US embassy cable - 04ANKARA6489

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 006489 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2014 
TAGS: ECIN, EU, PGOV, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: EUR DAS LAURA KENNEDY MEETS TURKISH OFFICIALS TO 
DISCUSS UPCOMING EU DECISION 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: EUR DAS Laura Kennedy visited Ankara November 
11-12 to discuss with Turkish officials the December 17 
European Council decision on starting accession negotiations 
with Turkey.  Kennedy met with Parliamentary Foreign Affairs 
Committee Chairman Mehmet Dulger, MFA Deputy U/S for EU 
Affairs Volkan Bozkir, National Security Council General 
Secretary Yigit Alpogan, Secretary General for EU Affairs 
 
SIPDIS 
Murat Sungar and MFA Deputy U/S Ertugrul Apakan.  Her meeting 
with MFA Deputy U/S Baki Ilkin on Aegean issues is reported 
septel.  DAS Kennedy emphasized U.S. support for Turkey's EU 
membership and urged Turkish officials to take the necessary 
steps to ensure a positive decision.  She explained that she 
had come from Brussels where EU officials, including Turkey's 
strongest supporters, considered it essential that Turkey 
conclude a protocol to the Ankara agreement to formalize the 
participation of new EU members (including Republic of 
Cyprus) in the EU-Turkey Customs Union.  Turkish officials 
expressed varying degrees of disappointment with the European 
Commission report, complaining that Turkey was being 
discriminated against.  Some Turkish officials insisted that 
the EU must correct certain problems in the report, such as 
the reference to the "open-ended process."  On the protocol 
to the Ankara Agreement, all of the Turkish officials agreed 
that it was highly unlikely that the Turkish government would 
do as the Commission requested before December 17, but 
Alpogan and Sungar indicated that the government was prepared 
to take the step after December 17.  The Turks also insisted 
that the Council's decision must be clear and set a 
reasonable date to start negotiations.  End Summary 
 
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Turkish Parliament - Mehmet Dulger 
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2. (SBU)  Mehmet Dulger, Chairman of the Parliament's Foreign 
Affairs Committee, conveyed Turkey's appreciation for the 
long-standing U.S. support for Turkey to join the EU.  &We 
know what is expected of us,8 he said, pointing out that 
Turkey has already taken significant steps to meet EU 
requirements.  And these enormous changes have been easily 
accepted by the Turkish people.  Nevertheless, Turkey wants 
to conserve what is special about Turkey ) &We are not 
French.8  On the other side, many Europeans continue to fear 
Turkey.  For some it is because of Turkey,s size ) Turkey 
will increase the EU population by 12 percent and dwarf the 
smaller countries, such as Slovenia and Estonia.  For other 
Europeans, it is historical prejudices.   Dulger asserted 
that Turkey,s membership will mean that the EU states must 
examine their values.  He emphasized that Turkey does not 
view accession as a choice between Europe and the U.S. 
 
3.  (C) Dulger was optimistic that the European Council would 
endorse the start of negotiations.  However, he said that the 
Council should correct the reference in the Commission 
recommendation about &open-ended8 negotiations.  He 
acknowledged that Turks are "hyper-sensitive" and do not 
fully understand European reasoning.  Dulger said he 
recognizes that the negotiations will be long and difficult, 
adding that the Irish told him they did not want to remember 
their difficult negotiations. 
 
4.  (C) Ambassador Kennedy agreed that accession would not 
harm strong U.S.-Turkey relations and cited the UK as an 
example of an EU member with strong ties to the U.S.  She 
stressed the importance of Turkey,s political leaders 
shaping public opinion, especially in regard to the 
Commission's reference to open-ended negotiations.  She 
emphasized that the Commission's recommendation should not be 
viewed as discrimination but as differentiation, which 
reflects Turkey,s unique characteristics. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Foreign Ministry -- Volkan Bozkir 
--------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Ambassador Volkan Bozkir, Deputy Under Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs for the EU offered the most detailed 
discussion and frank explanation of Turkey,s position on the 
Commission report and the December 17 Council decision. 
Bozkir said that the Commission report was less positive than 
Turkey had expected, and he identified three pitfalls for the 
December 17 European Council decision:  1) The Council 
decision must be clear ) not a decision for another 
decision; 2) The date to start negotiations must be clear and 
reasonable.  3) The Commission's reference to the 
&open-ended process8 must be replaced.  He pointed out that 
the sentence following is even worse.  (Note:  Bozkir was 
referring to the sentence:  &Regardless of the outcome of 
the negotiations or the subsequent ratification process, the 
relations between the EU and Turkey must ensure that Turkey 
remains fully anchored in European structures.8)  Bozkir 
said the wording was &very bad8 and omitted mention of 
accession.  He bitterly joked that the Commission's reference 
to European structures could mean the European Basketball 
Association. 
 
