US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS4915

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004915 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS AND EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2009 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, ETRD, RS, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: EU-RUSSIA SUMMIT: TWO-WEEK DELAY UNLIKELY TO 
BRIDGE DIFFERENCES 
 
REF: STATE 04629 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  The EU-Russia summit will take place 
November 25, a two-week delay at Russia's request.  Moscow 
said it wanted to allow the EU's new Barrosso Commission to 
participate, but many here believe that the EU's insistence 
on a simultaneous agreement on roadmaps for all four "spaces" 
of EU-Russian relations was the true motivation and Moscow 
wanted time to undermine the EU consensus for a package deal. 
 The delay provides opportunity for progress, but there is 
little mood for compromise on either side and there will be 
no joint declaration, merely a joint press statement.  Only 
the roadmap on cultural issues is nearly agreed.  In the 
economic space, Russia refuses to include May 2004 
commitments to phase out Siberian overflight fees and 
increase domestic energy prices.  In the internal security 
space, Russia is unwilling to discuss Chechnya or human 
rights, but wants references to Russian minority rights in 
the Baltic states and a visa-free travel regime for Russian 
citizens.  In the external security space, Russia rejects the 
EU's "common neighborhood" concept, emphasizing that its 
unique connection to the CIS is unlike that of the EU. 
Instead, Moscow wants to highlight joint efforts against 
terrorism and seeks to participate in EU crisis management 
decision-making.  The EU will also seek Russian support in 
organizing an EU mission to the Northern Caucuses and holding 
regular consultations on human and minority rights.  End 
Summary 
 
Delay Buys Time, but for what? 
------------------- 
2.  (C) Moscow's surprise request to postpone the planned 
November 11 EU-Russia summit, which has now been re-scheduled 
for November 25, provides the two sides with a small window 
of opportunity to make further headway in the negotiations 
over the "Four Common Spaces" -- the EU's headline documents 
for EU-Russia relations.  (The four spaces are Internal 
Security, External Security, Economics and Trade, and Culture 
and Research.)  At present, texts on two spaces * Economics 
and Culture * are close to agreement; the other two are 
problematic.  The EU is insisting that texts for all four 
areas be agreed simultaneously; Russia wants to move ahead 
and announce agreement on the first two at the Summit.  EU 
officials, however, say that the EU has already reached its 
redlines, and progress will only be possible with concessions 
from Russia.  According to Commission Russia Desk Officer 
Michael Miller, this will require the engagement of Russia's 
Presidential Administration to overrule the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  Russia has so far rejected the EU's 
approach, which Moscow considers an excessive intrusion in 
Russia's foreign and economic policies that betrays a lack of 
respect for Russia as an independent power.  EU-Russia 
negotiations are expected to continue right up to the summit. 
 
 
Why the Delay? 
-------------- 
3. (C) The EU accepted Moscow's request to delay the summit 
until after the new Commission is approved (Parliament 
approved the Barroso Commission on November 18), but 
unofficially some in Brussels doubt that Putin's desire to 
meet Barrosso was the true motivation.  Some EU officials 
suspect that Moscow simply wanted more time to press its case 
bilaterally with countries with which it enjoys close 
relations, such as Germany, Italy, and France.  Moscow's 
goal, these officials suspect, is to undermine the EU 25 
resolve to insist on a package deal on the four roadmaps. 
Moscow, they said, may also hope to dangle the prospect of 
significant summit deliverables in front of the Dutch, who 
hold the EU presidency, if the Hague agrees to a partial 
agreement, dividing the four spaces.  Negotiations on the 
roadmaps continue, but EU officials say there is little time 
or mood to compromise on the part of Brussels, and they do 
not anticipate significant breakthroughs. 
 
4. (C) There appears to be little disposition to compromise 
on Russia's side either.  Moscow insists its recent 
ratification of the Kyoto and PCA (Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements) treaties should suffice as 
concessions on its part.  Moscow expects to resolve the 
outstanding issues at the political and not technical level. 
To facilitate a political breakthrough, Moscow appointed 
high-level coordinators responsible for each roadmap, and 
appears disappointed at the lack of reciprocation on the part 
of the EU.  According to Russian Embassy officials here, two 
out of four coordinators are close Putin aides:  Sergei 
Yastrzhembskiy (responsible for the cultural space) and 
Victor Ivanov (internal security space).  The other two 
coordinators are Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov 
(external security space) and Victor Khristenko, Minister of 
Industry and Energy and until recently Deputy Prime Minister 
(economic space). 
 
5. (C) The tactic of appealing bilaterally to the political 
will of its friends within the EU may benefit Moscow. 
Council Secretariat's Carl Hartzell admitted that there would 
be pressure in EU circles to make more progress.  He said 
that the EU suffered from a certain "psychological effect" 
that inevitably leads some members to call for compromise 
when no deal with Russia appears possible.  Possibly taking 
advantage of this EU weakness, Yastrzhembskiy told Brussels 
on November 11 that Prime Minister Fradkov would replace 
Putin at the summit if no agreement on the four spaces was 
made. 
 
Four Spaces: Status of the Roadmaps 
----------------------------- 
6. (C)  The EU and Russia have essentially agreed to the 
roadmap text on the cultural space and, according to Miller, 
cooperation in this area will continue regardless of the 
outcome of negotiations on the remaining three spaces -- 
economic, external and internal security.  Even in the 
cultural space, however, Russia appears to be backtracking 
from its earlier proposal to establish a European studies 
institute at a Russian university. 
 
