US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1920

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 001920 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS 
NSC FOR DORMANDY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  LTTE HEROES' DAY ADDRESS SOFTER THAN 
EXPECTED 
 
REF: A. UNCLASS EMAIL TO SA/INS 11/29/2004 
 
     B. COLOMBO 1897 
     C. COLOMBO 1913 
 
Classified By: James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of Mission.  1.4 (b,d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  On November 27, Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) leader Velupillai Prabhakaran delivered his 16th 
annual "Heroes' Day" address from an undisclosed location in 
LTTE-controlled territory in Sri Lanka.  In the speech, 
Prabhakaran criticized Sinhalese political parties and the 
President for impeding the peace process by insisting on 
peace talks based on a permanent solution to the 
conflict--and not on the interim solution the LTTE is 
demanding.  He also asked all southern parties to publicly 
declare their position on "the Tamil national question." 
Expressing his impatience with the current pace of the peace 
process, the Tiger leader called on the Government of Sri 
Lanka (GSL) to return to talks based on the LTTE's Interim 
Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) or the Tigers will "...have 
no alternative other than to advance the freedom struggle of 
(their) nation."  Sources in the diplomatic community said 
they expected a much "sharper tone," and did not find the 
speech particularly worrisome.  While some press reports 
indicated that the GSL would reply to the LTTE speech on 
November 29, it has not released a statement-- possibly 
because it was busy cajoling coalition partner Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) not to make its own independent 
statement.  Prabhakaran's annual policy speech fell short of 
the sabre-rattling rant many feared it might have been, given 
the killings and hartals which racked the north and east in 
the week preceding the speech.  That said, the message did 
not sound the conciliatory note many had been hoping for. 
The comparative lack of vitriol aimed by Prabhakaran at 
President Kumaratunga offers the one slightly encouraging 
hint of a possible opening, however narrow, back to the 
negotiating table.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
Prabhakaran's Annual Address 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (U)  On November 27, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) leader Velupillai Prabhakaran delivered his 16th 
annual "Heroes' Day" address from an undisclosed location in 
LTTE-controlled territory in Sri Lanka.  Clad in camouflage 
and flanked by the LTTE flag and a map of "Eelam" (portions 
of Sri Lanka the LTTE considers the Tamil homeland), 
Prabhakaran delivered what many people in Sri Lanka consider 
the most important LTTE policy address of the year.  The 
speech received widespread print media publicity, and 
excerpts were shown on government- and privately-owned 
television stations on November 28. 
 
3.  (U)  In the speech (text sent to SA/INS via unclass 
email), Prabhakaran criticized Sinhalese political parties 
and the President for impeding the peace process by insisting 
on peace talks based on a permanent solution to the 
conflict--and not on the interim solution the LTTE favors. 
He also asked all "southern" parties to publicly declare 
their position on "the Tamil national question," arguing that 
unless these parties have consensus in their approach to the 
peace process, there is no point in talking about a permanent 
solution.  The Tiger leader expressed his impatience with the 
current pace of the peace process and called on the 
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) to return to talks based on the 
LTTE's Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) or the Tigers 
will "...have no alternative other than to advance the 
freedom struggle of (their) nation." 
 
4.  (U) Highlights of the speech follow: 
 
-- Prabhakaran 's speech provided an LTTE-slanted recap of 
selected failures of the nearly three-year old cease-fire 
agreement (CFA) between the GSL and the LTTE.  The Tiger 
leader recalled the six rounds of peace talks in 2003 which 
"turned out to be futile," rehabilitation-focused 
sub-committees which he described as "non-functional," and 
the GSL's participation in the February 2003 donor's 
conference in Washington, which he claimed undermined the 
LTTE's "status as equal partners in the peace process." 
Prabhakaran also noted President Chandrika Kumaratunga's 
actions to take over several ministries in November 2003 days 
after the  LTTE released its proposed ISGA proposal as 
"punitive action that plunged the southern polity into a 
crisis." 
 
-- Prabhakaran criticized southern political parties, but 
especially Kumaratunga's coalition partner Marxist Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).  The Tiger leader described the 
April 2004 parliamentary election as paving the way "for the 
hegemonic dominance of Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinistic forces 
in the southern political arena."  Prabhakaran lambasted the 
JVP as "an anti-Tamil political party steeped in a muddled 
ideology of racism, religious fanaticism and orthodox 
communism," and criticized the President's United People's 
Freedom Party (UPFA) coalition as "constituted by an unholy 
alliance of incompatible political parties articulating 
antagonistic and mutually contradictory views and policies on 
the Tamil national question."   The Tiger leader asserted, 
"There is no clear, coherent policy orientation, or a 
consensus approach within the political parties of the 
coalition government.  Since she has aligned herself with 
political parties drenched in anti-Tamil racism, militarism, 
and Sinhala-Buddhist hegemonies, the President cannot advance 
the peace process based on a coherent, consistent strategy 
and policy." 
 
