US embassy cable - 04MAPUTO1533

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MAPUTO 001533 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR AF/S AND AF/FO 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2014 
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, MZ, ZI, LY 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT CHISSANO ON MUGABE AND MARCH 2005 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
 
REF: A. STATE 242995 
 
B. MAPUTO 1520 
Classified By: Ambassador Helen La Lime for reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: President Chissano believes that Mugabe is 
interested in improving relations with the US, although still 
deeply suspicious of US and UK intentions. He will be 
receptive only if approached without hostility or 
preconditions. Mugabe might be willing to relinquish power 
before elections in 2008, if, by doing so, he would not be 
seen as giving in to outside pressure, if a strong successor 
could be identified, and if the opposition no longer 
threatened to split the country apart. Chissano considers 
opposition leader Morgan Tsivangirai too extreme to lead 
Zimbabwe. He thinks Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) observers will limit any critique of March 
parliamentary elections to a SADC-internal "peer review" 
process rather than go public. End Summary. 
 
2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by econ/pol chief 
(notetaker), met with President Chissano to deliver the 
demarche requested in ref A on upcoming parliamentary 
elections in Zimbabwe (March 2005) and to elicit Chissano's 
view of Zimbabwe's political crisis. She outlined the dire 
economic impact of Mugabe's policies and how his 
authoritarian rule jeopardized the opportunity provided by 
upcoming parliamentary elections. What could be done to find 
a way forward?, she asked. 
 
3. (C) After considering the question silently for a moment, 
President Chissano began by saying that he had met with 
Mugabe several weeks earlier and Mugabe appeared to him to 
want to improve relations with the US. But he remains 
suspicious, Chissano added. To approach him, one must do so 
as a friend. Chissano then reminded the Ambassador that when 
he first met with President George H.W.Bush, he had just 
finished visiting Qadhafi in Libya. Subsequently he met with 
Qadhafi several times and in his meetings suggested that 
Libya ought to improve relations with the West. He said that 
Qadhafi was resistant but later came round, mainly through 
Qadhafi's contact with middleman Tiny Rowland of the British 
mining company Lonrho. Chissano was careful to deny that he 
played a major role in the Libyan thaw, but offered Libyan 
relations as an example of an approach that might work with 
Mugabe. After all, he added, Mugabe is no Saddam: he has no 
weapons of mass destruction, he's no terrorist and his power 
is hobbled by internal politics. Mugabe might be receptive, 
he argued, depending on the proper approach. And if a 
dialogue with the US (or the UK) could begin in which he did 
not feel threatened or uncomfortable, other SADC 
representatives would find dealing with him much easier, too. 
? 
4. (C) Although Mugabe was largely alienated from the UK 
government, Chissano thought that he continued to have, 
ironically, good relations with Margaret Thatcher and perhaps 
a few others in the English establishment. He doubted that 
there was anyone Mugabe felt comfortable with in the current 
U.S. administration, but wondered it there might be someone 
from earlier administrations, possibly a Democrat, who could 
serve as a useful interlocutor. 
 
5. (C) Turning to the March 2005 parliamentary elections, 
Chissano informed the Ambassador that Mugabe told him he had 
received a letter from Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 
leader Morgan Tsivangirai, but that he decided he would not 
respond until after the ZANU-PF congress (now underway). 
Moreover, with the MDC losing by-elections and its support on 
a downward slide, according to Chissano, there did not seem 
to Mugabe much urgency to negotiating now. Mugabe's own 
party, ZANU-PF, was in the midst of squabbles over 
identifying his successor, Chissano noted, a complication 
that also blocked dealing with the MDC. 
 
6. (C) Chissano emphasized that the SADC observer guidelines 
agreed upon in August at a SADC meeting in Mauritius stressed 
"observe - yes; monitor - no." Pressed by the Ambassador to 
explain what this meant, Chissano said that monitoring 
implied more involvement than observing, something that 
hinted subtly of "control." "Control is a bad word, don't 
you think?" he asked rhetorically. He explained that SADC 
observers would likely limit any critique of the elections to 
a "peer review process," which we take to mean that SADC 
criticism of the election process in Zimbabwe would remain 
behind closed doors while any public statement would likely 
be positive. 
 
7. (C) In Chissano's opinion, Mugabe might be willing to 
leave before his term ends in 2008. But to leave early, four 
conditions first would have to be met: 1) his departure could 
not be seen as the result of "foreign" pressure, 2) ZANU-PF 
must unite around a chosen successor, 3) this successor must 
be someone who would not divide the country and 4) the 
opposition must be willing to behave responsibly rather than 
threaten civil war. Regarding the final requirement, 
Chissano thought Morgan Tsivangirai did not fit the bill. 
Although he admitted he had never met him, Tsivangirai seemed 
to him someone who "dropped from the clouds," a trade 
unionist who came out of nowhere. He is too extreme, 
Chissano said, even to the left of Mugabe. He is not 
sufficiently mature, he's never been elected to parliament 
and therefore those in parliament have no respect for him. 
Chissano considers him not good for the stability of 
Zimbabwe, but rather a divider like President Gbagbo of Cote 
d'Ivoire. Nevertheless, the MDC has other capable figures 
who could play a constructive role, he added. 
 
8. (C) As the hour was ending, President Chissano informed 
the Ambassador that he would be visiting Zimbabwe and several 
other countries in the region in coming weeks. Meanwhile he 
would consider carefully our demarche and look further for 
ways to improve the situation in Zimbabwe. The Ambassador 
interjected that we very much want to find a way forward. 
"Don't bite him," Chissano joked, he's not Saddam Hussein. 
He reiterated then that, when discussing his own retirement 
from office with Mugabe recently, Mugabe said that it was 
still too early for him to retire, that he still needed "to 
arrange things." He didn't see how Mugabe could continue on 
in power after 2008, when he would be 84, Chissano continued. 
 
9: (C) Comment: President Chissano again and again emphasized 
that Mugabe would not respond to pressure, but that an 
approach could work if done in a non-confrontational manner. 
He suggested that he would try to be helpful in this regard, 
but did not offer other specifics as to how. Chissano had no 
one in mind but several times mentioned that he thought 
Mugabe could be approached by someone from the U.S. He 
expressed a willingness to continue a dialogue with us. 
LA LIME