6.  (C) Ambassador Kennedy told Bozkir that the U.S. has 
advised the EU to avoid adding &cautionary language8 to its 
decision.  She added that it is important that Turkey not 
turn a yes decision by the Council into something else.  When 
questioned, Bozkir confirmed that Turkey cannot live with the 
current Commission language.  &We have 41 years of 
experience with the EU; we have suffered a lot from vague 
wording and promises not kept.8  It is essential that the 
Council define at the beginning that the objective is 
membership, he added. 
 
7.  (C)  Ambassador Kennedy told Bozkir that EU procedures 
are changing ) the EU is applying lessons learned from 
earlier enlargements, and therefore, Turkey should not feel 
that it is being discriminated against.  Bozkir countered 
that Turkey is being asked to do more than other candidates. 
For example, Turkey is required to solve any issues relating 
to the Customs Union before accession talks can start.  For 
other candidates, the question of a Customs Union comes up in 
the course of the negotiations.  In addition, the EU still 
does not endorse Turkey as a market economy but considers 
Romania a market economy.  &This is a political -) not 
economic -- judgment.8 
 
8.  (C) Ambassador Kennedy told Bozkir that she had met 
earlier in the week with EU officials in Brussels and even 
Turkey,s strongest advocates in the EU insist that Turkey 
must sign an additional protocol to the 1963 Ankara Agreement 
that would include the Republic of Cyprus in the Turkey-EU 
Customs Union.  Bozkir said the Commission sent them a draft 
protocol that included only Cyprus.  He noted that Turkey has 
not completed protocols for new members such as Spain, 
Portugal, Greece, Austria, Finland and Sweden, but told the 
Commission that it was ready to start negotiations that would 
include all 16 new members ) the earlier six plus the more 
recent ten.  He added that Turkey announced this summer that 
9 new members (not including ROC) were included in the 
Customs Union and issued another announcement in September to 
include Cyprus.  (Note:  Greek Embassy Counselor Efthymios 
Pantzopouos told Econoff that the September notice referred 
to Cyprus, not the Republic of Cyprus, which is unacceptable, 
he said, to the Commission.) 
 
9.  (C) Bozkir said that Turkey will not meet the EU demand. 
We must first receive our answer from the December 17 Council 
decision, he said.  &Politically, we cannot move; we will 
take that risk.  This isn't news to the EU.8  He argued that 
Turkey has already made considerable concessions on Cyprus, 
while the EU has done nothing in return.  When Kennedy 
pressed, Bozkir refused to reconsider and noted that: "When I 
say this (that Turkey cannot sign the protocol now, it is 
serious." 
 
10.  (C) DCM asked Bozkir about Turkey,s assessment of the 
positions of the EU member states.  Bozkir said that Slovakia 
had not yet decided but the visiting Slovak FM believed their 
parliament would be positive.  Despite public opposition, the 
Netherlands would not be a problem because of its role as 
current EU President.  Austria is a headache, he added, but 
&let them decide.8  France &has its own dynamic,8 and the 
rest are OK.  In the end, nothing is guaranteed, he 
concluded. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
National Security Council - Yigit Alpogan 
----------------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) EUR DAS Laura Kennedy and the Ambassador met with 
Turkey's first civilian NSC Secretary General, Yigit Alpogan, 
on November 12.  DAS Kennedy congratulated Alpogan on his 
appointment and said she hoped to see him in Washington. 
Alpogan responded that he would be pleased to accept, and 
thought January might be a good time. 
 
-- Association Protocol and Cyprus 
---------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) Ambassador Kennedy said that she wanted to compare 
notes about what countries were problematic on Turkey's 
beginning accession negotiations.  On Cyprus, the US was 
working to avoid the addition of any new conditions on Turkey 
and Washington was gratified that no such demands appear to 
be garnering support.  However, she reiterated the constant 
message from Europeans on the need for a separate protocol to 
the Ankara Agreement. 
 
