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| Identifier: | 04KINSHASA2170 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04KINSHASA2170 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Kinshasa |
| Created: | 2004-11-29 07:52:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 002170 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2014 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MOPS, KPKO, CG SUBJECT: CONGOLESE READOUT ON KABILA-KAGAME MEETING REF: KIGALI 01586 Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d. 1. (C) Senior Presidential Advisor Augustin Katumba called PolCouns November 27 to provide a readout of the meeting between Presidents Kabila and Kagame, facilitated by President Obasanjo. Largely agreeing in substance with Rwandan readout (reftel), Katumba mentioned Kagame's proposal to either dispatch Rwandan troops directly to deal with the situation, or to have Rwandan troops play some sort of role in a joint mission with Congolese military. The tone in which the Ouagadougou meeting was portrayed by Katumba was striking, however. Katumba said Kagame had come to the meeting with his mind already made up that Rwanda would invade the Congo; that Kagame was "bullying," "patronizing" and disrespectful to Kabila; that Kagame was not open to proposals from Kabila involving MONUC operations -- and questioned rhetorically how anyone could have expected a positive outcome. Katumba said the meeting ended inconclusively, with Kagame saying he would consult other international partners but that a solution needed to be found quickly. Katumba's closing remark was that if the matter was so urgent, Rwanda should have dealt directly with eliminating the "scourge" of the FDLR when it was in "sole charge" of the eastern part of the Congo. 2. (C) Comment: Katumba's readout, and especially the tone in which it was conveyed, exemplify the problem with the hardliners to which Kabila referred. Katumba, and others like him, could indeed topple the transition - and possibly plot against Kabila himself - should Kabila be seen to be capitulating to the Rwandans, which is how a cooperative effort would be viewed. We believe a South African military effort, however, whether directly or in some sort of cooperation with MONUC and the Congolese, would be much more palatable, if it indeed is feasible. MEECE
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