US embassy cable - 04YEREVAN2517

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ARMENIAN DEFMIN SOLID ON IRAQ CONTINGENT

Identifier: 04YEREVAN2517
Wikileaks: View 04YEREVAN2517 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Yerevan
Created: 2004-11-22 13:15:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: AM IZ MARR MOPS PREL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 002517 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE/EUR FOR DAS LAURA KENNEDY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2014 
TAGS: AM, IZ, MARR, MOPS, PREL 
SUBJECT: ARMENIAN DEFMIN SOLID ON IRAQ CONTINGENT 
 
REF: YEREVAN 2494 
 
Classified By: Amb. John Evans, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.(S) Summary.  In a two-hour one-on-one with the 
Ambassador November 18, Armenian Defense Minister Serge 
Sargsian confirmed that he was rock solid in his commitment 
to fielding the Armenian non-combat contingent to Iraq. 
He volunteered that the issue was with the Constitutional 
Court and would soon move to the National Assembly, where 
he would personally present it for approval.  Other issues 
he touched on included domestic politics, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
concerns about Georgia and Turkey, and relations with 
Russia.  End Summary. 
 
2.(S)  Sargsian said Armenia simply had to 
participate in the International Coalition in Iraq for 
reasons of its own state interests.  Armenia opposed 
terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism and with Georgia and 
Azerbaijan participating, how could Armenia stand aloof? 
Sargsian said he would like to contribute a much larger 
contingent, but there were some very real constraints. 
First of all, there were not enough trained personnel. 
Second, Armenia was already on a "war footing" 
because of Karabagh.  And third, premium pay for the 
volunteers going to Iraq was five times what Armenian 
servicemen on the borders of their own country were 
receiving.  Sargsian noted that he had just returned from a 
National Assembly meeting at which he had argued for an 
increase in the defense budget occasioned by higher than 
expected fuel costs.   This was a particular problem in 
view of the new aircraft  e confirmed that he meant the 
Slovak SU-25s  rmenia was in the process of obtaining. 
 
3.(S)   Prompted by the Ambassador, Sargsian launched into 
a tour of the domestic political landscape.  Predictably, 
he had little positive to say about opposition leaders 
Demirchian and Geghamian and others.   He eased up in his 
overall disdain for the political class by according mild 
approbation to Artur Baghdasarian, the Parliamentary 
Speaker and leader of Orinats Yerkir, and Raffi Hovhanissian, 
the former U.S. citizen who was Amrenia  first foreign 
minister. 
 
4.(S)  On Nagorno-Karabagh, Sargsian said a settlement had 
to favor neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan; eventually, 
fifteen or twenty years down the road, things might 
look differently.  He claimed that, given a choice, 
seventy percent of Armenians would rather live with the 
Azeris than with the Georgians; on a personal level, 
they had a record of getting along.   Sargsian said the 
OSCE Minsk Process needed to be preserved at all costs. 
This was why the Azeri move in the UNGA  nd the Council 
of Europe Parliamentary Assembly  critical reports  ere so 
dangerous. 
 
5.  (S) The Ambassador expressed concern about the situation 
on the line of contact and asked about rules of engagement; 
press reports continue to describe sporadic incidents 
resulting from the close contact of Armenian and Azeri troops. 
Sargsian said a lieutenant (vzvod commander) was authorized 
to return fire, but then had immediately to report to his 
headquarters.  Of course not a meter of territory could be 
taken without express authorization.   Sargsian dismissed 
Azeri talk of war, saying that even if Azerbaijan built its 
forces up to twice what Armenia could field, it would not 
suffice; Baku would need a three- or four-fold advantage to 
have any confidence 
of victory. 
 
6.(S)  On Georgia, Sargsian said he worried about 
the impulsiveness of the young leaders who had come to 
power a year ago.  He said he had advised them not to bait 
the Russian bear.  He thought they had been unwise to try 
to duplicate their early success in Ajara in South Ossetia, 
but might now have learned their lesson. 
 
7.(S)  Asked about relations with Turkey, Sargsian was wary. 
He also admitted that there were some reasons to tolerate 
the current blockade of the border with Turkey.  While EU 
membership would be an undoubted plus for the region, one 
had to recall that Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 despite 
membership in NATO.   Sargsian said it would indeed be a 
shame if the Kars-Gyumri-Tbilisi rail link were replaced 
with an expensive new line that bypassed Armenian 
territory. 
 
8.(S)  As for relations with Russia, Sargsian said 
Russia was indeed Armenia  traditional ally, but lamented 
that  e have not solved all our own security problems 
yet. His own view, he said, was that when 
Russian-American relations were good, this was good for 
Armenia. 
 
9.(S)   Biographic note:  Sargsian told the 
Ambassador that he was acquainted with Vladimir Putin from 
the days when he was in charge of Armenia  National 
Security Service and Putin was heading the FSB in Moscow. 
There had been at least two group meetings of the 
intelligence chiefs in those years, and Sargsian said that 
at the one in St. Petersburg, Putin had been especially 
warm, giving him a big hug.   Putin had also offered to 
help investigate the 1999 parliamentary shootings, Sargisan 
said, although the Armenian side had declined the offer. 
 
EVANS 

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