US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA2170

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

CONGOLESE READOUT ON KABILA-KAGAME MEETING

Identifier: 04KINSHASA2170
Wikileaks: View 04KINSHASA2170 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kinshasa
Created: 2004-11-29 07:52:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 002170 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MOPS, KPKO, CG 
SUBJECT: CONGOLESE READOUT ON KABILA-KAGAME MEETING 
 
REF: KIGALI 01586 
 
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
 1. (C)  Senior Presidential Advisor Augustin Katumba called 
PolCouns November 27 to provide a readout of the meeting 
between Presidents Kabila and Kagame, facilitated by 
President Obasanjo.  Largely agreeing in substance with 
Rwandan readout (reftel), Katumba mentioned Kagame's proposal 
to either dispatch Rwandan troops directly to deal with the 
situation, or to have Rwandan troops play some sort of role 
in a joint mission with Congolese military.  The tone in 
which the Ouagadougou meeting was portrayed by Katumba was 
striking, however.  Katumba said Kagame had come to the 
meeting with his mind already made up that Rwanda would 
invade the Congo; that Kagame was "bullying," "patronizing" 
and disrespectful to Kabila; that Kagame was not open to 
proposals from Kabila involving MONUC operations -- and 
questioned rhetorically how anyone could have expected a 
positive outcome.  Katumba said the meeting ended 
inconclusively, with Kagame saying he would consult other 
international partners but that a solution needed to be found 
quickly.  Katumba's closing remark was that if the matter was 
so urgent, Rwanda should have dealt directly with eliminating 
the "scourge" of the FDLR when it was in "sole charge" of the 
eastern part of the Congo. 
 
2. (C)  Comment:  Katumba's readout, and especially the tone 
in which it was conveyed, exemplify the problem with the 
hardliners to which Kabila referred.  Katumba, and others 
like him, could indeed topple the transition - and possibly 
plot against Kabila himself - should Kabila be seen to be 
capitulating to the Rwandans, which is how a cooperative 
effort would be viewed.  We believe a South African military 
effort, however, whether directly or in some sort of 
cooperation with MONUC and the Congolese, would be much more 
palatable, if it indeed is feasible. 
MEECE 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04