US embassy cable - 04AMMAN9215

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KING DISCUSSES PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP AND ISLAMISTS WITH CODEL ACKERMAN

Identifier: 04AMMAN9215
Wikileaks: View 04AMMAN9215 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2004-11-17 15:20:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV KISL KPAL IS JO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 009215 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KISL, KPAL, IS, JO 
SUBJECT: KING DISCUSSES PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP AND 
ISLAMISTS WITH CODEL ACKERMAN 
 
REF: AMMAN 9152 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) King Abdullah endorsed Abu Mazen and dismissed 
Qaddoumi as an "eccentric" during a meeting with CODEL 
Ackerman November 11. The King was concerned about Islamist 
political activity in Jordan and said that it was time for 
moderate Muslims world-wide to be more vocal in denouncing 
violence. He emphasized Jordan's support for a right of 
return, but only to a Palestinian state. End Summary. 
 
------------ 
After Arafat 
------------ 
 
2. (C) King Abdullah told CODEL Ackerman November 11 that he 
looked forward to working with new, responsible leadership in 
the West Bank and Gaza in the wake of Arafat's death. The 
King said that he had spoken to POTUS and endorsed Abu Mazen 
as a "good man." He elaborated that Abu Mazen has always been 
a moderate who opposed the violent intifada. In contrast, he 
characterized Qaddoumi as an "eccentric" beholden to Syria. 
The King felt that Abu Mazen's success would depend on the 
amount of authority he was given, the support he received 
from outside, and Israel's attitude. While the King saw Abu 
Mazen as someone the Israelis could talk to, he also saw him 
as a transitional figure -- with Marwan Barghouti possibly 
emerging in the long-run as the Palestinians' choice. 
---------------------- 
Opposing Radical Islam 
---------------------- 
 
3. (C) In response to Ackerman's congratulations on the 
"Amman Message" (reftel) promoting peaceful Islam, the King 
emphasized that it was time for moderate Muslims to be more 
proactive and vocal in denouncing violence. He stated that 
the Amman Message was just the beginning of his efforts to 
reach out to the "silent majority" of Muslims who reject 
extremism. He hoped it would lead to fatwas condemning 
violence. The King explained that the intended audience of 
the message included Muslims in the U.S., Europe, and Asia in 
order to counter revolutionary Salafism everywhere. 
 
------------------- 
Islamists in Jordan 
------------------- 
 
4. (C) King Abdullah termed the Islamist opposition in Jordan 
"a nuisance," but said that it could develop into a real 
problem if not addressed quickly. He was fighting a tendency 
within the government to be complacent and conflict averse by 
getting GOJ officials to "tighten the screws" on political 
Islamists. At the same time, the King wanted the government 
to develop better means to engage and assist needy Jordanians 
(such as a recent visit by Prime Minister al-Fayez to the 
poor) to off-set the Muslim Brotherhood's charitable, NGO, 
and medical care network. 
 
--------------- 
Right of Return 
--------------- 
 
5. (C) Asked to comment about the Palestinian argument for a 
right of return, the King stated that when a two-state 
solution was reached, Jordanian-Palestinians would be welcome 
to stay in Jordan (if they held valid 
residency/identification cards) or move to an independent 
Palestine. He emphasized that Jordan supported a right of 
return only to a Palestinian state (i.e., not to Israel). 
 
6. (U) CODEL Ackerman did not have the opportunity to clear 
this cable. 
 
7. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access the site 
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. 
HALE 

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