US embassy cable - 04MADRID4500

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 004500 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014 
TAGS: PREL, CU, SP 
SUBJECT: MFA CLAIMS SURPRISE AT CUBA'S NORMALIZATION OF TIES 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.5 (B) an 
d (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  MFA DG for Latin America Sandomingo told 
Polcouns that the GOS had been surprised by the Cuban 
Government announcement that it would resume official 
contacts with the Spanish Embassy in Havana after more than 
17 months of having "frozen" such ties.  Sandomingo cast the 
move as a Castro effort to divide the EU over Cuba policy. 
While reiterating Spain's commitment to the EU Common 
Position on Cuba, Sandomingo predicted that Spain would soon 
gain EU consensus for eliminating the policy of inviting 
dissidents to EU national day events.  He discussed Spain's 
alternatives to national day invitations, insisting that EU 
contact with dissidents would increase rather than decrease 
under the Spanish plan.  We are skeptical that the GOS did 
not know in advance of Castro's move, as well as of 
protestations that the GOS is acting in the best interests of 
the Cuban opposition.  FM Moratinos and Socialist officials, 
rather than MFA professionals, seem to be driving a GOS 
policy towards Cuba that appears more focused on breaking 
with Aznar's policies than with achieving progress on human 
rights issues.  We recommend continued USG action behind the 
scenes to block Spanish efforts to weaken EU measures against 
Cuba, as well as a call from WHA A/S Noriega to DG Sandomingo 
to emphasize the depth of USG concern with respect to the 
direction of Spain's Cuba policy.  End Summary. 
 
//END OF THE CUBAN DEEP FREEZE// 
 
2. (U) Spanish dailies provided extensive coverage of the 
Cuban Government's 11/25 announcement re-establishing normal 
contacts between the GOC and Spanish diplomats in Havana, 
ties "frozen" by the GOC in 2003 in the wake of the EU's 
imposition of "Restrictive Measures" on Cuba.  The Cuban 
action was widely interpreted as an acknowledgement of the 
Zapatero Government's efforts to end the EU policy of 
inviting dissidents to EU national day events.  Opposition 
Popular Party officials suggested that the GOC move was 
simply an effort to divide the EU and to disrupt 
transatlantic ties.  Socialist Parliamentary spokesman 
Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba discarded the possibility of any 
impact on U.S.-Spain ties, saying it was "compatible to have 
good relations with the U.S. while maintaining Spain's own 
foreign policy identity." 
 
//MFA CLAIMS SURPRISE AT CUBAN ANNOUNCEMENT// 
 
3. (C) Polcouns and poloff met with MFA Director General for 
Latin America Javier Sandomingo on 11/26 to discuss the Cuban 
announcement.  Sandomingo acknowledged the basic facts, 
saying GOC Foreign Minister Perez Roque had summoned Spanish 
Ambassador in Havana Carlos Saldivar to inform him that the 
GOC would resume normal official contacts with the Spanish 
Embassy after more than 17 months of having refused such 
contacts with most EU embassies.  Sandomingo said the GOS had 
asked Perez Roque not to announce the reopening of official 
links, but that the GOS had unilaterally decided to publicize 
its decision.  Sandomingo spoke with EU counterparts to 
reassure them that this development came solely at the 
initiative of the GOC and not as a result of Spanish-Cuban 
deal organized outside of EU channels. 
 
4. (C) Sandomingo said he did not know why the GOC had acted 
now, but ventured that Castro could have been trying to 
foment disunity within the EU, "which he did not manage to 
do."  He was unsure whether Spain would respond to Cuba's 
public announcement, other than the brief "clarification" 
already issued by the GOS stating Spain's objective as 
normalization between Cuba and all EU countries, not just 
between Cuba and Spain.  Asked whether he viewed the Cuban 
announcement as an effort to influence the EU COLAT 
discussions on the EU's "Restrictive Measures" on Cuba, 
Sandomingo allowed that that might be the case, but insisted 
that even without Cuba's announcement Spain had expected to 
gain EU consensus for easing the measures by January 2005. 
He was encouraged by the fact that none of the main Cuban 
exile groups had "reacted badly" to the announcement of 
normalized ties and had only called on the GOS to undertake 
actions they intended to pursue anyway, such as continued 
pressure on the GOC on human rights issues. 
 
