US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS5014

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 005014 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/RSA (MBITTRICK) AND PM/PPA (RFEATHERSTONE) 
DOD FOR USDP (BRZEZINSKI AND WHALEN) 
PASS USAID FOR DCHA AND AFRICA BUREAU 
PASS USUN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2014 
TAGS: PHUM, PREF, PREL, MOPS, SU, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: EU MILITARY COMMITTEE ADVICE ON THE AU MISSION IN 
DARFUR 
 
Classified By: USEU political military officer Jeremy Brenner for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  USEU was passed the text of the European 
Union Military Committee's military advice to the Political 
and Security Committee on the AU Plan for the AMIS II mission 
in Darfur. It was likely passed with the intention to 
influence, as well as inform. The Military Committee finds 
significant risks for the operation and concludes that some 
of the AU's assumptions are unrealistic. They express concern 
that the AU has shifted away from its original planning as 
the result of "uncoordinated donor action" and political 
pressure for rapid action. End summary. 
 
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Excerpts 
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2. (C) Begin salient portions of text from the European Union 
Military Committee Advice. Internal paragraph numbering does 
not reflect the original text: 
 
3. (C) The EU Military Committee considers that in general, 
the plan is realistic and structured and constitutes a 
significant improvement to the current mission.  It 
introduces a more proactive monitoring approach and there is 
a clear intention for the early deployment of additional 
MILOBS.  It takes a positive view on a liaison with non-AU 
organizations in particular the UN.  Furthermore, the 
intention to include a police component as an integrated 
element of AMIS II demonstrates recognition of the need to 
take a comprehensive approach to improving security 
conditions.  Overall it is the EUMC opinion that the plan 
would contribute to the achievement of the political aim, "to 
assist the parties to reach a political settlement in Darfur, 
contributing to a stable, peaceful and united Sudan." 
 
4. (C) The plan hinges on the assumption that all parties 
will comply with the HCFA and therefore implies that 
violations of the HCFA would be isolated and sporadic rather 
than structural.  The Government of Sudan (GoS) has primary 
responsibility for the protection of its civilians. 
Furthermore, and of equal importance, there is an underlying 
assumption that the GoS is capable of, and willing to 
exercise appropriate control over armed militias and 
Janjaweed who are not signatories to the HCFA.  The EUMC 
considers that these underpinning assumptions are not 
supported by a threat assessment of the situation and 
consequently that the plan carries a high level of risk. 
 
5. (C) The EUMC considers that in general terms the military 
mission supports the political intent and the mandate for 
AMIS II.  It is clear that AMIS II is not mandated to enforce 
compliance.  Certain tasks ("match threat levels as well as 
demonstrating an increased military presence where 
necessary.")  would seem to go beyond what was originally 
intended in the mandate.  The non-availability of ROEs 
however does not allow assessment of this question.  The 
current formulation of protection tasks, albeit contingent 
upon means and capabilities, will undoubtedly create 
expectations which cannot be met by a force the size of AMIS 
II in an area the size of France.  The EUMC therefore is 
concerned that AU Protection Elements operating beyond the 
mandate could be drawn into "enforcement" operations for 
which they are neither prepared nor equipped. 
 
6. (C) The expansion will lead to a new force consisting of 
some 530 MILOBS out of whom 450 will be working in 
operational observing teams.  The ratio between the actual 
number of MILOBS and the Protection Element is 450:1703 
(1:4).  Although it is understood that this ratio has been 
largely based on UN experience of peacekeeping operations 
elsewhere, the EUMC has difficulties to estimate if this 
ratio is sufficient for success due to absence of a risk 
assessment and the size of the Area of Operations. 
 
7. (C) The EUMC is concerned that command relationship 
between the MILOBS teams and the Protection Element is not 
clear.  Both are (under the local tactical control of) their 
respective Sector Commanders, however it is not clear who 
decides on actions where operations need to be conducted 
across sector boundaries. The EUMC believes that in addition 
to creating command and control complexities and increasing 
overall levels of risk, the limited presence of EU and US 
observers could have an impact on rebel parties acceptance of 
the expanded mission. 
 
8. (C) Although the plan provides and Exit Strategy, this 
focuses on the political/strategic End State.  The EUMC 
considers the criteria for success very ambitious, which 
could result in a mission of long duration.  Furthermore, the 
plan does not provide a military end state, just some 
benchmarks for the Military Component.  The EUMC notes that 
the plan does not provide for a periodic Mission Review 
process that could measure the progress towards the desired 
End State. 
 
