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| Identifier: | 04KINSHASA2115 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04KINSHASA2115 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Kinshasa |
| Created: | 2004-11-18 14:44:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PREL ECON ASEC CF |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 002115 SIPDIS PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C - BARGERON AND EB -F. CHISHOLM E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2014 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, ASEC, CF SUBJECT: CONGO/B - IS CONGO'S FUTURE ON THE RIGHT TRACK? IS AN IMF PROGRAM DESERVED? REF: KINSHASA 1055 Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBIN R. SANDERS FOR REASON 1.4 (D) 1. (C) Summary: Below follows an analysis of current political and economic atmospherics in the Republic of Congo, including points recently noted by the country,s President, Denis Sassou Nguesso, regarding his efforts to truly put Congo on a &democratic path8 and change once and for all Congo,s lack of transparency culture, history of bad business practices, and - personally important to him - the country,s negative international image. In the Post,s view, there are many positive signs, but there also remain challenges on both the macro and micro level in both the political and economic sectors. It will be up to President Sassou whether the country can build on the current progress. All members of his government are not reformers, and he is surrounded by many hardliners still clinging to their old Soviet habits and perspectives. Although for now, Sassou gets credit for trying to be a reformer. He still needs to figure out how to either bring the hardliners on board and stop the ankle biting and undermining, or take a tougher more politically challenging path of removing them from government (The planned Cabinet reshuffle and reduction has yet to take place - reftel). This will be the test of his leadership and legacy and whether he has truly changed his spots. OVERALL ATMOSPHERICS: 2. (C) The Republic of the Congo, with only three years since the end of major conflict behind it, wants to be viewed in the region and by the international community as having turned the corner to respectability, and good leadership both economically and politically. Clearly there is surface evidence that things have improved. Brazzaville city is showing signs that people believe the country is now stable. New construction starts are at an all time high, streets are clean, and new businesses (hotels, restaurants) are popping up all over town. Long gone also are the security checkpoints in the usually troubled BaCongo neighborhood (an area where many southerners live). Although there was a recent robbery on the Pointe Noire-Brazzaville train, by all accounts, it was a well-organized pirating commercial venture with likely complicity by individuals who are or were members of government, especially security force elements. The recent train attack was initially reported as a "Ninja Operation," referring to those previously or still connected to rebel leader Pastor Ntumi. However, the ragtag remnants of Ntumi's Ninjas do not have the capacity -- trucks, gasoline, organization, or well-armed manpower -- to pull off such an operation, including moving tons of goods across the border to Democratic Republic of Congo. Outside of the train attack, Congo has been calm, and may be past the stage of Post using the term "fragile calm." The real question is whether Congo can make more political and economic progress and solidify the changes to date? ECONOMIC PROGRESS MUST CONTINUE: 3. (C) On the economic front, with President Sassou,s personal commitment using his very able Finance Minister, Congo has cleaned up transparency in its oil sector, presented decent budgets the last two years, appears to be on track for a positive December IMF Board vote, and is working out payment schedules with bilateral and multilateral creditors comparable with Paris and London Clubs. Most of these major changes, particularly in oil transparency, have been accomplished in the last 18 months. Finance Minister Andely, who is respected by the international financial community as well as the diplomatic and NGO establishments in Congo, does not enjoy the same respect from many in the 37-member cabinet. Many in the cabinet are hardliners who want cronyism and the culture of payoffs to remain, and make it their daily duty to ankle bite and undermine him at every turn. Andely,s efforts are on target and Sassou has strongly supported his technician. The much-needed changes include: more oil and overall transparency; streamed lined Ministerial and national budgets; working with creditors, paying down debt; and trying to end the culture of impunity and illicit enrichment every step of the way. Andley,s work to meet IMF measures, has taken on a term used by the hardliners called "Andely-ism," and the Finance Minister has survived solely because of Sassou's commitment to turn the country around and his desire to leave an image and legacy quite different from his past leadership during the mid-to-late 20th century. 4. (C) There are a number of hardliners in both the cabinet and national assembly who are resistant to these more transparent, good governance moves. The hardliners include: the Minister of Government Coordination and Transport Isidore Mvouba, who holds the PM-like position in Congo; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and the Francophonie Rodolphe Adada; National Security Advisor Jean Dominque Okemba; Minister of Planning Pierre Moussa, Minister of Territorial Administration Francois Ibovi, Superior Education Minister Ossebi; Security Minister Pierre Oba; Senate President Noumazalaye, and National Assembly President Tchicaya ) to name just a few. Given the positions of these hardliners, sustained changes ) particularly politically ) will continue to be an uphill battle. The balancing act for Sassou is that many of these hardliners not only represent key political support as a result of their clans being close to Sassou,s Mbochi, but also because Sassou could not have won the conflicts of 1997-1999 without the support of Likoula ethnic group leaders such as Senate President Noumzalaye and Security Minister Oba, in addition, of course to Angolan support. POLITICAL