US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1862

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001862 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS 
NSC FOR E.MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR SEES LACK OF CLARITY ON BOTH 
SIDES OF PEACE PROCESS 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 1856 
 
     B. COLOMBO 1852 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.  Reasons 1.4(b,d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  The Norwegian ambassador observes that 
&neither side is clear8 in the peace process.  The LTTE was 
markedly less negative of President Kumaratunga in the 
Norwegian,s discussions in Kilinochchi last week. 
Balasingham in particular made clear that the ISGA is subject 
to negotiation.  The next major step will be the November 27 
Hero,s Day speech by LTTE leader Prabhakaran which the 
Norwegians will analyze carefully but fear will be similar to 
previous years, speeches -- or perhaps have even a harder 
line than last year.  Solheim may return to Sri Lanka in 
early December; Balasingham told the Norwegians he may be 
back in &several months.8  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) In a November 17 discussion with the Ambassador and 
DCM regarding last week,s high-level Norwegian visit to Sri 
Lanka, Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar underlined that 
the genesis of the visit had been a request from Sri Lankan 
President Kumaratunga (CBK) to Norwegian Foreign Minister 
Petersen when the two had met in New York on the margins of 
UNGA.  CBK had issued an invitation which the Norwegians had 
felt that they could not refuse (&there would have to be a 
heck of a good reason not to come8) even though Oslo had 
concerns about the timing.  The Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) leadership, Brattskar commented, had also 
wondered if the timing was propitious. 
 
Initial Confusion 
----------------- 
 
3.  (C) Brattskar noted that the run-up to the visit had 
gotten bogged down on the question of which side was more 
committed to the &Oslo Declaration,8 when in fact there is 
no such thing.  He speculated that the erroneous term stemmed 
from a confusion of several Oslo meetings, various documents 
which had been issued, and the Tokyo donor meeting in June 
2003 which had resulted in a declaration.  He also noted that 
reaction to the book released by London-based LTTE luminary 
Anton Balasingham (portrayed in the media here as rejecting 
federalism as a solution and holding open the option for an 
independent Tamil state) on the eve of the Norwegian visit 
had also muddied the waters although Brattskar was of the 
view that the book did not contain anything new.  Balasingham 
has always talked about &internal (read: federalism) versus 
external (read: separate state) solutions,8 Brattskar said. 
The Norwegians had hoped the LTTE would, either before or 
during the visit, give the GSL a &fig leaf8 by publicly 
recommitting to the Oslo principles of a federal solution but 
the LTTE did not, Brattskar stated. 
 
LTTE Better Disposed Towards CBK 
-------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Brattskar stated that there had been &nothing new 
from Kilinochchi8 during the Norwegian visit.  That said, 
the LTTE side (headed by Prabhakaran) had been markedly 
&less negative8 about CBK compared to previous discussions 
and seemed to be convinced of her &eagerness.8  The LTTE 
was extremely concerned about the role of the Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and told the Norwegians they needed 
assurances that the JVP supported CBK on the peace process. 
The Norwegians, Brattskar said, told the LTTE that they 
didn,t need to worry about the JVP.  It is up to CBK to 
deliver the JVP, the Norwegians said, and when she says they 
are on board the LTTE should take her at her word.  Brattskar 
said the Norwegian impression was that the LTTE feared 
&being led into a process that goes nowhere -- and then 
being blamed by the international community for the failure 
when they pull out.8  Brattskar commented that the Norwegian 
discussions with the LTTE have developed over time into 
free-wheeling, wide-ranging conversations, much less 
structured than the &formal sessions8 the Norwegians 
inevitably have with CBK. 
 
