US embassy cable - 04CARACAS3542

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 003542 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
HQSOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: SHATTERED OPPOSITION SHORT ON STRATEGY 
 
REF: CARACAS 03291 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR 1.4 (D) 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C)  Venezuela's Coordinadora Democratica, the 
amalgamation of opponents to President Hugo Chavez that had 
begun to disintegrate before the regional elections on 
October 31, has been deemed dead by opposition parties and 
Chavez supporters alike.   Many opposition members, who tend 
to blame the government for cheating and fault Washington for 
abandoning them, have been too preoccupied with their bad 
fortune to plan a rebound from the drubbing they had expected 
in the regionals.  Some Chavez opponents predict an 
undemocratic end to his rule; others believe internal 
fissures already have his government on the brink of 
collapse.  While opposition party members muse about new 
interparty alliances, policies, and strategies, the 
opposition is not making a serious effort to cooperate and 
may encounter more setbacks before being able to mount a 
serious challenge.  In the meantime, the administration will 
have to answer for more now that it controls most of the 
government authorities.  End summary. 
 
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Disunity and Disarray 
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2.  (C)  The union of Venezuelan political parties and 
interest groups opposing President Hugo Chavez, which had 
begun to unhinge before the regional elections on October 31, 
has disintegrated.  On November 2, Accion Democratica (AD) 
president Henry Ramos Allup publicly declared the 
opposition's Coordinadora Democratica (CD) "finished." 
Social Christian Party (COPEI) deputy secretary general Cesar 
Perez Vivas confirmed to poloff the following day that the CD 
had outlived its usefulness.  Primero Justicia (PJ) had 
broken with the CD in late September because, according to a 
PJ official in Tachira State, the PJ's involvement merely had 
bolstered rival opposition parties on the verge of folding. 
Smaller parties such as Causa R and Alianza Bravo Pueblo 
(ABP) also had walked in late September over their refusal to 
participate in elections viewed as rigged, according to 
press. 
 
3.  (C)  Chavez opponents expected the President's candidates 
would dominate on October 31, but few were considering any 
strategy to rebound from the losses.  Indeed, parties were 
still divided over short-term tactics.  For example, no 
consensus existed within parties over whether their 
candidates should remain in regional elections, although most 
of the opposition ended up supporting participation.  In some 
cases, such disagreements led to internal party fractures; 
Proyecto Venezuela leader Henrique Salas Roemer dismissed 
Luis Carlos Rubio for dropping out of the Anzoategui 
gubernatorial race, according to a member of the CD's 
political committee. 
 
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Pouters 
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4.  (C)  The most common trait among opposition supporters is 
an inability to look past recent setbacks.  Chavez's 
opponents focused on rehashing examples of alleged 
governmental election fraud, the trumped-up criminal charges 
brought against fellow Chavez opponents, and other abuses to 
discussing ways to exploit Chavez's political 
miscalculations.  Alfredo Coronil, AD's national secretary of 
international affairs, told poloff nearly 90 percent of the 
country opposed communism, but when asked why the opposition 
did not try to turn public opinion against oil loans to Cuba, 
Coronil merely resumed bashing Chavez's foreign policy. 
Coronil said Venezuela's former enthusiasm for democracy had 
dissipated into unprecedented apathy. 
 
   5.  (C)  Some dispirited Chavez opponents expect the 
United States to rescue Venezuela.  Most Chavez opponents 
resent the Carter Center's endorsement of the referendum 
process, and many convey distrust of the Embassy's appeals 
for better bilateral relations.  National Assembly deputy 
 
Alfonso Marquina (AD) questioned poloff October 18 whether 
the United States really cared about civil rights in 
Venezuela.  On October 5, the alarmist political analyst 
Isabel Bacalao, who heads the think tank "Servicios de 
Informacion Estrategica," lamented to poloff that the US had 
lost its ability and willingness to influence Venezuela. 
 
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Chicken Littles 
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      6.  (C)  Another view among opposition members is that 
Chavez is here to stay until he is overthrown.  Of these 
skeptics, many privately justify rebellion by citing article 
350 of the constitution, which provides for the public 
disavowal of antidemocratic or abusive leaders.  Some expect 
imminent violence, such as retired Vice Admiral Rafael Huizi, 
who told poloff in early October that unidentified military 
officers would stage a coup if the administration ignored the 
release of the CD's election fraud report (REFTEL) on October 
12. 
 
