US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS4937

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004937 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/ERA, AND S/CRS 
LONDON FOR DAVID BAME 
BERLIN FOR KRISTINE PELTZ 
PARIS FOR GUS RECINOS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, EUN, NATO, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: EU CIV/MIL PLANNING AND THE OPS CENTER: SHAPING 
THE OUTCOME 
 
REF: A. BRUSSELS 4686 B. BERLIN 3648 
 
Classified By: USEU polmil officer Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  As EU High Representative for Common Foreign 
and Security Policy Javier Solana and the PSC review papers 
designed to create a civ/mil planning cell and a capacity to 
stand up an EU Operations Center, they will consider it in 
the context of strategic EU efforts to define its future 
global role in security matters.  In line with last year's 
adopted European Security Strategy (ESS), Solana's focus is 
on development of the EU's concept of its comparative 
advantages, with a special focus on the instruments of "soft 
power" and integrating civilian and military components of 
crisis management.  By 
pushing for stronger NATO liaison relationships with the EU 
civ/mil cell, we can help channel its evolution and, in so 
doing, strengthen joint NATO-EU efforts to integrate 
civil/military activities rather than emphasize core military 
activities better 
left to NATO.  End summary. 
 
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December 2003 
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2. (C)  A FR-UK-GE paper on civ/mill planning and an EU 
Operations Center that went to Javier Solana for his 
consideration in early November 2004, put flesh on the bones 
of a long-standing EU idea.  At the same time that the EU 
adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS), the December 
2003 European Council (Heads of State and Government) invited 
Solana to "propose the necessary measures for establishing  a 
cell with civil/military components to meet the objectives 
and comply with the principles" set out in the EU Presidency 
document entitled "European Defense: NATO/EU Consultation, 
Planning, and Operations."  The Heads 
of State stressed that this cell should be functional as 
early as possible in 2004. 
 
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June 2004 
---------- 
 
3. (C) The European Council Conclusions of June 2004 took the 
idea further, agreeing to work on establishing an EU 
Operations Center.  The Council specified that the Operations 
Center would not be a standing headquarters, and that the 
primary option for conducting autonomous military operations 
would remain National Headquarters. A decision to draw on the 
"collective capacity " of the EU Military staff would be 
taken, upon the advice of the Military Committee, in a case 
where a joint civil/military response is required and no 
National HQ is identified.  The Operations Center's charter 
would be to plan and conduct operations -- within the 
spectrum envisaged in the Treaty -- on the scale of Operation 
Artemis (Note: Operation Artemis involved a deployment of 
2000 personnel controlled by an OHQ of 70. End note.)  The 
Council specified that the civ/mill cell and facilities for 
the Operations Center would be located in the same building 
as the main structures of the EU Military staff. (Note: 
Currently, EUMS is housed at 150 Avenue de Cortenburgh in 
downtown 
Brussels. End note.) 
 
4. (C)  In that same month, ESDP HR Solana presented concept 
papers that spelled out the mission, functions, and terms of 
reference of both the civ/mil cell and the Operations Center. 
 
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Civ/Mil Cell 
------------ 
 
5. (C)  Under Solana's concept, the civ/mil cell would 
undertake strategic contingency planning at the initiative of 
the High Representative or the EU Political and Security 
Committee. Its mission would be to reinforce the national HQ 
designated to conduct an autonomous operation, and assist in 
integrating civilian and military operations.  Solana's 
concept charged the civ/mil cell with responsibility for 
creating and maintaining the capacity to stand up an 
Operations Center capable of planning and running an 
autonomous EU 
military operation. That responsibility is vested in a 
permanent 8-member core staff within the civ/mil cell (also 
referred to as the "Key Nucleus). 
 
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Operations Center 
----------------- 
 
6. (C)  On paper, the Operations Center is designed to exist 
only as an empty room with 60 workstations, and required 
communications equipment -- until it is activated by a 
consensus decision of the European Council.  The FR-UK-GE 
paper added a requirement that the EU Military Committee must 
conduct a risk assessment and make a finding that the 
operations center is capable of running the operation -- 
including the risk of escalation.  This provision was 
conceived as one of several institutional "locks" that will 
provide political 
limits on the scope and ambition of the Ops Center. This is 
in addition to the other stipulations on size and location. 
The latest draft paper dated November 10, prepared by 
Solana's Council Secretariat staff dropped the requirement 
for military advice, calling only for an "assessment" that 
the Ops Center is capable of managing the risks associated 
with the Operation. If this language remains as currently 
drafted, it could represent a weakening of the political 
"locks" put in place in previous versions. 
 
