US embassy cable - 04CARACAS3639

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 003639 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PHUM, VE 
SUBJECT: "RE-DISCOVERING" THE OPPOSITION 
 
Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, 
for Reasons 1.4(b). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) Movement to Socialism President Felipe Mujica believes 
a first step for the Venezuelan opposition is to wage a 
"campaign of rights," perhaps beginning with a referendum to 
overturn the soon-to-pass media content law.  Additionally, 
the opposition must regain institutionality in the National 
Electoral Council, which would permit two or three opposition 
political fronts to form and compete in elections.  Barring 
this, Mujica asserted, the GOV may choose to ramp up the 
political fight against opposition groups, which will lead to 
more radical conflict.  Mujica concedes the GOV continues to 
hold tremendous sway over Venezuela's poor, loyalty that goes 
beyond financial benefits.  While he is idealistic, Mujica at 
least is giving serious thought to tangible actions for 
Venezuela's beleaguered opposition.  End summary. 
 
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Opposition:  Leaderless and Confused 
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2. (C) Felipe Mujica, president of the opposition Movement to 
Socialism (MAS) party, told poloff November 23 that groups in 
opposition to President Hugo Chavez are confused and in 
disarray.  The opposition's half-hearted call for abstention 
of the October 31 regional elections greatly weakened 
opposition political parties, he said.  He asserted that had 
turnout rivaled that of the August 15 presidential recall 
referendum, several key races would have gone for the 
opposition.  Mujica said the only viable opposition leader 
remaining is Zulia State Governor Manuel Rosales.  Mujica 
suggested that Rosales might be able to mount an effective 
campaign against Chavez in the 2006 elections, but first the 
opposition must "re-discover" itself. 
 
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A Campaign For Rights 
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3. (C) Mujica suggested the opposition may find its voice by 
opposing the draft media law currently before the National 
Assembly.  MAS publicly proposed a referendum to abrogate the 
media law in the likely event it passes (which will probably 
happen in December).  Mujica noted the constitutional 
requirements for such a referendum are 10 percent of 
registered voters signing a petition and 40 percent of 
registered voters calling for the law to be repealed. 
(Comment:  The constitution prohibits referenda to repeal 
laws that protect or develop human rights, which the GOV 
would surely argue in defense of the media law. 
Additionally, the 40-percent threshold amounts to a whopping 
5.6 million votes.)  Mujica suggested that, regardless of the 
outcome of their efforts to hold referendum, it could help 
cement the opposition behind a human rights message and, 
thus, regain some credibility. 
 
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Building Confidence in the CNE 
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4. (C) Calling it a best case scenario, Mujica suggested one 
of the opposition's first priorities is to negotiate with the 
GOV for some level of institutionality in the National 
Electoral Council (CNE), a sufficient change in personnel to 
assure fair elections.  Mujica said this would allow two to 
three opposition political fronts to compete for some elected 
offices.  He suggested a center-left bloc formed by MAS, 
Accion Democratica (AD), Union, and others and a center-right 
bloc formed by Primero Justicia (PJ), COPEI (Christian 
Democrats), and possibly Causa R (which recently formed a 
parliamentary alliance with Primero Justicia).  Mujica said 
that GOV-allied parties are positioned to capture at least 
two-thirds of the National Assembly in next year's elections 
(probably in December).  He said current CNE rules undermine 
the constitutional mandate of proportional representation, 
giving pro-Chavez parties an immense advantage.  He suggested 
a change in the law would be necessary before opposition 
parties can be guaranteed of winning a sufficient number of 
seats. 
 
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Or Things Could Just Get Worse 
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5. (C) Mujica admitted that carving out political space for 
the opposition would require the GOV to recognize and value a 
democratic opposition movement, which he thought unlikely. 
He said it is possible for the GOV to continue to defeat the 
opposition in elections, first in the March make-up elections 
for governor of Amazonas State and about four mayoralties, 
and later in the June parochial (neighborhood level) 
elections and then the December National Assembly races. 
Mujica predicted an increase in political persecution of 
opposition figures as well.  He thought it possible in this 
case that radical Chavez opponents could find they have 
"nothing left to do" but resort to violent acts, alluding to 
the killing of political prosecutor Danilo Anderson. 
 
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"Chavez Nos Toma En Cuenta" 
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6. (C) Mujica said the opposition's challenge to win the 
support of Venezuela's poor is daunting.  He noted that his 
own party's traditional lower class base had been mostly 
co-opted by Chavez, leaving MAS without a niche.  Mujica said 
Chavez's most popular program by far is "impunity."  The 
spread of the informal economy, informal housing, and land 
and building invasions, a plight for previous governments, 
have purposely gone unchecked by Chavez.  Chavez does not 
spend anything on these people, Mujica asserted, and yet they 
are grateful to Chavez for letting them violate property 
rights or tax laws.  Mujica said Chavez gives them hope that 
things will get better (though they arguably do not).  He 
summed this up with a phrase he says is repeated in 
Venezuelan shanty towns:  "At least Chavez keeps us in mind." 
 
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Comment 
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7. (C) There are many pitfalls to Mujica's optimistic 
scenario, but he is an intelligent opposition leader who is 
at least thinking about the future.  It might behoove a more 
sophisticated Chavista movement to open up political space 
for a democratic opposition; we do not, however, see Chavez 
likely to do so, either because he wants to mold his own 
"democratic opposition" or because he would not risk 
upsetting his more radical followers.  Mujica's view of 
Rosales as the future presidential candidate is still an 
embryonic concept, not widely shared by the opposition still 
two years away from elections.  It may also be that Chavez 
will encourage the opposition in this direction so as to hand 
the Zulia Governor a decisive and ostensibly legitimate 
defeat come election time. 
 
McFarland 
 
 
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      2004CARACA03639 - CONFIDENTIAL