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Pollyannas 
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7.  (C)  A final opposition school of thought is that 
Chavismo is soon to collapse on its own.  Bacalao sees hints 
of desperation in pro-government media broadcasts and Chavez 
speeches that point to the administration's lack of control 
over the military.  Those opposition figures who dismiss 
Chavez's influence also tend to be confident of his 
opponents' cohesion.  Chain emails announcing imminent, 
overwhelming street demonstrations circulate with such 
frequency that the radical pro-Chavez website www.aporrea.com 
prints them in derision. 
 
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Tacticians 
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   8.  (U)  A few politicians have considered the future of 
the opposition.  AD international affairs secretary Coronil 
said he envisioned a coalition of social democratic parties, 
to include AD, COPEI, Movement toward Socialism (MAS), and 
ABP.  His homologue in COPEI, Sadio Garavini, told poloff 
November 5 the same, although he consigned AD to another 
imaginary alliance because it was too left-leaning.  Causa R 
leader Andres Velazquez told poloff before the regionals he 
was considering a new leftist opposition bloc, and press 
reports on November 2 said ABP leader Antonio Ledezma had 
proposed a new opposition front, as well.  PJ and Causa R 
announced November 15 they would unite in a 8-member National 
Assembly bloc that they hoped would grow into a political 
alliance, according to press. 
 
      9.  (C)  Even fewer opposition figures have articulated 
a shift in platform.  Marquina, who is AD's floor leader in 
the National Assembly, told poloff before the regionals that 
most voters were interested in employment, not civil rights 
issues.  Reflecting on the "it's the economy, stupid" slogan, 
Marquina said the most important issues in Venezuela involved 
the people's empty stomachs.  PJ representatives in 
Anzoategui on October 26 also told poloff that the people 
were most interested in poverty alleviation.  An assistant to 
MVR National Assembly deputy Luis Tascon in early October 
privately credited PJ for engaging with lower-class 
neighborhoods. 
 
      10.  (C)  Primero Justicia, whose officials in Tachira 
and Anzoategui told poloffs they were more concerned about 
the 2005 National Assembly elections, is perhaps the only 
party to have formulated a post-regional election strategy. 
PJ backers said they wanted to show effective management and 
service provision in a few key mayoralties, from which they 
would radiate outward.  Anzoategui PJ backers won a local 
race with the campaign slogan "just like in Baruta and 
Chacao," which refers to two relatively clean, safe, 
upper-class Caracas municipalities run by PJ mayors.  A 
Tachira PJ representative said PJ would concentrate on 
educating party members before the National Assembly 
elections next summer. 
 
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Comment 
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11.  (C)  No serious interparty dialog about opposition unity 
is occurring yet.  Most opposition members are too focused on 
feeling sorry for themselves to plan for the future.  Because 
government coffers almost exclusively finance political 
campaigns in Venezuela, we may even see more splits as some 
opposition members approach the government seeking to cut 
deals to recoup financial losses.  PJ may be the only party 
making a promising effort to distance itself--both by 
choosing its allies and by managing its image--from the 
pre-Chavez past, but the young professionals failed to 
generate much support from Venezuelans at the national level. 
 Despite the Pollyannas' hopes, Chavez's government is highly 
unlikely to implode anytime soon.  Nonetheless, the 
electorate now will have mostly Chavistas to blame for 
underemployment, public insecurity, and scarce government 
services.  Chavismo may begin to face a bigger threat from 
within as pro-government officials compete for spoils in the 
regions. 
 
12.  (C)  The splintering of the opposition reflects the fact 
that the opposition was a coalition of disparate groups 
united only by the prospect of defeating Chavez.  As a 
coalition, the opposition groups excelled in organizing the 
signature collection drive (thanks to Sumate) but were less 
adroit in responding to Chavez and in offering a credible 
alternative to Chavez. 
 
13.  (C)  The challenge to opposition groups remains that of 
presenting a credible alternative to Chavez and the MVR in 
the 2005 National Assembly elections and the 2006 
presidential elections.  New leaders need to emerge, and 
parties need to get in touch with their supporters, before 
there can be progress towards opposition unity. 
Brownfield 
 
 
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      2004CARACA03542 - CONFIDENTIAL