US embassy cable - 04CARACAS3622

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 003622 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ LOOKING INSIDE AND OUT 
 
REF: A. CARACAS 3506 
     B. CARACAS 3536 
 
Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Political Counselor, 
for Reasons 1.4(b). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) Fresh from electoral victories in August and October, 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is deepening his Bolivarian 
Revolution with a new ten-point strategy.  Chavez now plans 
to create a "new political infrastructure" that integrates 
social action groups and forces political parties to elect 
their candidates for office.  He has also launched a round of 
international outreach based on his desire to create a 
"multi-polar" world where U.S. influence is lessened, aiming 
at Spain, Libya, Russia, Iran, Qatar, and China by the end of 
the year.  Rather than deepening the revolution, Chavez's 
plans seem more geared toward ensuring his re-election in 
2006.  End summary. 
 
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Many Meetings To Chart The Course 
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2. (C) On November 11, President Hugo Chavez announced ten 
strategies, called "The New Strategic Map," meant to 
re-orient the political, social, economic, bureaucratic, and 
geopolitical posture of the GOV.  He followed up the 
announcement with a two-day retreat of senior government 
officials and allied governors and mayors November 12-13 at 
Fuerte Tiuna in Caracas.  The GOV announced that a 
coordinating mechanism consisting of ministers and governors 
had been established to carry out the new strategy.  Vice 
President Jose Vicente Rangel announced he would head a 
presidential committee to flesh out an anti-poverty plan, 
following Chavez's strategies, to be unveiled before 
Christmas.  While most of Chavez's strategies are his usual 
statist policies (refs a and b), his proposal for a "new 
political structure" and a "multi-polar" foreign policy are 
particularly relevant, especially given Chavez's increased 
control of state and local governments and the lack of an 
organized political opposition. 
 
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"A New Political Structure" In The Works 
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3. (C) Domestically, Chavez plans overhaul his political base 
among the social organizations that support his 
administration.  Chavez asserted that his revolutionary 
movement has until the 2006 presidential elections to 
consolidate and make these organizations stronger.  He 
included in this list the Electoral Battle Units (UBEs); the 
Francisco Miranda Front (Cuban-trained Venezuelan "social 
workers"); the Cuban-operated medical clinics; health 
committees in the slums; land committees in rural areas 
(which work for land re-distribution for the poor); working 
groups on water; and the facilitators for the "mission" 
programs.  Minister of Communication Andres Izarra said the 
UBEs would be re-christened "Endogenous Battle Units," a 
reference to Chavez's philosophy for fomenting domestic 
production among the poor.  Izarra said the new UBEs would be 
fortified by "popular communication centers" to bring 
technology to poor areas.  He also said this infrastructure 
would be used to mobilize voters in 2006, with the ambitious 
goal of winning 10 million votes for Chavez. 
 
4. (C) Chavez also vowed to institute procedures for 
democratically selecting pro-Chavez candidates in future 
elections, instead of naming them personally as he did for 
the October 31 regional elections.  He said that the high 
abstention rate among Chavez supporters during the October 31 
referendum was caused by resentment over the manner in which 
candidates are selected.  Chavez lamented that in the past he 
has had to resort to hand-picking candidates, but claimed he 
was forced to do so by party leaders who "had not consulted 
anyone" at the grass roots level.  (In fact, the 1999 
Constitution mandates internal election of candidates and 
political party chiefs, though this has yet to be 
implemented.) 
 
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Bi-Polar Plus Uni-polar Equals Multi-Polar 
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5. (C) Internationally, Chavez has returned to his 
"multi-polar world" theme as a rhetorical defense against the 
perceived dominance of the United States.  Chavez claimed 
that, after the recall vote, Venezuela had been 
"re-legitimized," not only his government but his political 
system, which he said had been stigmatized by the media. 
Since the regional elections, Chavez has visited Brazil, 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba.  He also recently 
received a state visit from Paraguayan President Nicanor 
Duarte.  He is currently on a trip to Spain, Libya, Russia, 
Iran, and Qatar.  Chavez plans to visit China in December. 
In addition, newly-appointed Foreign Minister Ali Rodriguez 
told reporters in Spain November 21 the GOV will push for the 
"democratization" of international organizations such as the 
UN and OAS. 
 
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Comment 
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6. (C) Chavez's ten strategies are the beginnings of his 
campaign for the 2006 presidential election.  His "new 
political structure" attempts to maintain the network of 
diverse social action groups, largely state-subsidized, that 
supported his successful recall referendum campaign. 
Integrating "mission" personnel and Cuban-trained social 
workers into this political structure blurs the lines between 
the state and pro-Chavez political organizations even more. 
Chavez also shows his preference for mass organizations over 
political parties, which are highly suspect in his 
leader-people model of governance. 
 
7. (C) Feeling drenched in legitimacy from the referendum 
win, Chavez will continue to reach out personally to 
countries that might be sympathetic to his anti-U.S. rhetoric 
(China, Spain, Libya, etc.).  He will push regional 
integration efforts such as Mercosur that might challenge 
U.S. interests.  He also seems disposed to use his oil muscle 
to influence smaller countries, geo-politically unimportant 
but with votes in the OAS and other international 
organizations.  International outreach is important to Chavez 
domestically as it allows him to portray the Bolivarian 
Revolution as gaining acceptance in the world, no matter what 
the reality might be. 
 
Brownfield 
 
 
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      2004CARACA03622 - CONFIDENTIAL