US embassy cable - 04CARACAS3584

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 003584 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2034 
TAGS: PREL, EPET, PGOV, PHUM, ENRG, VE 
SUBJECT: "HEGEMONY IS A CHALLENGE:" CHAVISTA LEADER VIEWS 
GOV 
 
 
Classified By: DCM - Steve McFarland for reason 1.4 (D) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  Chavez supporter and Patria Para Todos 
(PPT) secgen Jose Albornoz talked with DCM November 18 about 
impending cabinet changes, policy challenges for Chavez and 
the MVR party, and potential to improve bilateral relations. 
PPT accepts that party stalwart Ali Rodriguez will leave 
PDVSA to be Foreign Minister, but is resisting a proposal to 
replace Ambassador to the US Bernanrdo Alvarez_ with William 
Izarra.  New PDVSA president may be Energy Minister Ramirez_. 
 Internally, Chavez' challenge is to not let political 
hegemony be undone by corruption.  Albornoz said the GOV paid 
attention to international and to US views on human rights 
cases, pointing to the release of Henrique Capriles; he said 
the Sumate case essentially would remain in suspended 
animation, so that the case could be revived in 2006 if 
needed.  Albornoz made a strong pitch for improved bilateral 
relations, including a presidential summit in 2005; DCM said 
the summit was improbable, and stressed that improved 
relations would depend on the resolution of each sides' 
concerns, including Sumate, the penal code, and press 
freedom.  End Summary. 
 
 
Cabinet Changes in the Works 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Chavez ally and PPT SecGen Jose Albornoz stated that 
PDVSA president Ali Rodriguez, a key PPT leader, would move 
to the Foreign Ministry as early as November 19.  Energy and 
Mines (MEM) Minister Rafael Ramirez_ was the leading candidate 
to replace Rodriguez; Albornoz warned that Ramirez_ was close 
to Cuba (comment:  Rodriguez was rumored to be very close to 
Castro as well).  Albornoz said that there was another idea 
floating around:  to move Ambassador to the U.S. Bernardo 
Alvarez_ back to replace Ramirez_, and to send to Washington 
William Izarra, the theoretician of the revolution, former 
coup plotter, and father of Communications Minister Andres 
Izarra.  The PPT was trying hard to resist this, Albornoz 
said, and warned that Izarra was harder-line than Alvarez_, 
and also that it was Marta Harnecker--who has an office in 
Chavez' palace--that was pushing Izarra's candidacy. 
(comment:  Izarra is a low-key and approachable ideologue 
whom Chavez had distanced himself from.  Izarra did valuable 
work in the referendum, and in now back in Chavez' favor.) 
DCM did not say, "oh what a shame if Alvarez_ were to be 
replaced."  The other cabinet change in the works is to 
replace Health Minister Capella with the sister of Army 
commander Gen. Baduel.  Albornoz said that Capella had been 
forced out because his arrogance had caused considerable 
problems in a ministry which had to satisfy numerous unions 
and groups of customers. 
 
"Hegemony is a Challenge:" 
-------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Albornoz said that during the November 13 meeting at 
Fuerte Tiuna with the Chavista governors and mayors, Chavez 
underscored the need to fight corruption and inefficiency. 
There were, however, initial signs of discord in Chavez' MVR 
party.  Chavez' recent order to the MVR to respond positively 
to the desire for cooperation from the Union party of 
Francisco Arias Cardenas (ex-Chavez coupplotter, and former 
Chavez rival) had really annoyed MVR deputies like Nicolas 
Maduro, Iris Varela, and William Lara.  These deputies feared 
that Arias Cardenas could somehow displace them, Albornoz 
asserted.  For the PPT, however, now was a time of 
opportunity:  the party now had 30 regional assembly 
delegates, and 27 mayors.  The PPT was pushing its deputies 
to get on accountability commissions in their respective 
assemblies in order to support anti-corruption efforts 
(comment:  in many cases, probably to ensure corruption flows 
their own way).  Meanwhile, the Chavistas are focused on the 
2005 national assembly elections.  The Chavistas supported 
the Electoral Council (CNE) decision to suspend the December 
recall elections (of opposition deputies) because any 
opposition victory would be a real boost for the opposition, 
whereas an MVR victory would have little additional impact on 
the heels of their August 15 and October 31 successes.  It 
was, however, a fiercely fought debate within the Chavista 
parties, Albornoz said. 
 
Better Relations with the U.S.? 
-------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C)  Albornoz stressed that Ali Rodriguez would, as 
Foreign Minister, aim for improved bilateral relations -- 
ideally to the point that there could be a Chavez-Bush summit 
in 2005.  DCM said that while nothing was impossible, this 
sounded very improbable.  The USG view is that presidential 
 
 
meetings reflect a positive bilateral relationship.  There 
would have to be considerable improvement on the issues each 
country is concerned about.  In the case of the U.S., these 
included Sumate, the penal code, and the media law.  Albornoz 
asked if we had not noticed that the Sumate case had moved in 
the favor of the defendants; he also claimed to have lobbied 
Chavez, at our request, to free the then jailed Henrigue 
Capriles.  DCM said we had.  Albornoz (who bears a grudge 
against Sumate from when Sumate trounced his own Comando 
Ayacucho in 2003-4) said that the judicial action against 
Sumate would be frozen, but not dropped altogether, so that 
the GOV could take it up again during the 2006 presidential 
campaign if needed.  On the penal code, Albornoz offered only 
that Venezuela was not as advanced a society as the US; on 
the media law, he agreed that it was "crap" ("una cagada") as 
drafted.  He nodded assent when the DCM observed that its 
purpose was to reduce TV network income by imposing local 
content rules.  Back to Rodriguez, Albornoz said that the new 
Foreign Minister would be interested in meeting privately 
early on with the Ambassador; DCM urged him to press 
Rodriguez to do so. 
 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
5.  (C) Albornoz usually offers a tantalizing mix of 
insights, news, and self-promotion.  Our take: 
 
--While the decision to replace the ineffective FonMin Perez 
is logical, the choice of Ali Rodriguez is curious.  It would 
seem to foreshadow an increase in Chavez' oil diplomacy, but 
it also raises questions about where PDVSA is headed.  The 
change would make some sense from Chavez's perspective:  it 
reduces the PPT's disproportionate power in PDVSA (Ramirez_, 
although a protege of Rodriguez, lacks the latter's political 
heft).  It would be a graceful exit for Rodriguez, and 
Rodriguez would offer Chavez far more ability to execute 
policies than FonMin Perez. 
 
--There is some churning about within the MVR and pro-Chavez 
groups.  Thus far we have seen nothing that Chavez can't 
 
easily control -- but there are differences out there over 
direction and resources and personalities, and we believe the 
Chavista hegemony will magnify those differences over time. 
 
--The international message on Sumate has had at least some 
positive effect.  Indeed, had prosecutor Anderson not been 
assassinated November 18, it is possible that the Sumate case 
might have evolved more positively in a short period of time 
-- although Albornoz's desire for what he called a "sword of 
Damocles" was and remains a plausible option. 
Brownfield 
 
 
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      2004CARACA03584 - CONFIDENTIAL