-- Prabhakaran cited the humanitarian needs of the Tamil 
people as justification for peace talks based on the ISGA. 
Surprisingly, he added, "If some elements of our proposal are 
deemed problematic or controversial, these issues can be 
resolved through discussions at the negotiating table." 
 
-- Prabhakaran spoke about the need for an interim 
arrangement before a permanent one.  He noted that once "an 
interim administrative authority is institutionalized and 
becomes functional, we are prepared to engage in negotiations 
for a permanent settlement..."  He criticized President 
Kumaratunga's invitation to talks based on a  permanent 
solution, citing her need to satisfy the JVP, her desire to 
impress the international community with her commitment to 
peace, and her desire to prolong peace negotiations 
indefinitely "by opting to talk on a most intractable and 
complex issue."  Prabhakaran charged, "Whatever the real 
reason, we can clearly and confidently say one thing; it is 
apparent from the inconsistent and contradictory statements 
made by President Kumaratunga that her government is not 
going to offer the Tamil people either an interim 
administration or a permanent solution." 
 
--  Prabhakaran summarized the long-standing arguments for 
the Tamil people's right to secede, claiming that, "The 
Sinhala political organizations and their leadership, which 
are deeply buried in the mud of Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism, 
will never be able to comprehend the political aspirations of 
the people of Tamil Eelam...  None... (are) prepared to 
accept the northeastern region as the historical homeland of 
the Tamil-speaking people, that the Tamils constitute 
themselves as a distinct nationalist and that they are 
entitled to  the right to self-determination, including the 
right to secede." 
 
-- He called on other political parties (including the 
constituent parties of the UPFA and the opposition United 
National Party (UNP)),  "... to declare publicly their 
official policy on the fundamentals of the Tamil national 
question, particularly on the core demands of the Tamils 
concerning homeland, nationality and the right to 
self-determination."  The Tiger chief asserted that unless 
Sinhalese political parties have a "clear, coherent policy, a 
proper insight and a consensus approach towards the Tamil 
national question, there is no meaning in engaging in talks 
about a permanent solution," and asserted that the 
President's government is deliberately impeding the peace 
efforts by insisting that talks should be based on a 
permanent settlement. 
 
-- He called on the GSL to return to talks based on the 
LTTE's ISGA, warning, "There are borderlines to patience and 
expectations.  We have now reached the borderline... We urge 
the government to resume the peace negotiations without 
conditions, based on our proposal on an Interim 
Self-Governing Authority.  If the Government of Sri Lanka 
rejects our urgent appeal and adopts delaying tactics, 
perpetuating the suffering of our people, we have no 
alternative other than to advance the freedom struggle of our 
nation." 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
The Other Heroes' Day - Karuna and Balasingham 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
5.  (C) In a speech posted to his website Neruppu, and 
translated by the Asian Tribune (a on-line newspaper based in 
Bangkok, the provenance of which is murky), breakaway LTTE 
eastern leader Karuna, now leader of the TamilEela Makkal 
Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP or People's Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam) delivered a rival Heroes' Day speech on November 
27, about hour and a half before Prabhakaran delivered his. 
Karuna demanded the GSL solve its problems with the Tamil 
people within two years, paid homage to LTTE martyrs, and 
criticized Prabhakaran for political killings and exploiting 
the Tamil people.  In his speech, Karuna asked, "Does one 
expect to have a mass killer as the leader of Tamil Eelam? 
Are we not ashamed of such a person?"  Karuna also asserted 
that given its close cultural and geographic proximity to Sri 
Lanka, India, rather than Norway, should facilitate the peace 
process.  Kethesh Loganathan, a Director at the Centre for 
Policy Alternatives, opined that Karuna is trying to make his 
presence felt to Sri Lankan and diaspora Tamils, as well as 
to irritate Prabhakaran.  Not surprisingly, Sinhala and 
English media carried reports of Karuna's speech, but Tamil 
media ignored it. 
 
6.  (C)  Meanwhile, a pro-LTTE Tamil daily reported that LTTE 
political advisor Anton Balasingham had also given a Heroes' 
Day speech in London, which stated that Prabhakaran is ready 
for war and that the President must decide if she wants war 
or peace.  Balasingham also noted that the peace process 
cannot be allowed to "drag on forever."  Indian DCM Mohan 
Kumar told DCM that Balasingham's speeches historically are 
often tougher than Prabhakaran's, since his job, inter alia, 
is to keep the Tamil diaspora stirred up and in a 
money-giving mood.  Kumar also opined that Balasingham has 
internal problems within the LTTE and thus needs to make 
clear he is still a firebrand. 
 
