US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE3015

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 003015 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, MOPS, IZ, NL, NATO, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAQ:  RECONFIGURING THE DUTCH PRESENCE 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 2766 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. HOOIJKAAS E-MAIL 11/15/04 ("POLITICS IN THE 
        NETHERLANDS") AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  A clear consensus in the Cabinet and 
parliament exists for concluding the Dutch deployment in Al 
Muthanna as scheduled.  The government's November 12 letter 
to parliament states Dutch troops will end their current 
mission in mid-March, although some personnel will stay 
longer (we understand six to eight weeks) to draw down the 
deployment, and the Netherlands will remain militarily 
engaged in Iraq through the NATO training mission.  The 
parliament chose not to debate the letter, reflecting the 
strongly held view that the government's decision is final. 
Extensive Embassy contacts with parliamentarians over the 
last few weeks confirms the view that, with the exception of 
Kamp's own Liberals,  there is virtually no support for a 
fourth extension of the mission.  FM Bot told Ambassador 
Sobel on November 15 that a solid majority in the Cabinet, 
including PM Balkenende, supports ending the mission as 
scheduled.  Kamp told Amb. Sobel on November 18 that he was 
sensitive to SecDef's suggestion the Dutch not characterize 
the end of their mission in Al Muthanna as the end of their 
military presence in Iraq.  He also reiterated that he was 
clear in his conversation with SecDef as to intention to end 
the mission as scheduled.  The uniformed military leadership, 
including CHOD Berlijn, stand firmly behind the Kamp's 
decision.  Although the British Ambassador has instructions 
to pursue the possibility of extending the Dutch presence, he 
advises that Balkenende has told Blair directly that this 
will not happen.  We will continue to pursue the Dutch 
interest in the NATO training mission and other options for 
retaining a Dutch military presence in Iraq before revisiting 
the question of extending the Al Muthanna deployment (in 
tandem with the UK and IIG) closer to the January 2005 
elections.  END SUMMARY. 
 
DUTCH GOVERNMENT RESTATES INTENTION TO WITHDRAW 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
2. (C) The Dutch government sent a letter to the Second 
Chamber of Parliament on November 12 describing its plans for 
Iraq over the next several months (ref B).  As expected, the 
letter, signed by FM Bot, Defense Minister Kamp, and 
Development Minister Van Ardenne, reiterated the previously 
stated position that the Dutch mission in Al Muthanna will 
conclude in mid-March of 2005, with the expectation that 
local Iraqi forces will, as scheduled, assume responsibility 
for security in the region.  In contrast to previous 
government statements (most notably by Bot), the letter made 
no reference to "extraordinary" or "unforeseen circumstances" 
having a bearing on a Dutch decision; the letter allows, 
however, that the "clearing out" of the mission "will take 
some time thereafter."  The letter also states that the Dutch 
government intends to make a "proportional contribution" to 
NATO and EU training missions in Iraq, noting in that context 
that "the departure of the Dutch contingent from Al Muthanna 
does not mean the end of the Dutch military involvement in 
Iraq." 
 
NO DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT 
----------------------- 
 
3. (C) In an unusual move, the foreign affairs and defense 
committees of the Second Chamber took note of the letter on 
November 16 but announced that there was "no need" for 
further public debate.  Had a debate taken place, it was 
expected that an overwhelming majority would have expressed 
support for the government's stated position, with only the 
conservative Liberal Party (VVD) pushing for an additional 
extension.  Liberal party foreign affairs spokesman Hans van 
Baalen later declared that he had chosen not to force the 
issue at this time, but might revisit it later depending on 
the situation in Iraq closer to the elections. 
 
4. (C) Embassy contacts with parliamentary leaders -- 
including floor leaders and defense spokesman for all three 
coalition parties as well as members of the main opposition 
party -- confirm that there is no stomach in parliament for a 
divisive debate on this issue a this time.  At least two 
major parties -- the Liberal Democrats (D-66) and the main 
opposition Labor Party (PvdA) -- are firmly opposed to a 
fourth extension, and only supported a third extension (last 
June) on the basis of assurances from Kamp that it would be 
the last.  (Comment:  This is the crux of the matter for 
Kamp.  He feels he has given his word and believes altering 
course may damage his credibility and undermine his 
relationship with parliament.  End Comment).  The Christian 
Democrats (CDA) -- Bot and Balkenende's party -- are also 
opposed to an extension of the current mission, although 
individual members have told us they do not rule out a 
reintroduction of Dutch troops at some point in the future. 
 
