US embassy cable - 04TAIPEI3779

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 003779 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, TW 
SUBJECT: LY ELECTION AT THE TWO-WEEK MARK 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 03771 
 
     B. TAIPEI 03340 
     C. TAIPEI 02662 
     D. TAIPEI 03294 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: The campaign for the December 11 Legislative 
Yuan (LY) election is entering its final phase with neither 
camp assured a majority of seats.  On balance, campaign 
officials and observers project that the Pan-Green will win a 
plurality, leaving it within reach of a majority with the 
help of non-partisans.  President Chen Shui-bian has 
dominated the campaign agenda, and his Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) is running a tightly coordinated campaign.  In 
contrast, Pan-Blue candidates are running individualized 
campaigns, with many downplaying their partisan affiliations. 
 The Kuomintang (KMT), which took a cautious nomination 
approach, will likely roughly retain its current seats, but 
its junior partner, the People First Party (PFP), is set to 
lose between 16-21 of its current 46 seats.  Both sides have 
employed sharply negative themes in order to mobilize core 
supporters, but DPP officials say they will attempt a more 
positive appeal in the final weeks of the campaign in order 
to win over centrist voters.  End Summary. 
 
Some Preliminary Predictions 
---------------------------- 
 
2. (C) It is still too early to make solid predictions about 
the results of Taiwan's Legislative Yuan (LY) election 
scheduled for December 11.  All major polls indicate that 
neither side has more than 50 percent of the electorate's 
vote, and differences in support rates for most candidates in 
each electoral district are well within the margin of error. 
Furthermore, polls in Taiwan are notoriously unreliable (Ref 
A) so predicting election outcomes is more art than science. 
Analysts are undaunted, however, and by far the most common 
assessment is that the Pan-Green will win several more seats 
than the Pan-Blue, but neither side will come away with an 
outright majority, so the balance will be held by 
independents.  The second most likely outcome, according to 
the majority of observers, is that the Pan-Green will win a 
very slim majority.  With the exception of the Pan-Blue 
public relations team, however, no commentators or political 
operators AIT has met predict the Pan-Blue will be able to 
hold onto its majority. 
 
3. (C) Turnout for the LY election is expected to be 
significantly lower than the 80 percent seen in the March 
presidential election, some say due to "election fatigue". 
Most observers expect turnout to be in the mid-60 percent 
range at best, a figure consistent with historical rates for 
LY elections (66 percent of eligible voters voted in the 
2001, for example).  Academia Sinica election researcher Hsu 
Yung-ming noted that this would mean 2.5 million voters who 
came out to the polls in March will stay home this December. 
With a margin of victory for the multiple seats in many 
districts of fewer than 1000 votes each, he said, all parties 
are therefore scrambling to mobilize their core supporters. 
However, Steve Hsieh (Hsiang-chuan) of the National Policy 
Foundation, a KMT think-tank, suggested that the Pan-Blue was 
at a decided disadvantage this election because as many as 1 
million embittered Pan-Blue supporters might have emigrated 
to Shanghai, among other places, after Chen Shui-bian's 
victory in the March presidential elections.  Taipei 
University professor Chiang Min-chin cited the same estimate 
from a weekly news magazine, and added that unlike Pan-Blue 
voters, who often have connections in the US, Canada and 
Mainland China, Pan-Green voters generally have no place to 
go, so their strength in Taiwan is only growing.  (Comment: 
Pan-Blue officials frequently make this claim, but AIT has 
not seen any concrete, or even anecdotal, evidence to support 
it.  End Comment.) 
 
Creating a Sense of "Crisis" 
---------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Both sides seem to have decided that the best way of 
spurring apathetic voters into action is by manufacturing a 
sense of "crisis" for their constituents, primarily by 
ratcheting up the rhetoric and mounting vicious and negative 
attacks on their opponents.  The danger that such tactics 
would alienate moderate voters may be partly mitigated by the 
fact that such voters are among those least likely to turn 
out in December.  Both camps, for example, have suggested 
that a victory for the other side would spell an end to 
Taiwanese democracy.  The Pan-Blue claims that its control of 
the LY is the only thing standing in the way of a Chen 
Shui-bian dictatorship and accuse him of wielding 
undemocratic control over the press and the judiciary.  The 
PFP's James Soong suggested that "a Pan-Green majority will 
mean war with China."  KMT Chairman Lien Chan has repeatedly 
demanded that the DPP organize a referendum on independence 
to coincide with the December 11 election.  KMT Culture and 
Publicity Department Deputy Director Chen Yu-mei told AIT 
that Lien's statements were meant to force the president to 
take an extreme position that would alienate centrist voters. 
 However, she bemoaned that the president easily side-stepped 
the attack and within 24 hours was back in control of the 
campaign agenda.  The Pan-Blue's campaign agenda does not 
appear to be filtering down to the grass-roots level, where 
many candidates, especially those from outside Taipei, are 
actively downplaying their partisan affiliations. 
 