------------------------ 
Donor Co-Chairs Reaction 
------------------------ 
 
7.  (C)  At a November 29 co-chairs meeting called by 
Japanese Ambassador Suda to discuss the growing JVP-led 
campaign against the Norwegians and the SLMM (septel), 
Norwegian Ambassador Bratskaar said he saw "positives and 
negatives" in the LTTE leader's speech.  The language on 
"advancing the freedom struggle" was cause for concern but he 
thought it significant that the sentence had contained no 
timeframe or ultimatum.  Bratskaar said he found quite 
encouraging Prabhakaran's stated willingness to discuss ISGA 
differences with the GSL although he had noted on the 
negative side of the balance sheet that there had been no 
reference to "internal" or "external" self-determination 
(internal self-determination is the longstanding LTTE 
codeword for federalism).  Bratskaar commented that, in light 
of last week's provocations by the LTTE (flag raisings, etc.) 
and the Sri Lankan Army's clumsy responses, he had expected a 
"much sharper" speech. 
 
8.  (C) The key element, Bratskaar concluded, is 
Prabhakaran's repeated references to the spoiler role being 
played by the JVP which prevents, in the LTTE view, any 
serious "Southern" effort to get back to the peace table. 
"The LTTE never likes to have the ball in its court and JVP 
behavior and rhetoric gives them the perfect excuse to lob 
the ball back to the government."  Bratskaar noted that 
Norwegian peace envoy Eric Solheim will see LTTE luminary 
Anton Balasingham in London December 1 and will seek 
clarification on both Prabhakaran's speech and Balasingham's 
speech in London.  Bratskaar said Solheim will then return to 
Sri Lanka December 11.  His agenda and program have yet to be 
determined and will depend on events between now and then. 
An "additional visit before Christmas" had been in the cards 
all along, Bratskaar said.  Bratskaar will not be present for 
Solheim's visit; he will be attending an SLMM organizational 
meeting in Copenhagen. 
 
--------------- 
Indian Reaction 
--------------- 
 
9.  (C)  Indian DCM Mohan Kumar told DCM November 29 that he 
had not found Prabhakaran's speech particularly worrisome. 
He described it as "hard line in substance" with no 
concessions to the GSL.  But Prabhakaran's tone, Kumar 
observed, had been almost "apologetic and defensive" in an 
attempt to "convince the international community that the 
LTTE is not the intransigent party."  Kumar said he did not 
regard Prabhakaran's comments about "advancing the freedom 
struggle" in the absence of a return to the peace table as a 
threat to return to war.  Rather, he viewed them as "largely 
for domestic Tamil consumption" and less belligerent than 
previous speeches, concluding, "This was not war rhetoric." 
Kumar also said he had found significant that there had been 
"no  mention of Karuna or Oslo," nor had Prabhakaran trotted 
out his familiar language about how a solution in Sri Lanka 
could not be "dictated" by the international community. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Softer for the International Community? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
10.  (C)  Kethesh Loganathan, a Director at the Centre for 
Policy Alternatives, told poloff that the speech was likely 
more subdued for the benefit of the international community. 
He noted that Prabhakaran did not suggest a deadline or 
ultimatum and indicated that comments on the LTTE's ISGA 
proposal would be welcome.  Nonetheless, he commented that 
the speech still had a very serious tone. Loganathan 
speculated that Karuna's absence from Prabhakaran's speech 
signaled that the LTTE was indeed having problems with the 
breakaway leader, and that the LTTE did not want to show 
weakness by mentioning Karuna.  Loganathan surmised that 
while the LTTE had initially demanded the GSL hand over 
Karuna as a condition of returning to talks, the Tigers have 
now changed tack and want to return to talks as soon as 
possible so that they can neutralize any GSL support for 
Karuna in the negotiating process. 
 
------------ 
GSL Reaction? 
------------ 
 
11.  (C)  While some press reports indicated that the GSL 
would reply to the LTTE speech on November 29, it has not 
released a statement-- possibly because it was busy cajoling 
the JVP not to make its own independent statement.  Eric 
Fernando,  Director General of the Policy Research and 
Information Unit of the Presidential Secretariat, told poloff 
that the President was trying to rein in the JVP to avoid 
complicating the situation further.  Sources at the JVP told 
political FSN that the JVP had decided not to issue a 
statement, because it would be "acknowledging the insults to 
the Sinhala people." 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
12.  (C)   Prabhakaran's annual policy speech was not the 
sabre-rattling rant suggested by the killings and hartals 
which racked the north and east in the week preceding the 
speech (see Reftels B and C).  At the same time, while the 
Tiger leader's annual policy address was more subdued than 
expected, it was not completely conciliatory.  The litany of 
complaints against the GSL and southern political parties was 
familiar, but the failure to mention Karuna, ostensibly the 
biggest provocation the LTTE has faced, was surprising.  The 
softer tone of the speech may be the result of recent visits 
to the Wanni by Balasingham and Norwegian Foreign Minister 
Petersen, as well as the Tiger delegation's October visit to 
Europe, in which a more international perspective was on 
offer.  While Prabhakaran was hard on the JVP, he was less 
vitriolic toward the President than usual, perhaps to offer 
her some space to forge a way back to the peace table. 
 
 
 
LUNSTEAD