//SPAIN STICKING TO EU COMMON POSITION// 
 
5. (C) Sandomingo reiterated Spain's commitment to the EU 
Common Position on Cuba.  He said he was convinced that 
Spain's plan for increased contacts with Cuban opposition 
figures would be even more problematic for the GOC than the 
current EU policy of inviting dissidents to national day 
events.  He said the Spanish plan calls for a structured EU 
dialogue with the opposition that would include monthly 
meetings between EU diplomats and dissidents, biannual 
meetings between dissidents and EU ambassadors, and regular 
invitations to activists to visit EU countries.  Spain's 
eventual objective is to reopen its cultural center in 
Havana, which he described as Spain's "most significant 
contribution to Cuban civil society." 
 
6. (C) Poloff pointed out that EU diplomats already meet 
regularly with dissidents and that the creation of a formal, 
structured dialogue would not be sufficient to offset the 
blow to the activists' morale as a result of being disinvited 
from the national day events.  Polcouns suggested that a 
better alternative would be both the continuation of 
invitations to national day events and the initiation of a 
formal dialogue between the EU and the democratic opposition. 
 Sandomingo agreed on the need for the EU to recognize 
activists as legitimate political figures, but said that GOC 
antagonism towards including them in national day events was 
a barrier to potentially useful relations between the EU and 
Cuba.  The EU could have "improved" contacts with dissidents 
in other venues. 
 
//CUBA MOVING THE GOALPOSTS// 
 
7. (C) Poloff noted that the Polish Embassy had already 
explored this purportedly less conflictual alternative by 
hosting a reception for a broad range of Cuban civil society 
figures on a date other than its national day.  Rather than 
ignoring the event, the GOC threatened to PNG the Polish 
Ambassador if he ever hosted such a reception again. 
Sandomingo was familiar with the Polish episode and said that 
Cuban FM Perez Roque had tried a similar tack with FM 
Moratinos during the Ibero American Summit in San Jose. 
After having told Moratinos in May that the main irritant for 
the GOC was the invitation of dissidents to national day 
events, Perez Roque now claimed that a structured EU dialogue 
with the opposition would also be viewed very poorly by the 
Castro regime.  According to Sandomingo, Moratinos told Perez 
Roque bluntly that the issue was not negotiable and that the 
structured dialogue was the only viable alternative to 
inviting dissidents to national day events.  Sandomingo said 
it would be up to Castro to decide whether to PNG EU 
diplomats or "freeze" relations again in response to 
continued EU activism on human rights. 
 
//COMMENT// 
 
8. (C) The GOC announcement may have been embarrassing for 
the GOS, but Spain has clearly been angling for a positive 
signal from Havana in order to increase Spanish leverage in 
EU negotiations over the Restrictive Measures.  We find it 
difficult to believe that nobody in the GOS was aware of 
Cuba's intention to "reward" Zapatero for his break with 
Aznar's Cuba policies.  The course of events and our 
conversations with GOS officials suggest that FM Moratinos, 
Socialist Party insiders, and the Spanish Ambassador in 
Havana are driving Cuba policy far more than MFA officials 
such as Sandomingo.  Unfortunately, our experience suggests 
Moratinos and other Socialist leaders are more concerned with 
burnishing their leftist (and anti-Aznar) credentials than 
with establishing a credible policy intended to promote 
Cuba's democratic transition.  In our view, we should work 
behind the scenes with receptive EU governments to block 
Spain's efforts to water down the EU Restrictive Measures 
since alternative plans are unlikely to outweigh the symbolic 
damage caused by the end of invitations to national day 
events.  We also note the Socialist Parliamentarian's claim 
that Spain's search for rapprochement with Havana has not 
affected U.S.-Spain relations.  A call from A/S Noriega to DG 
Sandomingo may help remind the GOS that Washington is closely 
(and perhaps skeptically) watching Spain's shifting policy 
towards Cuba. 
MANZANARES