US embassy cable - 04DUBLIN1697

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 001697 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2014 
TAGS: PREL, EUN 
SUBJECT: IRISH RESPONSE TO TURKEY AND PRE-GAERC DEMARCHES 
 
REF: A. STATE 244333 
 
     B. STATE 240286 
 
Classified By: political-economic counselor Mary Daly, reasons 1.4 (B) 
and (D) 
 
1.  (U) On November 17, Post delivered reftels' talking 
points to Gerald Keown, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 
EU correspondent. 
 
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Turkey 
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2.  (C) In a November 12 conversation with the Ambassador, 
Michael Collins, senior advisor to Prime Minister Ahern, said 
that Ireland would support Turkey's EU candidacy.  He noted 
that Ireland saw Turkey as an important market and did not 
have the same social concerns as those EU Member States with 
large Muslim populations.  Keown amplified these remarks with 
a more detailed explanation of where things stood in the EU. 
Ireland would support a European Council decision to begin 
early EU accession negotiations with Turkey in the context of 
an EU consensus on that step, said Keown.  He noted that 
Ireland acknowledged Turkey's efforts to fulfill the 
Copenhagen criteria, as did the Commission's October 6 report 
on the accession issue.  Keown expected that a decision 
endorsing early accession negotiations would include 
safeguard mechanisms for suspending negotiations in the event 
of significant policy reversals by the Turkish Government. 
He also pointed out that the December 17 European Council 
meeting would discuss the option of placing conditions on 
accession negotiations related to the implementation of 
Turkey's legislative and other reform programs, but that the 
same conditions would apply generally to any candidate 
country.  When emboff asked whether the EU would seek to 
apply more specific conditions in Turkey's case, Keown said 
that this would depend on Member States in which Turkey's 
accession posed a more serious domestic issue.  He added that 
an outstanding issue for Turkey was recognition of the 
Republic of Cyprus and that the possible amendment of 
Turkey's customs union agreement with the EU to incorporate 
the new Member States would be a positive step in that 
direction. 
 
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Middle East 
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3.  (C) The EU looked forward to close coordination with the 
Bush Administration in advancing the Middle East Peace 
Process, said Keown.  He did not know whether Ireland was 
considering contributions to the International Finance 
Corporation's Private Enterprise Partnership -- Middle East 
and North Africa (PEP-MENA).  He noted that Ireland and other 
EU Member States were examining ways to support small and 
medium enterprises in the region through the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process).  He added 
that the November 30 Euromed ministerial meeting would 
possibly address such assistance. 
 
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China 
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4.  (C) Keown said that the situation regarding the China 
arms embargo had not changed since the EU had decided in 
October on the need for further consultations at the 
technical level.  No European consensus on lifting the 
embargo was at hand.  Keown acknowledged that the November 
16-18 visit of Chinese Vice Premier Huang Ju had been an 
occasion to discuss the embargo as well as other issues, such 
as trade and human rights.  Vice Premier Huang, said Keown, 
had made clear China's desire that the embargo be lifted. 
His Irish interlocutors had repeated that the EU had not 
achieved consensus on the embargo issue. 
 
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Kosovo 
------ 
 
5.  (C) The GOI agreed that local government/decentralization 
pilot projects in Kosovo should get underway as soon as 
possible, said Keown.  He noted that the Kosovo Serb boycott 
of the recent Kosovo elections had been unhelpful, but he 
expressed reservations about the U.S. point that work in 
Kosovo would continue even if Kosovo Serbs refused to 
participate.  Keown elaborated that outstanding issues could 
only be addressed on a cross-community basis.  He noted that 
politicians in Serbia had used the election boycott to 
political advantage, and he observed that progress in Kosovo 
would therefore require efforts to engage both Serbia and 
Kosovo's Serbian population. 
 
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Belarus 
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6.  (C) According to Keown, EU Member States are deeply 
pessimistic about Belarus.  He conceded that EU policy had 
not only been unsuccessful, but had also worked to isolate 
Belarusian society.  Ireland agreed that it was important to 
broach that isolation; the question was how.  He noted that 
efforts to engage members of society could expose them to 
risks of arrest or personal harm.  Keown expressed confidence 
that the Dutch EU Presidency, following the line taken during 
Ireland's presidency, would maintain a tough stance against 
the Belarusian Government.  The November 22 GAERC meeting 
would issue conclusions to that end. 
 
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Cyprus 
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7.  (C) Keown described the Cyprus situation as a failure on 
both sides.  He said the EU would concur that a strong aid 
and trade package was critical to the prospects of 
pro-solution forces in the north.  Legal and technical 
factors, however, stood behind proposals to conduct 
Commission programs from the south.  He acknowledged recent 
USG efforts to engage north Cyprus, and he said the EU 
continued to explore ways that were legally permissible to 
provide assistance to the north. 
 
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ESDP 
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8.  (C) Keown said that GOI support for closer EU-NATO 
coordination was a given.  The GOI, he added, was pleased 
that preparations for SFOR's drawdown were proceeding 
smoothly.  On the question of Irish participation in EU 
battlegroups, Keown noted that the GOI would not take any 
decision until after discussions at the upcoming EU Military 
Capabilities Conference. 
KENNY