US embassy cable - 04RANGOON1488

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001488 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, BM, Human Rights 
SUBJECT: BURMESE REGIME BEGINS RELEASE OF 4,000 PRISONERS 
 
REF: A. USDAO RANGOON IIR 6812001505 25OCT04 
     B. RANGOON 1462 AND PREVIOUS 
     C. RANGOON 1409 
 
Classified By: CDA a.i Ronald K. McMullen for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Citing "irregularities" of deposed Prime 
Minister Khin Nyunt's recently disbanded National 
Intelligence Bureau (NIB), the Burmese regime commenced on 
November 18-19 to release nearly 4,000 prisoners, including 
an unknown number of political detainees.  Although some 
observers speculate that the regime's move is an attempt to 
improve its standing with the international community, the 
SPDC is more likely focused on the domestic political scene. 
Criticism of the NIB is yet another assault on Khin Nyunt and 
the next step in an ongoing campaign to blame the country's 
ills on the former Prime Minister.  We see no signs that the 
gesture to release prisoners represents a fundamental change 
in the regime's posture toward the democratic opposition. 
The NLD does not have immediate expectations that the prison 
release will include party leaders Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin 
Oo.  See para 11 for press guidance recommendations.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (U) In a brief statement issued on November 18, the SPDC 
announced that it had suspended the prison terms of 3,937 
"convicts," with plans to release all of them from their 
respective prisons.  The announcement referenced an October 
22 order issued by SPDC Chairman Than Shwe dissolving the 
National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) (ref A) and "observed" 
that investigations had revealed the NIB may have committed 
"irregularities," presumably associated with the arrest and 
imprisonment of thousands of Burmese individuals over the 
past 16 years. 
 
3. (SBU) The prison release list, which the regime has not 
made publicly available, includes at least some, if not many, 
of Burma's estimated 1,400 political prisoners, the majority 
of whom were originally rounded up by agents from the Office 
of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI, known simply as 
"MI.").  MI dominated the NIB, an inter-departmental entity 
that coordinated the activities of four regime intelligence 
and investigative units and the entire MI apparatus has been 
the target of a massive purge underway since the October 19 
ouster of former OCMI chief, and Prime Minister, General Khin 
Nyunt (ref B). 
 
4. (U) It is uncertain how many of Burma's political 
prisoners will be affected by the massive release.  NIB 
detainees include not only "traditional" political prisoners 
such as political party members and student activists, but 
also armed insurgents and other ethnic minorities; 
perpetrators of politically motivated violent acts; violators 
of immigration law; and many white-collar criminals. 
Although prison authorities may assist some released 
prisoners with transportation, it is likely that many will 
have to fend for themselves and it could, therefore, take 
days or weeks to learn the fate of prisoners held in many 
remote locations.  Burma's total prison population is 
unknown, but is reported to be in the tens of thousands. 
 
5. (SBU) On November 19, Embassy sources indicated that 
officials at several of the 45 known regime prisons 
throughout Burma had already begun to release prisoners in 
accordance with SPDC instructions.  Among those observed 
departing prisons or reported to have joined their families 
at home were the following well-known political prisoners, 
several of whom have been the object of international 
campaigns seeking their release (Note: One source claimed 
that Min Ko Naing, a student leader during the 1988 
pro-democracy movement and perhaps the most well-known of 
Burma's political prisoners, had been released from prison in 
Rakhine State, but this could not be confirmed by COB.  End 
note). 
 
From Insein Prison (Rangoon): 
--U Win Tin, a famous 75 year-old journalist and founding NLD 
member from Rangoon (imprisoned since 1989); 
--U Kyaw Sann (Hsan), NLD MP-elect from Sagaing (since 1998); 
--U Ohn Maung, NLD MP-elect from Bago (1998); 
--U Toe Po, NLD MP-elect from Thanintharyi (1998); 
--Dr. May Win Myint, female NLD MP-elect from Rangoon (1997); 
--U Aung Zin, NLD member from Lashio; 
--U Htwe Myint, journalist and leader of the "Democracy 
Party" from Rangoon (1995). 
 
From Swebo Prison (Sagaing): 
--U Khun Sai, NLD supporter. 
 
From Thayet Prison (Magwe): 
--U Nyan Hla, NLD member from Rangoon. 
--Min Zaw Thein, youth activist from Rangoon. 
 
6. (SBU) On November 19, Emboffs visited Insein Prison in 
northern Rangoon, Burma's most notorious destination for 
political prisoners.  A crowd of 150-200 family members and 
political party supporters were gathered at the prison 
entrance, waiting with hope and anticipation that their loved 
ones would be among those released.  Witnesses confirmed that 
prison authorities had already released dozens of political 
prisoners, as well as numerous common criminals, and were 
expected to release some 1,000 prisoners by the end of the 
day.  The release operation was orderly, but prison officials 
were noticeably tense and vigorously questioned Emboffs, 
insisting they cease taking photographs at the scene. 
 
7. (C) We also spoke briefly with NLD Secretary U Lwin, who 
was pleased about the prison releases but had no immediate 
expectation that the SPDC would release party leaders ASSK or 
U Tin Oo anytime soon.  He observed that the general prison 
release was a step in the right direction, but "only a first 
step" that does not address the larger issues of political 
dialogue and reconciliation.  U Lwin opined that the regime 
had ordered the releases not as a goodwill gesture, but 
rather as a malicious action directed at military 
intelligence. 
 
Comment:  Not the Strategic Move It Appears to Be 
 
8. (U) Burmese leaders have a long tradition of periodically 
offering amnesty for prisoners, usually as a means of gaining 
religious merit in this predominantly-Buddhist culture or in 
order to curry political favor with one segment or another of 
this diverse and fractious country.  The current regime is no 
exception, having released large numbers of prisoners, 
including political detainees, on several occasions in the 
1990s.  However, the November 18 announcement, if fully 
implemented, is without precedent in its scale and apparent 
scope. 
 
9. (C) International observers are likely to speculate that 
the Burmese regime has undertaken this massive prison release 
in a calculated move to soften potential criticism at the 
ongoing International Labor Organization Governing Body 
meeting in Geneva and at the upcoming ASEAN Summit in 
Vientiane.  However, from our perspective, the SPDC is purely 
motivated by the domestic political situation.  Citing 
"irregularities" of the National Intelligence Bureau is yet 
another frontal assault on Khin Nyunt and the next step in an 
ongoing campaign to blame the country's ills on the former 
Prime Minister and his expansive empire, which included his 
once-powerful military intelligence network as well as broad 
commercial interests. 
 
10. (C) It would not appear that the gesture to release 
prisoners represents by any means a change in the regime's 
posture toward the democratic opposition or dissenters in 
general.  To the contrary, harassment of opposition 
supporters has continued in recent months (ref C), including 
the arrest on November 5 of three NLD members in Irrawaddy 
Division for possession of party position papers on education 
and health.  End Comment. 
 
Recommended Press Guidance 
 
11. (SBU) We recommend the Department welcome the inclusion 
political prisoners among the general prisoner release, with 
several important caveats:  for this step to have genuine 
meaning, all of Burma's political prisoners and detainees 
must be released, including ASSK and U Tin Oo as well as 
recently arrested pro-democracy activists; the SPDC must 
cease the arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention of 
individuals for their peaceful political activities; the 
regime must improve its overall human rights record, in 
particular by allowing and improving freedoms of association 
and speech; and, substantive political and economic progress 
in Burma will not be achieved unless the SPDC fosters a 
meaningful and fully inclusive political dialogue aimed at a 
genuine transition to democracy.  End recommendations for 
press guidance. 
MCMULLEN