US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE3006

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 003006 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR AND WHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, CU, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: CUBA/NETHERLANDS/EU: NO CONSENSUS (YET) TO CHANGE 
EU POSITION 
 
REF: A. (A) BRUSSELS 4662 
 
     B. (B) STATE 228300 
 
Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: According to Dutch presidency contacts, there 
is no immediate prospect of changing the EU's policy toward 
Cuba.  Discussion of the issue at the November 16 EU COLAT 
meeting was inconclusive, preserving the status quo.  A 
discussion of proposals by EU Heads of Mission on ways to 
intensify cooperation with Cuban dissidents, while at the 
same time reopening contact with the Government of Cuba, is 
on the agenda for the December 14 COLAT.  The Dutch are 
hoping to avoid making a decision during their presidency. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Dutch Cuba policy advisor Jan Jaap Groenemeijer told 
POLOFF November 17 that no decision had been reached at the 
November 16 COLAT meeting to change the EU position. 
Therefore, he confirmed, EU policy - including the June 2003 
measures - will remain unchanged for the immediate term.  The 
next opportunity for further discussion will be the December 
14 COLAT.  Groenemeijer emphasized that participants at the 
COLAT "agreed that the EU should intensify its contact with 
Cuban dissidents and civil society" and said EU Heads of 
Mission in Havana would submit concrete proposals at the 
December 14 meeting.  Groenemeijer stressed that this 
decision was the result of members states' feelings that 
"more could be done" in engaging dissidents and civil 
society, and contacts could be "more intensive" and/or "more 
effective." 
 
3. (C) Groenemeijer noted that the other objective of a 
revised EU policy would be a "reopening of contacts with the 
Government of Cuba."  Groenemeijer said this was the result 
of member states' feelings that "the current situation is not 
beneficial to the EU, Cuba, or a transition."  Groenemeijer 
argued that such a reopening would allow the EU to "bring 
human rights to the fore" and "steer the GOC toward better 
human rights policies" which he felt it had done "pre-2003." 
Noting that the GOC had refused contact with EU member states 
following the EU's initiation of its policy to invite 
dissidents to national day receptions, however, Groenemeijer 
stated that more discussion would be necessary regarding 
"conditions under which such a reopening could take place." 
 
4. (C) At a reception on the evening of November 17, Marianne 
Kappeyne van de Capello, Head of MFA's Western Hemisphere 
Affairs Department (who chaired the November 16 COLAT), 
confirmed to POLOFF that the EU was looking at ways to revise 
its relations with the Cuba in a positive direction.  She 
noted, however, that Castro's approach to the opposition and 
to dialogue on human rights was so negative that it had 
poisoned EU efforts in this regard, making it "nearly 
impossible" for the EU to reach out. 
 
5. (C) In a separate meeting with POLCOUNS on November 17, 
Jaap Werner (Head of the MFA's Political Affairs Department) 
said that the Dutch hoped to avoid having the EU take a 
decision on this issue during the Dutch presidency.  Since 
the next national day event would not take place until March, 
Werner felt that it would not be too difficult to avoid 
making a decision at the December 14 COLAT, thus effectively 
pushing the issue into 2005 (and the Luxembourg presidency.) 
Werner emphasized that the Dutch national position -- which 
they would feel more comfortable expressing once they no 
longer held the presidency -- was strongly opposed to 
changing the policy on inviting dissidents to national days. 
Werner disparaged Spanish efforts to convince the EU to make 
a "unilateral gesture" with no hope of a reciprocal gesture 
by the GOC, but noted that within the EU only the Germans 
continued to make a strong case for maintaining the current 
policy; surprisingly, he said, the Nordics and other 
traditional human rights proponents were largely silent or, 
as in the case of the UK, supported reevaluating the policy. 
Werner noted, however, that the Cuban dissidents themselves 
had been "quite helpful" in making clear their own feelings 
about the proposed changes.. 
 
6. (C) Comment: The Dutch clearly feel pressure within the 
EU, driven primarily by Spain, to change the EU's policy 
toward Cuba.  While the EU may try to couch such a change in 
terms of "intensifying" contacts with dissidents, clearly the 
intent is to strengthen relations with Havana.  The current 
Dutch strategy of postponing discussion for as long as 
possible may get them through the end of their presidency, 
but the issue is likely to come to a head as soon as the next 
EU national day appears on the calendar in the spring.  End 
Comment. 
SOBEL