13. (C) Alpogan responded that Turkey had taken the technical 
steps necessary following the accession of new members and 
did not think anyone in Ankara was of a mind to do anything 
more on Cyprus.  Whatever Turkey does, "it won't satisfy the 
Greek Cypriots," he said.  They will want more; "we don't 
trust them."  He said that the GOT saw the request for the 
protocol as parallel to the idea heard in some quarters that 
Turkey should withdraw troops from the island.  "A date will 
come if it comes."  Turkey had met the Copenhagen criteria 
and wanted no additional conditions.  Frankly, he continued, 
the feeling in Ankara is that the Turkish Cypriots continued 
to be punished including through blockage of EU regulations 
on aid and trade, and the Greek Cypriots continue to be 
rewarded for the situation on the island. The EU "broke its 
promises" on Cyprus, he said.  The GOT wanted to see progress 
before moving on other fronts vis-a-vis Cyprus. 
 
14. (C) Ambassador Kennedy reiterated that the protocol 
requirement had not originated with the Greek Cypriots but in 
Brussels and that the US did not see it as a concession to 
Nicosia.  Alpogan believed that those advocating this step 
thought it would "soften up" Papadopolous, but that would not 
work, he stated.  What Papadopolous was really seeking was 
Turkey's recognition of the GOC, withdrawal of forces and 
return of settlers.  For its part, Turkey only wanted two 
things from the EU: 1) a decision to start accession 
negotiations based on objective criteria and on an equal 
basis with other candidates; and, 2) a definite date to begin 
negotiations 
in 2005.  He was optimistic that the EU would do this. 
 
15. (C) Alpogan said the EU faced a decision on what kind of 
Europe it wanted:  a dwarf with no strategic vision that 
would simply be a Christian club, or a partner of the US that 
reaches out to the regions that surround it, such as the 
Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia.  "This will be decided 
on December 17," he declared.  If the EU leaders make the 
wrong choice, Turkey would turn the Copenhagen Criteria into 
the "Ankara Criteria" and continue with its reforms while 
maintaining a western orientation.  Alpogan said the "yes" 
part of the decision on Turkey is important but insufficient 
without a date. 
 
16. (C) Returning to the protocol, the Ambassador observed 
that the other 24 EU members were trying to discipline 
Papadopolous and were simply looking for a talking point that 
would allow them to tell him to pipe down.  Alpogan said he 
understood, but even he was not convinced signing the 
protocol now was the right thing for Turkey to do.  He said 
it would be sad if the EU passed judgment on Turkey's 
accession on this issue.  He acknowledged the Ambassador's 
point that the EU would require Turkey to conclude the 
protocol before negotiations could begin.  "It will be a new 
ball game" after December 17 if Turkey receives a date.  He 
said the protocol is actually ready, but no one is prepared 
to move on it at this time.  Kennedy and the Ambassador urged 
Ankara signal before December 17 that it was prepared to sign 
the protocol thereafter.  Alpogan repeated that the 
atmosphere in Ankara was that Turkey owes nothing more, 
rather others owe Turkey (on ending the isolation of the 
Turkish Cypriots).  In any event, "there are just five weeks 
more," he concluded. 
 
--Keeping the Aegean Calm 
------------------------- 
 
17. (C) Turning to Greece, Ambassador Kennedy noted that 
Athens was unhappy over the recent USG decision to recognize 
the constitutional name of Macedonia.  This had put the 
Greeks in a sour mood toward the US.  Alpogan congratulated 
the US on this "courageous decision" that contributed to 
peace in the Balkans. 
 
18. (C) Officials in Brussels had raised with Kennedy recent 
reports of aircraft incidents in the Aegean.  She told 
Alpogan that the US, like Turkey, disagreed with the GOG's 
position on FIR and 10 NM territorial air claims.  The US 
wanted the region to be calm and she was confident that 
Turkey would act in a statesman-like manner.  Alpogan 
attributed the Greeks' complaints to their mistaken belief 
that Ankara would maintain the same low level of activity 
over the Aegean that it exercised during the Olympics until 
after the EU Summit in December.  He said Turkish Air Force's 
return to pre-Olympics optempo had surprised Athens, but what 
was going on now was "the same old pattern" and not a big 
issue.  He emphasized that Ankara remains committed to 
dialogue with Athens and, in fact, incoming and outgoing MFA 
Deputy Undersecretaries Ilkin and Apakan had just reached 
agreement with the GOG during their visit to Athens to resume 
meetings of bilateral committees working on various CBMs and 
bilateral Aegean issues. 
 
--Caucasus/Central Asia 
----------------------- 
 
19. (C) Alpogan asked Ambassador Kennedy for her assessment 
of new Russian bases in Tajikistan.  The Kyrgystan base was 
clearly designed in response to the coalition base at Manas. 
Russia lacks resources, despite the Russian military's desire 
to return to the region.  In Tajikistan, the Russians were 
not creating a new base, but consolidating the old 201st 
division that had existed there for decades.  This should 
also be viewed in the context of the withdrawal of Russian 
troops from Tajikistan's borders; it was not a new deployment. 
 
