US embassy cable - 04SANAA2972

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 002972 
 
SIPDIS 
 
MEPI PLEASE PASS TO HANS WECHSEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2014 
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, KMPI, YM, DEMOCRATIC REFORM 
SUBJECT: IS A KHAIWANI RELEASE IMPENDING? 
 
REF: A. SANAA 02498 
     B. SANAA 02863 
     C. SANAA 02790 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas Krajeski for reasons 1.4 (b. and d.) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  In separate discussions on 11/21 with a 
member of the as-Shura Council and a close Presidential 
advisor, Ambassador was told "in strictest confidence" that 
Saleh has decided to release imprisoned As-Shura opposition 
newspaper editor-in-chief, Abdulkarim Al-Khaiwani "very 
soon."  End Summary. 
 
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Is a release in the offing? 
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2. (C) On 11/21 a Shura Council member and an advisor to 
President Saleh told Ambassador that although the conviction 
of Khaiwani was legal, Saleh intends to release him due to 
negative international attention and fear that "Yemen's 
reputation and Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) grade would 
suffer."  Khaiwani has been imprisoned since 9/25 when he was 
convicted for several violations of the Yemeni Press Law 
including, "supporting al-Houthi in his rebellion," 
"publishing reports damaging to the public interests," and 
"public humiliation of the President" (ref A).  Both 
interlocutors expressed concern over the harm that Khaiwani's 
case was causing, noting the possible negative effect on 
Yemen's MCA scorecard.  They pointed out that Freedom 
House,s condemnation of the arrest and detention of Khaiwani 
was particularly alarming to the ROYG. 
 
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The straw that broke the camel,s back 
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3. (C) The advisor informed Ambassador that the 
editor-in-chief was arrested because of a specific comment in 
one of his newspaper's op-ed pieces that stated "any 
president who arises from the common people has no 
legitimacy."  Interlocutors furthered that Khaiwani's 
"royalist, Hashimite leanings" had been tolerated up to that 
point, but that Saleh considered the "no legitimacy" comment 
as going too far.  (Note: Although post has closely followed 
articles in Khaiwni's paper, we are unable to find this 
particular quote in print.  End note). 
 
4. (C) Ambassador informed interlocutors that the USG was 
increasingly concerned about reports of mistreatment and 
beatings of Khaiwani in prison, (ref B) and that speaking out 
publicly would have to be the next step (ref C).  Both noted 
that Khaiwani would not be exonerated or pardoned but 
released on parole. 
 
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MOI promises to ease Khaiwani,s condition 
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5. (C)  Minister of Interior al-Alimi told Journalists at an 
iftar dinner on 11/09 that he would follow up on the case, 
and would assure that Khaiwani,s conditions of incarceration 
would be eased.  Nevertheless, two female journalists who 
disguised themselves as relatives in order to visit him in 
prison, reported, after Alimi's promise, that Khaiwani,s 
condition continues to deteriorate and that he is in pain 
from his last beating (ref B). (Note: There is a current ban 
on journalists visiting Khaiwani. End note). 
 
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Comment 
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6. (C) It is unclear whether the actual comment referred to 
by these two closely connected officials was indeed the red 
line that caused Saleh to call for Khaiwani,s arrest; it was 
not cited in the numerous charges against him (ref A).  His 
arrest and continued imprisonment demonstrates that, despite 
Saleh's promises earlier this year to end imprisonment of 
journalists, the President has no intention to cease using 
the justice system against those whom he feels are attacking 
him.  On the positive side, interlocutors expressed concern 
about MCA funding in particular, indicating that the program 
does have the ability to affect the thinking of decision 
makers.  End Comment. 
KRAJESKI