CSB v. KMT 
---------- 
 
5. (C) While Chen has tacked to the pro-independence extreme 
on several occasions during the campaign, these have been 
mostly in response to statements by former President Lee 
Teng-hui rather than Lien Chan.  The president's main focus, 
however, has been assailing the KMT for its party assets, its 
use of the national emblem for its party seal, and 
allegations that the Pan-Blue appealed to KMT loyalists in 
the Taiwan military to attempt a "soft coup" after the March 
20 presidential election.  National Security Council (NSC) 
Secretary General (and veteran campaign strategist) Chiou 
 
SIPDIS 
I-jen told AIT that these attacks are part of a calculated 
effort to blame the island's woes on the KMT's inability to 
disentangle itself from government.  Chiou said the DPP is 
satisfied that the negative campaign push has succeeded in 
energizing the DPP base.  Chiou said that in the final two 
weeks of the election, President Chen will shift to a more 
positive, substantive approach tailored to win over centrist 
voters.  Political commentator Yang Hsien-hong assessed that 
Chen's move to the center would open up space for the Taiwan 
Solidarity Union (TSU), which has been largely marginalized 
in the campaign by Chen's domination of the Pan-Green air 
waves. 
 
Peipiao Will be Key 
------------------- 
 
6. (C) More than any of these issues however, the single 
biggest variable that will determine the outcome of the 
election in December will be intra-party vote distribution, 
or "peipiao."  In Taiwan's multi-member district system, 
proper distribution of votes among candidates is often more 
important than the gross number of votes received (Ref B). 
The Pan-Green has a huge advantage in this area because the 
DPP enjoys greater party cohesion than the other parties and 
its candidates are more willing to cooperate with forced 
peipiao schemes.  Adept use of peipiao allowed the DPP to 
take six percent more seats than its vote share would seem to 
have justified in the last election, according to ERA Polling 
Center Director Tai Li-an, and the party is focusing its 
efforts on repeating that success.  Candidates in most 
districts run as a team and plans have already been made to 
ask voters to divide their votes based on the month of their 
birth or the last digit of their national ID card number. 
DPP voters, who tend to be more ideologically loyal to the 
party than to any particular candidate, can be expected 
reliably to follow the party's peipiao instructions. 
 
Can the Pan-Blue Peipiao Successfully? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Soochow University political science professor and 
political talk show host Emile Sheng (Chi-jen) asserted that 
successful DPP peipiao is a given, and that "the only 
variable is Pan-Blue peipiao."  The outlook for the Pan-Blue 
in this regard is not good.  KMT and PFP politics are 
dominated by personalities and their LY campaigns are far 
more candidate-based than party-based.  KMT Culture and 
Publicity Deputy Chief Chen told AIT that prospects for vote 
coordination within the KMT are close to zero and the 
likelihood of establishing peipiao schemes with other 
Pan-Blue parties is even lower.  Successful peipiao would be 
difficult under the best of circumstances, but Pan-Blue 
candidates are even less likely to show generosity in this 
election.  Academia Sinica's Hsu suggested that this is 
because Pan-Blue candidates see this election as a "primary" 
for the 2008 LY election.  Since the number of LY seats will 
be halved in 2008 under a constitutional amendment expected 
to be ratified in the spring (Ref C), it is widely believed 
that only incumbents from this election will be considered 
for nomination in the next one, and those with the highest 
vote totals in 2004 will stand the best chance.  An 
additional difficulty for the Pan-Blue is that, in 
opposition, it has few appointments to offer its most 
well-known national figures other than LY nominations.  These 
"superstar candidates" are likely to take an unnecessarily 
large share of the vote in their respective districts, and 
are generally unwilling to cooperate with peipiao schemes, as 
these have famously backfired in the past, resulting at least 
twice in 2001 in the most popular candidate losing after his 
votes were "shared" away to weaker candidates. 
 