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Looking at the Numbers 
---------------------- 
 
7. (C)  The proposed numbers of personnel designated for the 
civ/mil planning cell and the Operations Center (detailed ref 
a) are in keeping with previous estimates, and do not 
represent a departure from long-standing figures.  The 
Operations Center is designed to be able to support a command 
element in line with the "scale" of Operation Artemis, in 
which there were seventy Headquarters staff. The Council 
Secretariat's November 10 paper calls for a total of 29 
 
SIPDIS 
people within the civ/mil planning cell. Of those, 17 would 
constitute the Strategic Planning Branch, 4 represent the 
Command Group -- including the Commander and his personal 
staff, and 8 (including 4 housekeepers) would form the 
permanent core staff of the Operations Center in the event it 
is activated. The Strategic Planning Branch is to be 
operational as of January 1, 2005, while the Key Nucleus 
staff would become operational in January 2006. 
 
8. (C) It is important to note, however, that the personnel 
to staff an operation of this size is not actually assigned 
to the Operations Center; to staff an HQ of the size of 
Artemis would require transferring military and staff members 
who currently have other responsibilities in Brussels, as 
well as augmentation by experts from member states.  The 
FR-UK-GE paper proposed staffing limits: quantitative 
limitations are not specified in any of the relevant European 
Council mandates to Solana. Despite some efforts to limit its 
scope, political desire within the EU to move ahead with this 
project seems to be unequivocal. 
 
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Defining the Mission 
-------------------- 
 
9. (C)  US and Allied forces currently conduct planning for 
crisis management and military intervention at a combined 
force level, and joint force level (inter-service  According 
to our contacts, the EU civ/mil planning cell and Ops Center 
would be expected to plan and operate on the equivalent of 
the US inter-agency level, bringing together the full range 
of EU "instruments" including Commission experts on law 
enforcement, development and 
reconstruction, and civil administration, in conjunction with 
the required military component to ensure a secure 
environment in which the other instruments can be 
successfully deployed. 
 
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Channeling the Effort 
--------------------- 
 
10. (C)  EU planners and political leaders of some member 
states argue the civ/mil planning cell will provide a 
capability that has not previously existed by better 
integrating military tasks with the law enforcement and civil 
administration challenges that are part and parcel of most 
regional crises.  They frequently speak to us as if this is a 
new capacity that is lacking elsewhere in the world.  They 
also argue that it goes beyond the capabilities embodied in 
NATO's crisis management planning, or our own ability to 
integrate 
military, assistance, and political elements in a 
comprehensive approach to a crisis situation.  Those who 
belong to this school of thought believe in the need for the 
Operations Center, where all the EU "instruments" brought to 
bear in a crisis management operation can be coordinated.  In 
many ways, the EU focus is in keeping with the vision 
expressed by NATO's Strategic Commanders in an August 2004 
paper on the military challenges facing the Alliance over the 
next fifteen years, and offers areas for cooperation rather 
than duplication. 
 
11. (C)  Comment: Solana's strategic goal, supported by EU 
heads of government, is to carve out a more robust role for 
the EU on the world stage.  To do so, he believes this must 
include the ability to play a larger role in regional 
conflicts -- a role that includes not only political 
declarations and assistance programs, but also an integrated 
military component in support of the UN Security Council.  An 
EU better capable of handling the full range of challenges 
arising from failed and failing states is in our interest 
also, and 
should be encouraged.  In moving ahead, however, Solana is 
walking a tightrope between countries (led by France) that 
seek capabilities for the EU that would parallel those of 
NATO, and those countries (led by the UK, but cheered on by 
many of our other allies) which still see NATO as the primary 
structure for "hard security."  Sustained US engagement with 
the EU on the evolution of the civ/mil planning cell and 
Operations Center can be important in helping ensure that the 
 NATO-EU relationship remains viable for all future 
operations. To the extent that we can encourage progress in 
EU "inter-agency" planning, we can help 
ensure that the civ/mil cell is populated with Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA) experts, development and reconstruction 
planners, and civil administrators rather than military 
headquarters staff. Such an approach would emphasize the EUs 
capabilities in "soft power" projection, provide a multiplier 
for US efforts in the same direction, reinforce the role of 
NATO (SHAPE) planning for military missions, and forestall 
development of an EU Operational Headquarters. 
 
McKinley