US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA2096

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 002096 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, KPKO, PHUM, CG, UN 
SUBJECT: THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD: GOMA AND NORTH KIVU 
INSECURITY MOUNTING 
 
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
1. (C)  Summary:  A wave of what appear to be executions in 
Goma, as well as clashes throughout North Kivu between 
military nominally responsive to regional military commander 
Obed and militia loyal to Governor Eugene Serufuli, suggest 
that Serufuli's grip on his province might be slipping. 
Monuc believes the current instability results in part from 
political manipulation by elements in Kinshasa, and Serufuli 
agrees.  Whatever the cause, North Kivu -- and Goma in 
particular -- seems potentially to be the next "crisis site" 
in eastern Congo.  End Summary. 
 
Stepping Up The Heat on RCD Bastion Of North Kivu 
 
2. (C)  North Kivu Governor Eugene Serufuli, long the master 
political juggler of the DRC, artfully balancing Kigali and 
Kinshasa's interests against his own, may finally be 
embroiled in a situation from which he will not easily 
wriggle free.  For the last six months his stronghold, Goma, 
has effectively been surrounded by about 20,000 forces loyal 
to Kinshasa, dispatched to eastern Congo to confront the 
threat posed by rebellious general Laurent Nkunda, the 
despoiler of Bukavu.  Although Nkunda's forces seem to have 
dissipated, and Nkunda himself disappeared, the loyalist 
forces have not been recalled, but instead have remained in a 
loose ring around Goma, with some even stationed in the 
northern part of North Kivu itself.  Over the last two months 
in particular there have been sporadic clashes between 
elements of the 8th and 10th military regions (North and 
South Kivu, respectively), whose regional commanders (Obed 
and Mabe) are at odds.  Kinshasa regards Serufuli with 
mistrust, but views Obed even more negatively.  Indeed, 
Kabila has stated to diplomats that he considers Obed to have 
facilitated Nkunda's insurreection, and Obed has several 
times refused to fully implement orders from the FARDC chain 
of command.  Secure in Goma, however, and with backing from 
Serufuli, Obed has been a difficult issue with which to come 
to grips. 
 
3. (C)  Over the last several weeks, however, a wedge seems 
to have been increasingly driven between Serufuli and Obed. 
Ex-RCD military responsible, at least nominally, to Obed have 
been robbing citizens and even stores in Goma, and in 
outlying areas, raping women and burning homes in villages. 
Serufuli several times told PolCouns that the problem is that 
these soldiers are not being paid -- unlike compatriots in 
neighboring military regions, he said.  (Note:  Kinshasa has 
been marginally better than usual in its record of paying the 
troops in the field and the result, by-and-large, has been a 
slightly better record in regards to respecting civilians' 
rights in most places.  We know, for instance, that troops in 
South Kivu, Maniema and Kisangani have been being paid at 
least something, sometimes.  We don't know that the same is 
true of 8th district North Kivu troops. End Note.) 
 
Kinshasa Taking A More Direct Hand? 
 
4. (C) In the last week, the situation has taken an even more 
foreboding turn.  A man whom Serufuli identified to PolCouns 
as a "lawyer and investigator from Kinshasa" was killed 
execution-style four days ago, and one night later a police 
captain, another lawyer and an "innocent bystander" were 
murdered the same way.  Other victims of what appears to be a 
targeted campaign (as distinct from the more random 
robberies) include a student and a human rights NGO worker 
(Congolese).  When PolCouns asked Serufuli for more detail 
regarding Kinshasa's investigation, Serufuli said he was not 
fully informed but believed it to be aimed at military 
misconduct.  He insisted, however, that he retained full 
confidence in General Obed.  Monuc Head-of-Office M'hand 
Njuzi said that Monuc's investigations indicate that all the 
crimes, including the recent executions, have been conducted 
by RCD soldiers. Monuc has proposed increased joint 
(Monuc-FARDC-police) patrols of the city to address the 
immediate security situation.  Meanwhile, particularly in 
outlying villages such as Kanyabayonga (near Butembu in the 
northern part of the province) Serufuli's militia, assisted 
often by students, increasingly are facing-off against 
soldiers trying to pillage neighborhoods or entire villages. 
 
Comment 
 
5. (C)  Current events could very possibly represent the 
fruit of a Kinshasa-orchestrated (read Presidency) campaign. 
The political class has speculated for months about a 
possible deal with Serufuli, maybe involving a Ministerial 
portfolio, but Serufuli has prefered to build his base and 
authority in his fiefdom in North Kivu.  If Kinshasa's hand 
indeed is in the Goma events, then it seems likely to us that 
this could be as a way to ratchet up pressure on Serufuli to 
"make a deal," and become de facto part of a larger Kabila 
camp. This scenario would greatly advance PPRD interests in 
North Kivu (where otherwise they will not be strong), and 
potentially allow Serufuli to remain in place, even as the 
elected governor.  Given that such a deal by Serufuli (with 
either the PPRD or MLC, for instance) would threaten RCD 
interests, it is also possible that the current wave of 
violence is being orchestrated by RCD hardliners such as 
Bizima Karaha, to threaten and weaken Serufuli.  What the 
case, if the security situation truly spirals out of control, 
Kinshasa could be in a position to dispatch FADRC troops into 
the province to restore order and protect the citizens - 
where they doubtless would come into conflict with Serufuli's 
militia, sparking a wider confrontation.  Serufuli has not 
yet lost his grip, by any means, but probably within the next 
few weeks it will be clear whether he can regain full 
control, or begin instead to drop some of the political balls 
he has so artfully juggled. 
MEECE