STRONG CONSENSUS IN CABINET 
--------------------------- 
 
5. (C) In a November 15 meeting with Amb. Sobel, FM Bot 
stressed that the cabinet was firmly behind the decision to 
draw down the Al Muthanna deployment on schedule.  Bot said 
that he had been alone in advocating a more flexible 
position, but his effort to retain a reference to "unforeseen 
circumstances" had run up against stiff opposition from Kamp, 
with most other cabinet ministers following his lead "in lock 
step."   Bot described PM Balkenende as "adamant" that the 
Dutch government end the deployment after eight months in 
accordance with the agreement it made with parliament last 
June.  In a separate meeting, Rob Swartbol, Balkenende's 
senior foreign policy advisor, confirmed that there had been 
"broad consensus" within the cabinet during its discussion of 
the draft letter on November 12. 
 
6. (C) According to Bot, Kamp was personally (and, he 
suggested, emotionally) committed to concluding the Dutch 
mission in Al Muthanna no later than mid-March.  In addition 
to the cabinet, Bot argued that Kamp had now also convinced 
the senior military service chiefs to support a draw down 
which they had earlier opposed.  (Note:  This has been 
confirmed through our own contacts with the uniformed 
military, including by CHOD Berlijn.)  Bot said that he found 
Kamp's arguments -- that the Netherlands has already done 
more than its fair share, and that the Dutch troops might be 
needed for missions in Africa later -- unconvincing, but they 
had resonance with the public. 
 
KAMP CLARIFIES DUTCH PLANS 
-------------------------- 
 
7. (S) On November 18, Kamp told Ambassador Sobel that he 
made clear in his telephone conversation with SecDef that the 
Dutch would not abandon Iraq.  The current Dutch deployment 
will be maintained at full strength until March 15; at that 
point, a "new group" of soldiers will be sent in for a short 
period (six-eight weeks) to facilitate the draw down and 
handover of regional control to the Iraqis.  Kamp anticipated 
that the British might send "a few troops" to the region at 
this time.  In response to a question from the Ambassador, 
Kamp said that he expected the Dutch contingent of a future 
NATO training mission to be about 100 troops (Note:  We have 
heard from other sources that the Dutch plan to provide 
approximately 30 trainers, possibly in addition to the 100 
troops.)  He did not know the details of how those troops 
would be deployed exactly, but took note of NATO's pressing 
requirement for force protection.  Looking ahead, Kamp said 
the Dutch may contribute to the NATO strategic reserve for 
the Balkans, in addition to fulfilling their NRF rotation 
commitment in 2005, and are also looking at sending special 
forces possibly to SE Afghanistan in support of OEF as well 
as F-16's to Afghanistan.  He noted that the Dutch were 
finalizing their plans for next year and would be able to 
announce them shortly.  Kamp reaffirmed that Dutch Apaches 
and Chinooks currently overseas needed to be recalled to the 
Netherlands for "reconditioning," but did not rule out the 
possibility that they might be redeployed in the region again 
in the second half of 2005. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
-------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Kamp's strongly held view has cemented consensus in 
the cabinet and parliament that the Dutch deployment in Al 
Muthanna should conclude on schedule in mid-March with no 
additional extensions.  In our view, direct requests for the 
Dutch to reverse the decision made last June (and reaffirmed 
in the November 12 letter) at this time have virtually no 
chance of success.  The British and Japanese, for example, 
are pushing the Dutch hard to extend the Al Muthanna mission, 
but have made no headway.  (British Ambassador Budd told us 
that Balkenende rejected a direct request from PM Blair on 
November 12.)  Some -- like van Baalen and Bot -- continue to 
assert that "unforeseen circumstances" could compel the Dutch 
to stay longer in Al Muthanna, but this is impossible to 
predict and, in any case, would probably mean only a short 
extension of a few weeks. 
 
9. (C) On the other hand, nearly all our Dutch interlocutors 
have stressed that a continuing Dutch presence in Iraq via 
the NATO mission demonstrates that the Netherlands' ongoing 
commitment to Iraq.  We will push hard to lock in a 
substantial Dutch component for the NATO mission -- perhaps 
including force protection -- and look for other ways to 
involve the Dutch in Iraq and Afghanistan, using Kamp's own 
arguments to support our case.  Although we will have to 
overcome the perception, shared by Kamp and many others, that 
the Dutch are already doing more than their "fair share" in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, we believe the Dutch government will be 
more receptive to approaches along these lines.  We do not 
rule out the possibility of extending the Dutch mission in Al 
Muthanna, and will continue to push for it, but every signal 
we have received here suggests this is not the right time to 
force the issue; instead, we believe we should pocket what we 
can now and then seek to revisit the issue in January or 
February (closer to the elections.)  We also will look for 
opportunities to modify the public debate from emphasizing 
the Al Muthanna draw down to focus more explicitly on the 
continued Dutch engagement in Iraq. 
SOBEL