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| Identifier: | 04ROME4474 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04ROME4474 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Rome |
| Created: | 2004-11-24 11:17:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PHUM ETTC CU IT UN |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004474 SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2014 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, ETTC, CU, IT, UN SUBJECT: ITALY - LIBERTAD ACT TITLE III WAIVER REVIEW REF: A. SECSTATE 248337 B. ROME 02517 C. ROME 04198 Classified By: Labor Counselor Candace Putnam for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). 1. (C) Summary. Mission believes renewing the Title III Libertad Act waiver would enhance the possibility of increased US-Italian cooperation on Cuba and have a positive impact on already strong bilateral relations with Italy. Italian policy towards Cuba follows the EU Common Position, which is based on constructive engagement. In 2003, Italy, as EU Presidency, led the EU in taking Q more critical stance towards the Castro regime which, in the view of many EU members, ha resulted in a loss of clout by EU missions in Q Havana and, consequently, a push by some membeQs to reevaluate the Common Position. Italy co.tinues to support the fundamentals of the Cmmon Position avely participating iprove measures to stQtion. Further bilateral olicy could best be ensurtle III Libertad Act wQ (C) On November 23, relations @iB@d human rphe policy of constructi 2003 Italy led the EU the unacceptable attitude o towards EU delegations Italy has followed EU ). 3. (C) the increased criticism@t since 2003 has providm for moral support fornd democratic movements `ed that this harsher lin@ter difficulty for EU n Havana to engage the Castro regime. This loss of leverage in Havana has led EU members, some more than others (Spain), to push for a reexamination of the Common Position. 4. (C) Miraglia stated that at the COLAT meeting on November 16, members reached consensus on the need to maintain and adhere to the fundamentals of the Common Position. Having reconfirmed the value of the Common Position, he said members agreed to explore specific strategies and actions to allow them to regain leverage in Havana and regain the lost momentum of constructive engagement. He said EU mission heads were analyzing the issue and would continue the discussion at the next COLAT in December. (Note: Miraglia had stated something similar for the November 16 COLAT - ref C). 5. (C) Miraglia said no decision had been made and did not offer any specifics on possible strategies but mentioned the agreed need to renew the "critical dialogue" with the Castro regime and develop a more "structured and efficient dialogue" with dissidents without sacrificing the fundamentals of the Common Position. How this would be achieved, he said, would be decided later. 6. (C) Italy's continued support for the fundamentals of the Common Position and caution on this issue makes Italy a reasonable and effective partner through whom we can reach other EU members. We believe that renewal of the Title III waiver for Italy would have a positive impact on our already strong bilateral relations and prospects for further cooperation on Cuba policy and would not jeopardize U.S national interests. SEMBLER NNNN 2004ROME04474 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
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