US embassy cable - 04MADRID4492

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 004492 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUCOM PASS TO ODC SPAIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014 
TAGS: MARR, PGOV, PREL, SP 
SUBJECT: MEETING ON WITH DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER ON IRAQ, 
AFGHANISTAN, SUBMARINE CONTRACTS 
 
REF: STATE 236268 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.5 (B) an 
d (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Deputy Defense Minister Francisco Pardo told 
Charge that the MOD will take the lead in promoting 
"excellent" bilateral ties between Spain and the U.S. 
Regarding the tender for the S-80 submarine weapons system, 
Pardo indicated a GOS decision would be forthcoming soon.  He 
strongly implied that the GOS was leaning towards awarding 
the contract to one of the two U.S. bidders, but made clear 
that the MOD,s decision was not yet final.  On Iraq, Charge 
pressed the GOS to support common funding for the NATO 
training mission and to allow Spanish officers assigned to 
NATO commands to deploy to Iraq (REFTEL).  Pardo stressed 
continuing GOS political sensitivities over Iraq, making 
clear that the Zapatero administration would be very leery of 
the deployment of Spanish forces to Iraq under any rubric. 
This tracks with what we have heard from Chief of Defense 
General Sanz and MOD Director General for Policy Admiral 
Torrente (the number three MOD official) in recent meetings. 
Pardo was slightly more flexible with respect to additional 
Spanish troop commitments to Afghanistan, saying no increases 
were contemplated but that the GOS could "study" new 
proposals. 
 
2. (C) This meeting confirms reports that the GOS hopes to 
use defense issues to smooth relations with the USG.  This 
bodes well for our core defense interest in Spain ) 
continued unimpeded access to Spanish military bases. 
However, on political lightning rods such as Iraq, we see 
little chance of progress with the GOS, at least until the 
Iraq elections.  In Afghanistan, Spain won,t lead a PRT but 
they might be convinced to participate in one.  End Summary. 
 
//MOD WANTS TO PROMOTE STRONG TIES WITH USG// 
 
3. (C) Deputy Defense Minister Pardo met with Charge on 11/22 
accompanied by his chief of staff Jose Pablo Sabrido 
Fernandez and technical advisor General Juan Martin Villalon. 
 Charge was accompanied by Political Counselor, Defense 
Attache, ODC, and poloff.  Pardo led off by expressing the 
Zapatero Government,s desire for improved relations with the 
USG, "relations that can only be good, very good, or 
excellent."  He noted that, contrary to speculation in the 
press and by the opposition that Zapatero would be weak on 
defense issues, the Socialists have proven even stronger on 
defense than their Popular Party predecessors, submitting a 
request for a 4.2 percent increase in the defense budget for 
2005.  Pardo insisted that media claims of anti-American 
sentiments within the GOS were without foundation.  He said 
the MOD was strongly in favor or close relations with the USG 
and would do what it could to cement bonds of friendship. 
Charge welcomed Pardo's comments and said the USG stands 
ready to improve bilateral relations. 
 
//S-80 SUBMARINES: CLOSE TO A DECISION// 
 
4. (C) The Charge raised the matter of the long-awaited GOS 
decision on the contract for weapons systems for Spain,s two 
S-80 submarines.  Pardo said the GOS was close to making a 
final decision, though he would not be pinned down on a 
specific timeframe  He said he understood the desire of both 
U.S. companies to get a rapid decision and, while he noted 
that there could be only one winner, he said that the USG 
likely would be "pleased" by the Spanish decision. (NOTE: 
Other defense sources have told us a decision would be 
announced within weeks, perhaps in early December.  Pardo,s 
forward-leaning comments are a positive sign, but we cannot 
be certain that either U.S. company will be awarded the 
contract.  END NOTE.) 
 
//IRAQ AND NATO// 
 
5. (C) The Charge said the USG understands that the Zapatero 
administration will not be budged on the issue of deploying 
Spanish troops to Iraq, but requested Spanish flexibility on 
the issues of NATO funding and the participation in Iraq of 
Spanish forces assigned to NATO commands.  Charge said it was 
our understanding that Spain had lifted its block on the use 
of common NATO funds for housing construction to support the 
NATO mission in Iraq, but that Spain, along with Belgium, 
Germany, and France continued to block common funding of the 
APODS.  He underscored the importance to the USG, NATO, and 
the international community in general of a successful 
rebuilding effort in Iraq.  Pardo said he was not aware of 
the details of the debate in the NAC regarding the use of 
common funds, but would endeavor to find out.  He assured the 
Charge that Spain,s position was technical in nature and not 
due to political concerns. 
 
6. (C) However, on the matter of deploying Spanish officers 
assigned to NATO commands, Pardo said political 
considerations were the key factor underlying Spanish 
concerns.  He said the Iraq issue remained "polemic" in Spain 
and that the GOS was under strong public pressure to renounce 
the deployment of any Spanish forces to Iraq, regardless of 
whether they were sent by Madrid or by NATO headquarters.  He 
asked for USG understanding of the political sensitivities 
involved.  Asked whether the MOD, like the Spanish MFA, saw 
Iraq,s January elections as a possible turning point that 
would permit greater Spanish activism, Pardo was 
noncommittal.  Pardo said, however, the GOS was looking for 
"flexibility" on the issue of  lifting the caveat on Spanish 
members of NATO commands to participate in the NATO training 
mission (NOTE:  MOD number three, Admiral Torrente, told 
Polcouns Nov. 18 that the GOS would prefer not to be among 
the first from NATO commands to be deployed to Iraq. END 
NOTE). 
 
//AFGHANISTAN// 
 
7. (C) Charge said Spain and the USG should be proud of 
having worked with others in the international community to 
liberate Afghanistan from the Taliban.  He thanked Pardo for 
Spain's participation thus far and said we would be looking 
to Madrid for additional commitments and hoped that Spain 
would make a decision on its participation in a PRT prior to 
the Force Generation Conference in Brussels next week.  Pardo 
said that Spain was pleased with the role it had played in 
Afghanistan, but cautioned that the GOS did not contemplate 
additional deployments or new missions there.  He said that 
in the Spanish political context, any deployment was 
potentially controversial and would require close 
consultations with Parliament. He said, though (also 
reflecting comments by Torrente) that the issue was still 
open regarding additional deployments or new missions such as 
a PRT. 
 
//COMMENT// 
 
8. (C) This meeting confirms other indications that the GOS 
hopes to use defense issues to smooth relations with the USG, 
friction that has left them open to opposition criticism that 
Zapatero is mishandling one of Spain's key relationships. 
Pardo is a good interlocutor and gave every indication of his 
readiness to engage in a positive manner.   This bodes well 
for our core defense interest in Spain ) continued unimpeded 
access to Spanish military bases.  However, on political 
lightning rods such as Iraq, we see little chance of progress 
with the GOS, at least until the Iraq elections.  In 
Afghanistan, meanwhile, Spain probably won't lead a PRT but 
they might be convinced to participate in one. 
MANZANARES