5.  (C) Asked about the LTTE endgame, Brattskar noted that, 
just as the Norwegians were leaving the Kilinochchi meeting, 
Prabhakaran (described by Brattskar as &impatient8) had 
said he wanted talks to resume.  In the same vein, when 
Brattskar and Solheim had met Balasingham at Colombo airport 
before the LTTE leader returned to London (note: Brattskar 
said that an LTTE &central committee8 meeting had been held 
after the Kilinochchi meeting but before their airport 
Balasingham chat), Balasingham had been &eager8 for talks 
to resume on the LTTE,s interim self-governing authority 
(ISGA).  Balasingham (who had &not been part of8 internal 
LTTE discussions on the ISGA) had made clear &once again,8 
Brattskar said, that the ISGA was a &starting point8 and 
&subject to negotiation.8  Brattskar noted that erroneous 
reports that the Norwegians had carried a specific proposal 
on how to restart talks back from Kilinochchi to be delivered 
to CBK were due to a translating error by one of the 
newspapers. 
 
Speeches and Interviews 
----------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Brattskar noted that Prabhakaran's annual &Hero,s 
Day8 speech on November 27 will be a useful gauge of LTTE 
reaction both to the Norwegian visit and to the GSL posture 
in general.  Balasingham told the Norwegians not to expect a 
speech much different from previous years -- or even a bit 
more hardline.  The problem is that such a speech can be read 
many ways, as it will have both good and bad parts. 
Brattskar said he fears that such a speech would elicit a 
negative reaction in the south and exacerbate mutual 
suspicions.  He saw CBK,s November 16 press interview with 
the government media (septel), in which she invited the LTTE 
to return to the peace table within a month, as a vain 
attempt to influence the contents of Prabhakaran,s speech in 
a positive direction. 
 
&Neither Side Clear8 
-------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Brattskar noted that &neither side is clear8 on 
next steps.  CBK is focused on parliamentary maneuvering and 
the economy.  The problem, Brattskar opined, is that the LTTE 
will react defensively if it perceives that the peace process 
is anything less than the GSL,s top priority.  The 
Norwegians, efforts to engage CBK on whether peace is higher 
on her agenda than political survival or the economy had not 
been well-received by the President, Brattskar noted wryly. 
Brattskar noted that Peace Secretariat chairman Jayantha 
Dhanapala swung between optimism and pessimism which, 
Brattskar commented, is not helpful in a long, tedious peace 
process.  Brattskar and the Ambassador agreed that Foreign 
Minister Kadirgamar, who has not appeared to always be in 
CBK,s inner circle on peace process issues, now clearly is a 
player again, and that given Kadirgamar's legalistic bent, 
this might not be helpful. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
8.  (C) Brattskar said that the Norwegians will wait for the 
Hero,s Day Speech, analyze the fallout and then decide how 
to proceed.  Solheim will visit with Balasingham in London 
(after his Hero,s Day speech there) and try to ascertain 
LTTE thinking.  Brattskar said that, based on what happens in 
London and here on the ground, Solheim may return to Sri 
Lanka in early December.  Balasingham had told the Norwegians 
that he might also return to Sri Lanka &in several months.8 
 Brattskar commented that at the beginning of the Norwegian 
visit, Solheim and Helgesen had told him they thought the 
odds of a timely return to the peace table were &two out of 
ten.8  At the conclusion, one of them saw the odds as 
&three out of ten,8 the other &four out of ten.8 
 
9.  (C) Brattskar noted that he continues his efforts to 
start a dialogue with the JVP in order to explain the 
Norwegian role and to hopefully temper some of the chauvinist 
party,s more apocalyptic pronouncements about the 
Norwegians.  So far, the party has refused such a meeting 
(although Brattskar has seen some JVP leaders in their 
ministerial capacities).  Brattskar,s impression is that the 
JVP definitely does not want to leave the government since 
the party would no longer be able to steer government 
resources to their areas. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.  (C) Brattskar confirmed the impressions we have received 
from others (reftels).  Petersen came without a clear 
objective and left without a clear outcome.  And neither of 
the contending parties seems to have an idea how to break the 
deadlock and move on.  For now, the Norwegians seem content 
to let things stay that way, mildly encouraged by the 
apparent desire of both sides to resume negotiations -- even 
though no one seems able to figure out how to get there. 
 
LUNSTEAD