US embassy cable - 04KUWAIT3933

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COURTESY CALL ON THE INTERIOR MINISTER REVEALS CONFUSION ON BORDER MOU, THINKING ON IPR, TERRORISTS, AND THE COURT SYSTEM

Identifier: 04KUWAIT3933
Wikileaks: View 04KUWAIT3933 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kuwait
Created: 2004-11-18 05:53:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PREF MOPS IZ KU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

180553Z Nov 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 003933 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PREF, MOPS, IZ, KU 
SUBJECT: COURTESY CALL ON THE INTERIOR MINISTER REVEALS 
CONFUSION ON BORDER MOU, THINKING ON IPR, TERRORISTS, AND 
THE COURT SYSTEM 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (a) and (d) 
 
 1. (C) Summary and Comment:  During the Ambassador's 
introductory call on Interior Minister Shaykh Nawaf, the 
Minister was unable to clarify status of the border MOU with 
the U.S. military.  Shaykh Nawaf insisted the signed 
agreement had been returned to the MFA for further action, 
but he had no additional information.  On IPR, he stated that 
police were aggressively working to stop the trafficking of 
counterfeit goods, particularly audio and video materials. 
Commenting on jihadi court cases, Shaykh Nawaf said the 
police's ability to catch jihadis was not always matched by 
the Ministry of Justice's ability to prosecute them.  He made 
clear his belief that cases were handled appropriately and 
that no one, regardless of position or connections, could 
influence the outcome of a trial.  Despite his strong 
convictions, Shaykh Nawaf came across as someone not fully in 
touch with his own Ministry.  On several issues, he seemed 
unaware of the basic facts that the Ambassador raised and 
relied heavily on his General Manager to provide him with the 
answers.  Post will continue to engage Shaykh Nawaf on 
bilateral issues, but will rely on and further expand our 
network of senior and working-level MOI and police contacts. 
End Summary and Comment. 
 
 
The Good News 
------------- 
 
2. (C)  The Ambassador opened his November 8 call on Interior 
Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister Shaykh Nawaf 
Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah by thanking him for his strong support of 
U.S. interests, notably:  cooperation of the Criminal 
Investigation Department (the Kuwaiti FBI counterpart) with 
the LEGATT in Riyadh, security escorts for OIF convoys 
traveling to and from the Iraq border, good use of DS 
training for MOI officials, and provision of Ambassador's 
security detail.  The Ambassador also noted the improved 
information exchange with KSS. 
 
3. (C)  The Ambassador said that speedy conclusion of the 
Customs and Border MOU with the U.S. would open another area 
for bilateral cooperation.  Shaykh Nawaf expressed confusion 
about the status of the MOU and questioned, in Arabic, MOI 
General Manager Brigadier General Hamed Al-Jumah why it was 
still an issue. The General assured Shaykh Nawaf the MOU had 
been signed and delivered to the Foreign Ministry "some time 
ago."  While still uncertain about the status and actual 
location of the MOU, the Shaykh attempted to reassure the 
Ambassador that he and FM Shaykh Dr. Mohammed were in touch 
on the matter and that the MOI was not an obstacle to MOU 
implementation.  (Note: A meeting with the Foreign Minister 
immediately afterward did not clarify the status of the MOU.) 
 
Fighting Against Fakes 
---------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) On intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, 
the Ambassador requested greater protection and enforcement. 
Shaykh Nawaf asserted his commitment to fighting 
counterfeiters and said that he had implemented a program 
last year targeted at stopping them.  He added that he was 
also involving local governorates in the fight and he was 
keen to capture the criminals involved. 
 
Jihadis and The Courts 
---------------------- 
 
5. (C)  The Ambassador then asked about terrorists in Kuwait 
and the MOI's role in capturing and bringing them to trial; 
making it clear that the USG disagreed with Kuwaiti attempts 
to deal with terrorists through family or tribal pressure. 
In a vague and ambiguous answer, the Minister responded that 
"real terrorists are those who influence the infrastructure 
of a country" and restated his determination to fight 
terrorism and maintain peace and stability in Kuwait.  He 
added that the MOI's role is to capture terrorists, but it is 
up to the Ministry of Justice to impose punishment.  The 
Minister affirmed his belief in the independence of the 
judiciary and argued that no one can influence the outcome of 
a court case. 
 
6. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
 
********************************************* 
Visit Embassy Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website 
********************************************* 
LeBaron 

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