FRONT - PROGRESS, BUT MORE CHANGES NEEDED: 5. (C) Clearly more improvement has been made on the economic side of the ledger than the political, although we have to note there has been improved governance over the last 18 months in several areas such as: some outreach to NGOs; TV coverage of parliament sessions; ministers called to defend positions before Parliament and on occasions talking to the press; defense of the national budget before the national assembly; publishing national budget and oil sector contracts; and other government reports; Sassou holding western-style press conferences and making state of union speeches before parliament; and, so on. However, Congo must overcome a few more challenges in order to have sustained good governance and for the country,s image to truly change. For example, the opposition needs to be allowed to have more dialogue and access to the press, and the NGO and civil society communities need to be viewed as an asset to public policy, not threats. 6. (C) There is some evidence that Sassou is trying to do more to improve the political front and build on the governance improvement to date . He has tried to move forward on a much-needed cabinet reshuffle/size reduction, but has not yet found his legs to do so (reftel). Many of the hardliners who need to be removed so that more/more good governance can take place, helped and served Sassou over many years doing the communist era, including in later years during the 2002 elections. It is uncertain what kind of backlash would take place if any of these powerful, clan-based hardliners were removed from their post, and what effect ) if any ) this would have on emerging stability. What appears to be happening is change over several stages. Sassou's Peoples, Workers Party (PCT) is rumored to be on the verge of a split within the next 3-6 months, between reformers under the umbrella of a new party which will reportedly be called the &Union for the Republic,8 led by Sassou, and old hardliners of the PCT, which could include many of the current cabinet. Thus far, there is no single leader among the hardliners and their individual personal financial interests have, to date, outweighed any organized anti-Sassou efforts. One of the biggest challenges in addition to addressing the inner circle leadership issues is to find ways to cut the undermining by the hardliners in the short term. 7. (C) In a recent conversation that Ambassador had with Sassou at his hometown in Oyo on November 4-5, 2004 he noted that he did not have enough people around him &ready to accept8 long term change. His daughter, close confidant and Public Relations Counselor, Mrs. Lemoumba, told Ambassador during same period that it was difficult to really identify who is inhibiting progress, transparency, and change because the blockage can be as far down as the director or office level of a Ministry. (Note: Ambassador was invited to spend 2 informal days in Sassou,s hometown in Oyo to have a more one-on-one dialogue on Congo issues in general. Policy conversations in Oyo only included Sassou, Mrs. Lemoumba, and the Ambassador. End Note.) 8. (C) Despite what appears to be a commitment at the top with Sassou for more good governance and reform, political missteps continue and old habits die-hard. Some in the inner circle clearly act in ways that fly in the face of transparency. That being said, the hardliners are smart enough to have learned to "talk the talk" about democracy, good governance and transparency, but when out of view do not "walk the walk," with the press, with the NGO community, and with the opposition. For example, recently the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called in freelance journalists linked to international press such as Reuters, PANA, AFP, Africa Number One, etc., many who also hold jobs in the national media, as well as the BBC correspondent, and "implied" that their accreditation could be pulled if they reported issues that sullied Congo,s image. BBC headquarters was later asked to pull its correspondent, the only independent reporter in Congo, seemingly without cause because of his reporting on the challenges that remain in Congo. In another case, one hardline Minister recently engaged with an NGO and implied that its exoneration could be pulled if it did not allow "its list of bidders" to receive contracts. These are just a few glimmers of the challenges that remain to transparency despite the progress noted thus far. NEXT STEPS: BUILD ON PROGRESS, CONTINUE TO REFORM, AND NEUTRALIZE HARDLINERS 9. (C) The near future for Congo has always been clear - it rests in the hands of President Sassou and how he continues to move forward on the issues noted above. Ambassador has had some discussions with other reformers to see where they think the country is going. It has come to light that Sassou seeks a lot of advice from former Ghanaian President Rawlings. One could described this frequent contact as one former dictator turned "democrat of sorts" (Rawlings) giving advice to one (Sassou) who wants to be remembered in the same light -- dictator who changed his spots, wants to change his country,s image, and is trying to move in the right direction politically and economically. Sassou still has some old habits, some he recognizes, however, others he does not -- at least yet. For example, he still dabbles in CEMAC regional issues in a desire to control or influence who is in leadership positions in neighboring countries. Relations with DRC continue to have ups and downs, and in 2003, reports indicate that he played a role in removing Central African Republic President Patasse. For now, let,s give him the benefit of the doubt and put him in the reformer camp. We will need to watch and see if this is a faade or a true change of spots. Congo still has a ways to go, but in two years there have been some visible changes, but long-term success will be determined by continued and expanded changes and, in the end, the sustainability of these changes. For now, the IMF called for measures are in place, and the hardliners are unhappy. It is clear to Post that the reformers will need to be successful with the IMF and other good governance efforts in order to neutralize the hardliners enough that they no longer are a political risk. 10. (U) Brazzaville Embassy Office - Sanders MEECE
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