9. (C) Although the possibility for deterioration of the 
situation is not excluded, the EUMC notes the absence of the 
mechanisms for possible evacuation of MILOBS and Protection 
Elements. 
 
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Factual Evolution of the Implementation 
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10. (C) The plan under assessment is the written plan that 
was briefed to the AU Military Staff Committee and 
subsequently the AU PSC. However, a different plan has been 
subsequently implemented, according to the EUMC's 
information, partially as a result of uncoordinated donor 
action and political pressure for rapid action.  The 
principles that underpinned the initial plan developed by the 
Technical Assistance Group: 
 
- operational and logistic enablers in place prior to 
deployment 
- sufficient staff at all levels 
- priority to deployment of additional MILOBS 
- adequate force protection 
 
have been set aside.  Although the revised plan retains the 
political intent, military mission and mandate of the 
original plan, the implementation and timelines are 
significantly altered. 
 
11. (C) The scheme for the expansion of AMIS that initially 
foresaw 5 phases was accelerated and condensed concentration 
on the deployment of Protection Elements with little regard 
to what they might be able to accomplish once deployed.  As a 
consequence, troops are now being deployed to staging areas. 
Follow-on deployment to final destinations is delayed by the 
lack of adequate infrastructure and facilities at the final 
destinations.  This leads to congestion at the staging areas 
and possibly to the perception of mismanagement of the 
operation and idling troops in the public eye.  The current 
focus on deploying the Protection Element without the MILOBS 
does not directly contribute  to the intent of AMIS II ("to 
strengthen the monitoring capacity of the AMIS to a level 
where it conducts pro-active monitoring and through political 
and diplomatic means increase the level of compliance of the 
Parties to the HCFA thus discouraging attacks on civilians"). 
 
12. (C) Many of the pre-conditions detailed in the first 
deployment phases of the original plan have yet to be met 
thus increasing levels of risks.  The TAG brought this issue 
to the attention of the AU in writing when plans were 
amended.  The continuing absence of a capable AU planning 
capacity at all levels (the DITF in Addis, the Mission HQ in 
Khartoum and the Force HQ in El Fashir), coupled with a 
continuing reluctance to accept international planning 
support remain primary concerns. 
 
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Conclusions 
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13. (C) Following the analysis, the EUMC concludes that in 
general, the plan is realistic, structured, and if properly 
implemented - a significant improvement on the current 
mission, however the EUMC has identified deficiencies that 
might put the whole mission at risk.  The EUMC therefore 
believes that there is a requirement for the following points 
to be brought into the AU attention. 
 
- The assumption that all parties will comply with the HCFA 
without taking account of GoS willingness/capability to 
control armed militias nor the Janjaweed activities seems to 
be unrealistic; 
- The absence of a risk assessment is an essential flaw in 
the plan; 
-Some military tasks could have the potential for mission 
creep or, at worst, mission failure.  Significantly, a number 
of supporting appendices including ROEs are not included with 
the document. 
-Potentially significant supporting capabilities such as 
SATINT and aerial surveillance are not addressed; 
-Command and control arrangements are rigid and do not take 
account of the need for cross-sector boundary operations and 
this could limit the capacity for proactive operations and 
speed of reaction to certain incidents. 
-The arrangements for liaison with the EU, a principal 
partner, are not satisfactory and need improvement. 
- The plan is lacking mechanism to review the effectiveness 
of the mission 
-The plan differs significantly from the plan currently being 
implemented by the AU, that carries a significantly higher 
level of risk. 
 
14. (C) Against this background, for the support of the AU 
interest, the EUMC sees an urgent need for the AU to: 
- Establish the DITF in Addis and Force HQ at El Fashir as 
soon as possible 
-With the framework of the AU ownership, accept international 
support wherever needed 
-Consider non-AU MILOBS 
-Develop and implement ROEs for this operation consistent 
with its mandate and international law 
-Accept an EU presence, where the EU deems it necessary, at 
all levels to increase the situational awareness of one of 
its principal donors 
-Review its Command and Control structure and be urged to 
support this by adequate communications and information 
systems. 
-Implement a pre-deployment training scheme for both MILOBS 
and Protection Elements.  End abridged text. 
 
Schnabel