US embassy cable - 04DJIBOUTI1498

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DPI CHAIRMAN PROPOSES U.S. MILITARY CONTROL OVER DJIBOUTI'S AMBOULI AIRPORT

Identifier: 04DJIBOUTI1498
Wikileaks: View 04DJIBOUTI1498 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Djibouti
Created: 2004-11-22 12:36:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD DJ TC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 001498 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF AND AF/E; LONDON/PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
STATE ALSO FOR EB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, ETRD, DJ, TC 
SUBJECT: DPI CHAIRMAN PROPOSES U.S. MILITARY CONTROL OVER 
DJIBOUTI'S AMBOULI AIRPORT 
 
REF: A. DJIBOUTI 1443 
     B. DJIBOUTI 1034 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARGUERITA D. RAGSDALE. 
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
 1. (C) Summary:  Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, Executive 
Chairman of Dubai Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation 
(the parent company to Dubai Ports International which 
manages Djibouti's existing maritime port and airport), has 
put forward a proposal that the U.S. military, based at Camp 
Lemonier, assume control in its entirety of Djibouti's sole 
airport at Ambouli.  In exchange for such control, the U.S. 
military would construct, at its own expense, a new civilian 
international airport that would support what Sulayem 
anticipates will be a growing tourism industry in Djibouti. 
Sulayem broached the proposal during a November 16 meeting, 
at his request, with Ambassador and Major General Samuel 
Helland, Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of 
Africa.  Sulayem said the expected influx of business and 
tourist travel through Ambouli airport might form a long-term 
security threat to Camp Lemonier, thus making more valuable 
U.S. control of the Ambouli facility as an airport 
exclusively for military use.  Sulayem's initial proposal did 
not include a clear role for France or its existing 
interests, preferring to leave the matter to the U.S. 
Sulayem's proposal is blessed by Djibouti's aggressive and 
key businessman Abdurrahman Boreh, who, with the Government 
of Djibouti and with Dubai Ports, Customs and Free Zone 
Corporation, are investing USD 120 million in construction of 
Djibouti's new shipping port, now under construction, at 
Doraleh.  It is not clear, however, if the proposal is 
blessed by Djibouti's President Guelleh. A meeting between 
Guelleh and Sulayem, that also would include Boreh, was 
scheduled for the same evening. There are important residual 
issues in Sulayem's proposition, such as presidential 
concurrence and our relationship with the French. There is 
also the nuts and bolts matter of cost and benefit to the 
U.S., which must ultimately drive the stance we take. End 
summary. 
 
2. (C) Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, Executive Chairman of Dubai 
Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation (the parent company 
to Dubai Ports International which manages Djibouti's 
existing maritime port and airport), accompanied by 
Djiboutian businessman Abdurrahman Boreh and current General 
Director of DPI entities in Djibouti, David Hawker, met 
November 16 at the Embassy with Ambassador and Major General 
Samuel Helland, Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force 
Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).  The meeting was at Sulayem's 
request, ostensibly to discuss the future of DPI in Djibouti 
and how its operations might affect Camp Lemonier, as well as 
the new Doraleh port now under construction (see reftels), in 
which Sulayem's company, the Government of Djibouti and Boreh 
are investing USD 120 million. Pol/Econ Officer sat in as 
notetaker. 
 
3. (C) Sulayem initiated discussions by making the point that 
Djibouti is in need of an updated international airport which 
could service an expected influx of business and tourist 
traffic once Djibouti's new Doraleh port comes on line.  He 
detailed the interest of Dubai Ports, Customs and Free Zone 
Corporation in investing in Djibouti through development of 
the country's tourism potential.  It would be his company's 
preference to cater to the high-end luxury tourist and 
business traveller, constructing hotels and recreation 
facilities for same. In Sulayem's view, natural growth 
stemming from traffic coming into and out of the Doraleh 
port, would significantly increase flight volume into and out 
of Djibouti.  This, in Sulayem's opinion, would not create an 
ideal security environment for Camp Lemonier, now based on 
the perimeter of Djibouti's existing single-runway civilian 
and military airport at Ambouli. 
 
