US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2995

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002995 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/UBI, S/CT, INR, INL 
JUSTICE FOR OIA  JFRIEDMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER, PINR, PINS, NL, KPRP 
SUBJECT: CRITICAL REPORT ON DUTCH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 
(AIVD) 
 
REF: (A) THE HAGUE 2929 (B) THE HAGUE 2308 
 
Summary 
------- 
1. On November 16, a special blue-ribbon panel published 
its long-awaited evaluation of the Dutch AIVD (civilian 
intelligence service).  The "Havermans Committee," which 
included a former Interior Minister and several senior 
officials, was formed in February 2004 at the request of 
Interior Minister Remkes.  The move came in response to 
parliamentary criticism about a series of AIVD missteps 
including confusion over the number of suspected terrorists 
in Holland, failure to prosecute suspects identified by 
AIVD, and clumsy handling of the investigation of the 
fianci of a Royal family member.  The release of the 
panel's report in the aftermath of the Van Gogh killing 
(reftel A) was timely but coincidental. 
 
2. The report endorsed C/T organizational reform measures 
already underway (reftel B) as well as the British "JTAC" 
style of integrated C/T coordination.  Key findings of the 
Havermans Report include: 
 
?Cumbersome bureaucratic structure that hinders C/T 
operation, particularly overlap and ambiguity between 
the Justice and Interior Ministries. 
?A lack of coherent policy guidance and prioritization. 
?Poor oversight of AIVD and insufficient supervisory 
mechanisms and authorities. 
?Insufficient information sharing with law enforcement 
agencies (particularly at the local level) and a 
culture of withholding information. 
?Inadequate staff and funding. 
 
Tasks 
----- 
3. According to the assessment, the AIVD has a coherent set 
of duties crucial to the protection of national security 
rity 
(counterterrorism, violent political activism, non- 
proliferation and counter espionage).  As a result of the 
current focus on combating radical Islamic terrorism, AIVD, 
however, lacks sufficient means and manpower to address all 
potential threats.  Despite this, the committee did not 
recommend AIVD should cut back on any of its tasks, nor did 
the committee consider it necessary to give the AIVD any 
additional powers (other than those included in recently 
proposed bills). 
 
Responsibility 
-------------- 
4. The Havermans Committee concluded AIVD's management was 
fragmented and unclear, because four ministers and three 
national coordinators were involved in its activities. 
Although AIVD falls within the Interior Ministry, there is 
no clear structure to select and prioritize relevant 
expectations and to task the AIVD with assignments. 
Therefore, AIVD itself mostly determines its own priorities 
and activities.  Considering this undesirable, the 
committee recommended the Interior Minister be made 
responsible for setting AIVD priorities in an annual AIVD 
plan that would be discussed in the National Security 
Council and submitted to the Cabinet for approval. 
 
Cooperation 
----------- 
5. The committee was concerned about the lack of 
cooperation between AIVD and other organizations, in 
particular the police.  It welcomed measures to streamline 
information sharing and endorsed initiatives by the 
National CT Coordinator to form an analytical unit (similar 
to the UK), in which all relevant organizations within the 
government cooperate in high-quality analyses of terror 
threats and counterterrorism in the Netherlands (reftel B). 
The committee also recommended expanding the so-called CT 
Infobox, a handful of senior officials who direct 
information gathering on a fluctuating group of about 150 
suspect persons.  The report called for closer 
international cooperation with foreign intelligence 
agencies and increased stationing of AIVD liaisons abroad. 
 
Reaction 
-------- 
6.  Interior Minister Remkes endorsed the recommendations 
about drawing up an annual AIVD plan.  He agreed with the 
committee's conclusion cooperation between AIVD and police, 
prosecutors and mayors should be intensified, and 
recommended AIVD improve the sharing of information with 
other parties.  Together with the Defense Minister, Remkes 
will take the initiative to intensify cooperation between 
AIVD and the MIVD military intelligence service. 
Nevertheless, he cautioned there would always be 
information that could not be shared widely.  Remkes also 
referred approvingly to the agreement reached during the 
November 11 parliamentary debate about the Van Gogh murder 
to increase AIVD's budget by 100 million euros.  Despite 
increased resources, he warned against excessive 
expectations. 
 
7.  Remkes submitted the report to the Second Chamber 
(Lower House of Parliament) for review.  Initial MP 
reactions have been positive. 
 
Comment 
------- 
8.  AIVD has come under increased scrutiny and criticism 
recently, particularly after the van Gogh murder (reftel 
A).  AIVD will likely use this report to justify more 
resources.  We welcome the independent assessment of AIVD's 
problems (particularly highlighting its reluctance to share 
information either with domestic or international 
partners/colleagues), but it is unclear whether AIVD will 
change the way it does business  even with more staff and 
funds. 
 
Sobel