7. (C) According to Miller, the economic space, which until 
recently appeared largely agreed, now poses problems.  For 
example, Russia refuses to include its May 2004 commitments 
to phase out by 2013 Siberian overflight fees and increase 
domestic energy prices.  The EU aims to reinforce these 
commitments by including them in the economic roadmap, but, 
according to Miller, the corrupt Russian Ministry of 
Transport is reluctant to forego the slush fund that 
overflight fees generates.  The EU has made progress with 
Russia on other economic issues, however.  For example, 
Russia no longer blocks EU-wide meat exports, imposing only 
regional restrictions that are dealt with at the technical 
rather than political level. 
 
8. (C) The near agreement of the cultural and economic spaces 
contrasts with the "extremely problematic" external and 
internal security spaces, according to Commission Deputy 
Director General Michael Leigh.  In the internal security 
roadmap, Russia continues to object to discussion of Chechnya 
or human rights, lobbies for mention of Russian minority 
rights in Latvia and Estonia, and harbors unrealistic hopes 
that the EU will grant visa free travel to Russian citizens. 
Viewing visa free travel as a long-term goal, the EU is 
willing instead to discuss visa facilitation when linked to a 
readmission agreement that Russia rejects.  Russia has only 
one readmission agreement (with Tajikistan), and refuses to 
be responsible for other third country citizens who transit 
Russia and seek asylum in Europe. 
 
9. (C) In the external security roadmap, Russia is "not 
ready" to discuss issues related to the "near abroad." 
Moscow objects to the EU's "common neighborhood" concept, and 
refuses any mention of it in the roadmap.  According to 
Miller, the EU wants a "big leap forward" in cooperation with 
Russia to advance what the EU sees as "shared interests" in 
Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and Southern Caucuses.  The EU 
wants a stable, prosperous neighborhood, but it encounters 
difficulty overcoming Russia's belief in exclusive spheres of 
influence that views the EU's interest as a zero-sum threat. 
Russia is adamant about its unique relationship with the 
neighborhood countries, which is a much older, deeper and 
more privileged one than the EU enjoys with these countries. 
Our Russian embassy contacts told us that the EU must 
understand Russia's exceptional connection to the CIS.  These 
diplomats argued that the countries of the "near abroad" are 
"relatives" who are "very near to our heart," while to the EU 
they are merely neighbors, and new ones at that. 
 
10. (C) In the external security roadmap, Russia wants to 
stress the need to fight terrorism, but rejects EU attempts 
to link these efforts to the need to respect human and civil 
rights.  Mirroring debates in NATO, Moscow also seeks to 
participate in EU crisis management decision-making, while 
the EU offers to facilitate Russian participation in future 
ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) missions only on 
the basis of an invitation.  In effect, Russia is seeking a 
de facto veto over potential EU peacekeeping operations in 
the CIS. 
 
Possible Summit Deliverables 
----------------------- 
11. (C) The EU has nixed Russian proposals for a joint 
political statement at the summit, and there is agreement at 
present only for a joint press statement.  The statement may 
emphasize the progress in "practical implementation" in the 
roadmaps on the economic and cultural spheres, and will 
likely include a pledge to continue working on the remaining 
two spaces, external and internal security. 
 
12. (C) Additionally, the EU seeks Russian support in 
organizing an EU post-conflict assistance exploratory mission 
to the Northern Caucuses, and would like to hold regular 
consultations on human and minority rights.  According to 
Miller, the EU is hopeful that Moscow will reciprocate with a 
dialogue on human rights in Chechnya in return for the EU's 
recent flexibility in agreeing to discuss Russian minority 
rights in Latvia and Estonia. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
13. (C) The EU complains it is getting mixed messages from 
Moscow.  On the one hand, Moscow says it wants a successful 
summit and seeks political deliverables that would show that 
Moscow is not isolated internationally.  Russia wants a 
demonstration of EU solidarity in the fight against 
terrorism, but also seeks to limit EU criticism of political 
developments in Russia.  Some here think that Russia decided 
to postpone the summit because it failed to get the 
concessions it expected on the roadmaps, underlying Russia's 
apparent frustration with the EU's insistence that all four 
roadmaps go forward together. 
 
14. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED:  Beyond the planning for the 
current summit, EU officials say that policy toward Russia 
shifted substantially after the 2003 EU-Russia summit, when 
Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi's statements in support of 
Putin were out of step with the general EU policy toward 
Russia.  For Brussels, this highlighted the need for the EU 
to have a more coherent and disciplined policy that could 
withstand Russian attempts to undermine consensus by 
exploiting its bilateral relationships with individual EU 
countries.  Additionally, the 1 May EU enlargement brought in 
former Soviet states and satellites that have a strong 
interest in pursuing a tough policy with Russia.  Some in 
Brussels suggest that a more assertive EU policy that views 
Russia as just another Eastern European state*a view that 
contrasts sharply with Moscow's image of itself as uniquely 
important*may have motivated Moscow to demonstrate its 
weight by postponing the summit.  The tension between 
hard-nosed new members and the EU's larger veteran states, 
who often prefer a more moderate approach to Russia, is not 
fully resolved.  As the new member states find their voice 
within the EU, they will continue to influence the EU's 
approach to Russia.  How Russia chooses to engage the EU as 
this process is underway will also affect the outcome.  At 
present, Moscow is not winning many friends. 
 
MCKINLEY