4. (C) Sulayem said he believed the U.S. military would be in 
Djibouti for many years to come.  In addition, the U.S. Navy 
has contracted to lease at least four fuel storage tanks at 
the new Doraleh port, which will come on line between April 
and June of 2005.  Thus it is likely that Qatar, Kuwait and 
other Gulf countries would increasingly have less future 
appeal to the U.S. military for its security needs. He 
continued that Djibouti is ideal because of its strategic 
location, stable government and relative safety.  In such an 
environment, the military would naturally want to expand its 
base of operations and the logical location would be at the 
existing airport where it currently is billeted. 
 
5. (C)  Ambassador asked Sulayem what would he propose, in 
the scenario given, one do with  the French military, which 
also has basing facilities at the current airport?  She 
continued that Djibouti has already agreed in principle to 
grant France an additional 21 hectares at the current airport 
in order to help France meet its stated desire for added 
berthing and aircraft staging space. Sulayem responded that, 
unfortunately, "France would have to be your problem." 
 
6. (C) Boreh interjected that he was aware of the agreement 
in principle in French, and appeared to confirm its 
existence.  He continued that this is why Djibouti so badly 
needs better coordination between its various sectors.  He 
said it was his intention to raise with President Guelleh, 
during a meeting he and Sulayem would have later that 
evening, the "mixed signals" Djibouti sometimes sends because 
of a lack of coordination. 
 
7. (C) Leaving aside the issue of France for the moment, 
Sulayem went on to say that it would be easier to move the 
civilian airport to a new location than to move the U.S. 
military base and expand the existing airport.  The 
Djiboutian military, which also uses the existing airport, 
would not be a problem because its fleet consists only of two 
helicopters and two fixed wing aircraft.  It could use the 
new airport.  Whoever took over the old airport should pay 
for construction of the new one, Sulayem said.  General 
Helland advised Sulayem that it was highly unlikely anyone in 
Washington would be convinced to pay for an entirely new 
airport.  Cost of construction, as well as the amount of 
money that would be needed to bring the existing airport up 
to standard would be prohibitive. 
 
8. (C) Sulayem and Boreh put the cost of a new airport at 
around USD 100 million.  They then put forward a series of 
alternative funding options, most of which were variations on 
ascribing cost for the U.S. military's base lease in 
Djibouti.  Boreh's first idea was to allocate specific funds 
from the cost of the base lease for construction of the new 
airport, which would be carried out by DPI and the Government 
of Djibouti.  Sulayem topped that idea with a suggestion that 
perhaps the base lease amount be waived altogether for a set 
number of years in return for funding of construction of a 
new airport.  The final option the two presented was a 
negotiated sale of the current airport to both the French and 
U.S. militaries and the proceeds used to help build a new 
airport.  This could give the U.S. all the land on one side 
of the runway and the French military all the land on the 
other side of the runway, including the existing terminal 
facility, Boreh suggested.  Ambassador and General Helland 
both expressed skepticism regarding the feasibility and 
financial practicality of Sulayem's proposition and its 
alternatives. 
 
9. (C) Comment:  We do not believe Sulayem and Boreh are in a 
position at the moment to offer or negotiate any of the deals 
they proposed in their meeting with Ambassador and CJTF-HOA 
Commander.  That said, they are to be taken seriously as 
interlocutors, given their fiscal and investment influence in 
Djibouti and their clout with President Guelleh.  Also, Boreh 
is an astute and serious businessman who is rarely deterred 
from a project he has set out to accomplish.  A new 
international airport for Djibouti remains very much on his 
radar.  The existing airport, with its single runway, is 
woefully inadequate for what he hopes to create for 
Djibouti's future. 
 
10. (C) Comment continued:  The pair may, for the moment, 
have the intention merely to plant ideas as the U.S. is in 
the midst of negotiations to renew its lease of Camp 
Lemonier.  There is no doubt that if the U.S. ultimately saw 
some value in the propositions-- or variants thereof -- 
Sulayem and Boreh could make it happen. However, there are 
important residual issues such as concurrence of President 
Guelleh, our relationship with the French, and implications 
for French interests here, in whatever we choose to do. 
There is also the nuts and bolts matter of cost and benefit 
to the U.S., which must ultimately drive our stance in 
Djibouti and which currently appears quite weak .  End 
comment. 
 
11. (U) General Helland has cleared this message. 
RAGSDALE 

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