US embassy cable - 04QUITO3028

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 003028 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2014 
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, EC, KICC 
SUBJECT: RENEWING THE ARTICLE 98 PUSH 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Article 98 negotiations in Ecuador have 
stagnated of late.  Two factors are to blame:  continued 
push-back from the Embassy's prime interlocutors, the Foreign 
Ministry and Congress, and the Gutierrez government's focus 
on self-preservation in the face of impeachment proceedings. 
Cognizant that increasing deployments of U.S. forces 
worldwide makes inking an Article 98 with Ecuador imperative, 
we are conducting another offensive.  Recent visits of USG 
VIPs have helped return the issue to GoE radar screens. 
Additionally, the Ecuadorian military's own plans to step up 
its fight against narcotraffickers will require greater U.S. 
military assistance, perhaps spurring them to fight (and 
defeat) the MFA in GoE interagency Article 98 battles. 
Finally, imminent turnover in legislative leadership 
positions offer us hope we can dilute (but not remove) 
opposition in Congress. END SUMMARY. 
 
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Negotiations Stuck in the Mud 
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2.  (C) We have seen no movement on Article 98 since 
Secretary Powell's June visit to Quito for the OAS General 
 
SIPDIS 
Assembly.  In a high-level bilat June 7, Ecuador President 
Lucio Gutierrez told the Secretary he had sought Congress's 
formal opinion on Article 98's constitutionality and 
appropriateness.  We worried then, and are certain now, that 
Gutierrez's "consultations" were but a time-buying ruse. 
Meanwhile, the MFA's Article 98 point-of-contact has 
disappeared, and Congressional moderates' promises to raise 
the negotiations in committee meetings went nowhere. 
 
3.  (C) Autumn has seen Gutierrez hanging on by a thread.  A 
broad-based Congressional coalition, including center-right, 
center-left, and indigenous political parties, initiated 
impeachment proceedings against him November 4.  Each 
organization filed separate grounds for removal; misuse of 
public funds led the list, but poor defense of national 
sovereignty (by involving Ecuador in Plan Colombia, for 
example) was close behind.  The administration won the first 
battle, as the opposition November 9 was unable to muster 
votes to form a Congressional investigatory committee. 
Gutierrez opponents claim they will fight on, however. 
 
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Visitors Underscore Article 98 Imperative 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Just two weeks ago, we could not imagine the 
administration re-engaging on Article 98, as the mere whiff 
of ongoing negotiations on the unpopular measure might have 
convinced teetering legislators to vote to impeach.  The GoE 
emerged more confident after last week's legislative victory, 
however, and seems again willing to talk.  Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld, in Quito for the Defense Ministerial of the 
Americas (DMA), raised Article 98 in a November 16 bilat with 
Gutierrez (Septel).  While Gutierrez's response was 
regrettably old-hat - "I'm waiting for a Congressional green 
light before proceeding" - our impatience with the pace of 
talks undoubtedly registered with the Ecuadorian president 
(and foreign minister, who also attended).  In addition, new 
Southcom commander General Bantz J. Craddock, also attending 
the Quito DMA, calls on Ecuador's minister of defense and 
service chiefs November 19.  We expect Article 98's necessity 
to open his talking points. 
 
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Increasing GoE Ops Tempo Necessitates USG Assistance 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
5.  (C) Despite bearing the totality of ASPA sanctions, 
Ecuador's military never lobbied hard for Article 98 in the 
GoE interagency.  We surmise they might now rejoin the fight. 
 New Joint Forces Chief Admiral Victor Rosero recognizes 
Ecuador's national security threats, shows vision, and takes 
chances.  We could not say the same about his predecessor. 
We have received briefs recently on two politically sensitive 
initiatives - an EC offensive against narcotraffickers in 
Sucumbios province, and Ecuador's interest in establishing a 
non-lethal Airbridge Denial (ABD) program - each requiring 
prior Rosero buy-in.  For both, EC military leaders have 
requested USG military assistance. 
 
6.  (C) While non-ASPA-affected program monies could (and 
will) help support these initiatives, we are not missing any 
opportunities to flog the military over the need for Article 
98.  Big-ticket items, such as A-37 upgrades for ABD and 
additional helicopters for Sucumbios, are non-starters until 
we get an agreement, for example.  Further, a joint special 
forces counter-terrorism operation, featuring Blackhawk 
helos, is underway near Quito.  At its conclusion, we expect 
Ecuadorian battalion- and brigade-level officers to push 
their HQ superiors for similar goodies. 
 
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Additional Hope From Legislative, Government Changes 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
7.  (C) We are convinced we cannot slip Article 98 by 
Ecuador's suspicious, do-nothing Congress; engaging them now, 
even as a deal with the executive remains distant, seems 
proper.  The current Congressional lineup is stocked with 
enemies, from President Guillermo Landazuri (who owes 
Gutierrez the Article 98 response), to International 
Relations Committee Chairman Carlos Vallejo.  Thankfully, the 
presidency, vice-presidency, and committee leadership turn 
over in January 2005, the mid-point of the legislative term. 
While we cannot predict their replacements, we can only see 
improvements.  We will delay our outreach acceleration until 
the impeachment furor dies down, however, not wanting to 
throw Gutierrez's many opponents additional political 
ammunition. 
 
8.  (C) Finally, we require approachable MFA interlocutors, 
not the lackeys we endure now.  The designated POC is 
particularly useless, regularly dodging our calls and burying 
our correspondence.  In higher-level Embassy-MFA gatherings, 
we will request that our counterparts name serious officers 
to staff their side. 
 
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COMMENT: 
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9.  (C) Regrettably, Article 98 seems as distant now as in 
July 2002, when we began the diplomatic effort.  The MFA 
continues to believe it can wait us out.  It cannot.  We are 
helped by Washington re-opening the second front, calling in 
Ecuadorian Ambassador Raul Gangotena for meetings with 
Assistant Secretaries Roger Noriega and Steven Rademaker. 
From Quito, Post will report regularly and often on its own 
renewed push toward securing a deal.  END COMMENT. 
KENNEY