Pan-Green Overnomination in the North? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) However, even the most perfectly implemented peipiao 
scheme is doomed to failure if the party has run too many 
candidates.  The Pan-Green may be in greater danger in this 
regard.  Encouraged by Chen's victory in the March 
presidential election, the DPP nominated aggressively in 
areas where Chen made major gains during the 2004 election. 
In many southern districts where it already enjoys high 
support levels, the DPP's nominees will likely find the 
necessary votes.  In northern districts, however, which have 
historically favored the Pan-Blue, the Pan-Green's nomination 
strategy ranges from merely aggressive to downright reckless. 
 The DPP is not entirely at fault here, however.  The TSU, 
encouraged by media speculation that it could double its 
seats by riding the wave of growing Taiwanese identity, 
hastily decided to increase its nominations in almost every 
district.  Most of these last-minute additions stand little 
chance of winning election, and will possibly drain enough 
votes from their TSU and DPP allies to give up a seat to the 
Pan-Blue.  The NSC's Chiou acknowledged this danger and said 
the DPP would make a call by December 1 about culling weak 
candidates from several northern districts.  Chiou noted that 
if the DPP dropped a candidate each from Taoyuan County, 
Taipei City North, and Taipei County's Second District it 
could guarantee a pick up of three seats over 2001 by 
securing the rest of its candidate list in these areas. 
 
Pan-Blue Problems with Mavericks 
-------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) The Pan-Blue is not entirely free of overnomination 
worries, however.  Lack of discipline among candidates has 
undermined the KMT's generally conservative nomination 
strategy in some districts, as the candidates who did not 
receive nominations decided to run anyway on their own.  Such 
"maverick" candidates could potentially split the KMT vote in 
some decisive districts, giving up seats to the Pan-Green and 
reducing the KMT party's share of votes for the at-large 
proportional representation seats.  Soochow University's 
Sheng noted that the political balance in Taipei City splits 
65-35 in favor of the Blue, yet campaign officials on both 
sides predict that the Pan-Green will win half of the 20 
seats in the capital due to poor Pan-Blue nominations and 
coordination (Septel). 
 
The Decline and Fall of the PFP 
------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) A greater concern for the Pan-Blue is the widespread 
perception that the PFP is on the verge of collapse as a 
result of the Pan-Blue's clumsy mismanagement of the proposed 
KMT-PFP merger and the PFP's increasingly extremist line on 
many policy issues.  Most of the PFP's stronger incumbents, 
especially in northern districts, are unlikely to be hurt by 
this, but PFP newcomers and less well-known incumbents are in 
increasing danger.  This has given rise to PFP calls for the 
KMT to include PFP candidates in its peipiao efforts, but 
with the exception of Nantou County (Ref D), these pleas have 
been ignored.  Hsu Yung-ming offered a typical assessment of 
the Pan-Blue situation, saying that "the KMT will keep its 
seats because it nominated conservatively, but the PFP will 
suffer, going from 46 seats now to probably less than 30 
after the election."  PFP Acting Secretary General Chin 
Ching-Sheng separately offered an estimate of 25-30 seats for 
his party.  LY President (and KMT Vice Chairman) Wang 
Jin-pyng was even more downbeat on the PFP, "they can count 
on 25 seats, but definitely no more than 28." 
 
Comment: First Step Towards a Two Party System? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
10. (C) Although it is too early to predict the final outcome 
of the LY election, some general shifts seem likely.  The 
Pan-Blue will almost certainly lose its control of the LY, 
with its losses coming almost exclusively from the ranks of 
the PFP.  The DPP stands to gain seats, but with TSU support 
remaining stagnant, an outright Pan-Green majority may be 
beyond its grasp.  DPP officials are confident that if they 
are within 3-5 seats of a majority, they can assemble a 
working coalition with like-minded (or buyable) independents. 
 Strong showings by the DPP and KMT vis-a-vis their junior 
coalition partners could reduce TSU and PFP ability within 
the LY to push extremist agendas.  However, much will hinge 
on what happens to the Pan-Blue after December 11.  Opinion 
among Pan-Blue leaders over the opposition's post-election 
role is divided.  Some officials, like Wang, have warned that 
the DPP will be allowed to dictate policy, with an unengaged 
and marginalized KMT sitting on the sidelines.  KMT Taipei 
Mayor Ma Ying-jeou have emphasized the need for the KMT to 
play an active, responsible, balancing role in order to 
remain competitive for elections in 2006 and later.  What 
sort of KMT emerges after December 11 could matter more than 
who wins on election day. 
PAAL