20. (C) Ambassador Kennedy suggested that Central Asia and 
the Caucasus were two regions where the US and Turkey should 
deepen their dialogue.  Countries in the region could benefit 
from advice from outsiders that they trust.  Both Turkey and 
the US wanted to promote the independence of these states, 
which usually meant breaking Russian monopolies' control over 
key infrastructure. 
 
------------------------------ 
EU Secretariat -- Murat Sungar 
------------------------------ 
 
21.  (C) Murat Sungar, Secretary General for EU Affairs, told 
Ambassador Kennedy that the EU should not expect any more 
concessions on Cyprus before the December 17 Council meeting. 
 Signing the protocol would be considered a concession, which 
would be very difficult for this government.  It would be 
seen as Turkey recognizing Cyprus without receiving a yes 
from the EU.  For the moment, we are refusing to talk about 
Cyprus as much as possible, he said. 
 
22.  (C) Sungar said that the government was disturbed by the 
Commission report, and there is still disagreement in the 
government about how we should interpret it.  So far, we have 
used this process to correct a number of problems in Turkey. 
Unfortunately, some in Europe are trying to find pretexts to 
block Turkey.  For example, the Christian Democrats in the 
Netherlands, Austria and Germany are raising objections based 
on a European Parliament report.  And in Austria, they are 
still talking about 1683, when Turkish troops were at the 
walls of Vienna.  Others see Turkey's membership as a Trojan 
Horse for U.S. or Islamic influence in the EU. 
 
23.  (C) In the end, the EU leadership realizes that it must 
find a way to satisfy Turkey, he noted.  For example, a 
decision without a specific date would end our relationship 
with the EU.  He advised that the Council should just 
reference the Commission's report.  It will pose a big 
problem for Turkey if the Council restates some of the most 
objectionable language from the Commission report in its 
decision. 
 
24.  (C) Sungar said that Turkey will face considerable 
difficulties in the negotiation process.  He expected that 
accession will be difficult for certain sectors in the 
economy and he thought that the country,s employers might 
have second thoughts about joining once the implications of 
full membership become clearer.  Turkey,s bureaucracy faces 
serious challenges managing the process.  The government is 
considering several schemes to get organized; however, &we 
are not taking any action now.  We don,t want to appear 
presumptuous.8  He explained that it will be essential that 
the chief negotiator have sufficient political power to get 
things done in the government.  It will also be important to 
implement a communication strategy to address European 
attitudes about Turkey. 
 
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Foreign Ministry - Ertugrul Apakan 
---------------------------------- 
 
25.  (C) DAS Kennedy told Ertugrul Apakan, MFA U/S Designate, 
that the U.S. will continue close dialogue with Ankara on a 
range of issues.  The U.S. is focused on quietly helping 
Turkey get an early date to begin negotiations and working to 
prevent imposition of additional Cyprus-related conditions 
before December 17.  Kennedy informed Apakan Turkey's EU 
supporters had told her that it is important for Turkey to 
sign before December 17 an additional protocol to Turkey's 
Association Agreement even though it is not a legal 
requirement. 
 
26.  (C) Kennedy pointed out the protocol takes account of 
all ten new members, not just the ROC, and Turkey could 
supplement it with a side letter indicating no change on the 
GOT position on Cyprus, as it had upon signing the EU 
Constitution Treaty.  This will merely formalize what Turkey 
has already done and would prevent the ROC from gaining 
support for its other demands.  Cyprus Department Head Bilman 
asserted that the Greek Cypriots are demanding a bilateral 
protocol, not one with the Commission.  DCM Deutsch said we 
had not yet seen what the Commission is asking the Turks to 
sign, but if it is an agreement with all ten new members, it 
could be a good idea for the GOT to sign it.  (Note:  We 
e-mailed a copy of the draft agreement to the Department 
November 17; it is not a bilateral agreement.  End Note.) 
 
27.  (C) Apakan pointed out the lack of normal trade 
relations between northern and southern Cyprus.  Turkey wants 
all restrictions on both sides lifted, he said; this will 
facilitate overall settlement, which should occur in a UN 
framework, although the EU may contribute.  Kennedy said the 
sides need to return to working on the Annan Plan after 
December, but the U.S. is now focused on getting to December 
17.  Turkey did everything asked of it on Cyprus; the U.S. 
does not expect more unilateral Turkish concessions on Cyprus 
before December. 
 
This cable was cleared by DAS Laura Kennedy. 
EDELMAN