substitute for CICIACS, not a supplement.  The 
original proposal for CICIACS envisioned an unprecedented 
level of intrusiveness and autonomy for international 
investigators to set up shop in Guatemala.  Optimism for 
CICIACS's success hinged on the hope that the independence of 
its international staff would keep Guatemala's "hidden 
powers" from obstructing investigations.  While the new 
Special Prosecutor may be a far cry from what was originally 
envisioned under the daring CICIACS proposal, it is the most 
feasible interim measure available to the GOG.  The HRCACS's 
sharp criticism of Stein's letter to Annan is probably the 
result of the GOG's failure to consult with the NGOs which 
had campaigned for the creation of CICIACS.  Reaching out to 
these NGOs, however, probably would not have netted the GOG 
any brilliant new strategy.  In its communique, HRCACS does 
not offer any alternatives that get around the Constitutional 
Court's objections to CICIACS.  But a more inclusive approach 
might have kept the HRCACS members inside the tent. 
HAMILTON