US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1856

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001856 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKAN FOREIGN MINISTER SAYS ROAD AHEAD 
"MURKY" FOLLOWING NORWEGIANS' VISIT 
 
REF: COLOMBO 1852 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) In a November 16 meeting with the Ambassador, Foreign 
Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar noted a "lack of clarity" in the 
peace process following the Norwegian facilitators' November 
11 meeting with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) chief 
Prabhakaran.  Prabhakaran's ambiguous response to the 
Government's overture, conveyed by the Norwegians, that each 
side publicly endorse the Oslo communique has left the 
Government unsure of how best to proceed, Kadirgamar 
indicated.  Despite the lack of progress, President 
Kumaratunga plans to address the nation within the next few 
days--well before Prabhakaran's annual policy speech on 
November 27--on the peace process.  Kadirgamar, as usual, 
expressed confidence that the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 
(JVP), the President's maverick coalition partner, will 
support her efforts to reopen negotiations.  Absent other 
signs of progress on the peace front, the President seems 
determined to pre-empt Prabhakaran's Heroes' Day thunder by 
depicting her government as more forward leaning and more 
flexible than the Tigers--even if neither she nor the LTTE 
has modified their respective positions significantly over 
the past six months.  End summary. 
 
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NORWEGIANS' LUNCH WITH PRABHAKARAN: 
INCONCLUSIVE AND CONFUSING 
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2.  (C) In a November 16 meeting with the Ambassador, Foreign 
Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar said that Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Jan Petersen's November 11 meeting with Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) chief Prabhakaran in Kilinochchi 
(Reftel) had resulted in only a greater "lack of clarity" 
about the Tigers' intentions and how best to move ahead on 
the peace process.  "Our impression was that the Norwegian 
facilitators themselves were confused by their conversation 
with Prabhkaran," he said, and were thus "not able to 
formulate clearly what had happened" in the meeting.  As a 
result, the debrief that Petersen gave the Government of Sri 
Lanka (GSL) before his departure on November 11 was 
"indistinct," leaving next steps on the peace process 
"murky," Kadirgamar commented. 
 
3.  (C) Kadirgamar said that Petersen (who was accompanied to 
Kilinochchi by Vidar Helgesen, his Deputy Foreign Minister, 
Special Envoy to Sri Lanka Erik Solheim, and Norwegian 
Ambassador Hans Brattskar) had clearly conveyed to 
Prabhakaran the GSL's message asking the LTTE leader to make 
some kind of public reference to the Oslo Declaration that 
would indicate support for its principles.  (Note:  The Oslo 
Declaration refers to a communique issued by Norway and 
agreed to by both parties to the conflict during the third 
round of peace talks in December 2002.  The statement 
committed both parties to exploring a solution "founded on 
the principle of self-determination . . . based on a federal 
structure within a united Sri Lanka."  Recent statements by 
Tiger theoretician Anton Balasingham appearing to repudiate 
the Oslo Declaration have raised concerns that the Tigers may 
be reneging on their earlier commitment to a solution within 
a federal system.  End note.)  Since "Oslo is code word for 
federalism," Kadirgamar explained, the GSL wants to be 
assured of the Tigers' continued commitment to the basic 
principles outlined in the communique.  If Prabhakaran would 
make such a statement, Kadirgamar said, the GSL could make a 
reciprocal statement, either from President Kumaratunga or 
through Norway, reaffirming its own commitment.  Prabhakaran 
reportedly offered no immediate response to the overture, 
according to the Norwegians' report, until the group moved to 
lunch.  At that point, he told Petersen, through an 
interpreter, that if the GSL were looking for a one-line 
message from him, his one-line message would be that talks 
could only resume on the basis of the Interim Self-Governing 
Authority (ISGA), the Tigers' controversial proposal for an 
interim administration.  According to Kadirgamar, Petersen 
said that he did not know what to think of Prabhakaran's 
cryptic comment--whether to interpret it as a rejection of 
the GSL overture or a foretaste of his upcoming annual 
Heroes' Day policy speech scheduled for November 27. 
Kadirgamar added, however, that the GSL construed 
Prabhakaran's remark about the one-liner as "a bit of a slap 
in the face." 
 
4.  (C)  Adding to the confused atmosphere was an interview 
Balasingham had given to a pro-LTTE Tamil vernacular 
newspaper on November 12, Kadirgamar noted.  (Note:  The 
interview slammed the GSL position, as conveyed by the 
Norwegians, as nothing "special or new."  Balasingham also 
reiterated the long-standing Tiger position that the ISGA 
must form the sole basis for resumed negotiations and cannot 
be linked to any possible permanent settlement in the 
discussions.  He sidestepped taking a position on federalism, 
but said that the Oslo communique did not necessarily 
preclude Tiger demands for a separate state.  End note.) 
While Kadirgamar sees the sentiments expressed in the 
interview as a step backward, the President takes an 
optimistic view, the Foreign Minister said, inexplicably 
seeing unidentified "building blocks" in Balasingham's 
statements that offer a way forward.  "She's in that frame of 
mind," he concluded, "wanting to be optimistic" about the 
peace process--even if there is little basis for sanguinity. 
 
 
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PRESIDENT TO ADDRESS NATION; 
JVP APPEARS AMENABLE 
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5.  (C)  A follow-up briefing with Solheim and Helgesen after 
Petersen's departure on November 12 brought no greater 
clarity, Kadirgamar said.  Instead, Helgesen had told 
Kadirgamar that the Norwegians were unable to predict what 
might happen next in the peace process and suggested that the 
GSL not make any statements before Prabhakaran's Heroes' Day 
speech.  Nonetheless, President Kumaratunga plans to address 
the nation either November 16 or 17 on the peace process, he 
reported.  "We've decided to say something . . .irrespective 
of (and before) whatever Prabhakaran will say."  While 
acknowledging that he does not know exactly what the 
President plans to say, he speculated that she might make a 
statement reaffirming her government's commitment--including 
the recalcitrant JVP--to resuming negotiations based on the 
Oslo principles.  While the President's address might convey 
"a bit of an invitation" to resume talks, Kadirgamar said he 
expects the President "to come out strongly in favor of 
federalism and Oslo on a take-it-or-leave-it basis." 
 
6.  (C)  Kadirgamar said that recent discussions he has 
conducted, apparently on the President's behalf, with the JVP 
have done much to secure the coalition partner's agreement to 
support resumed negotiations.  Kadirgamar said he, along with 
Information Minister Mangala Samaraweera, planned to hold the 
third round of talks with the JVP leadership later the same 
day.  The JVP is "keen to start talks" with the Tigers and is 
willing to consider discussions on an interim administration 
as long as such a proposal is part of an integral solution, 
he said.  He believes he is close to obtaining JVP agreement 
on a joint statement of support for negotiations--perhaps the 
same statement Prabhakaran has stipulated as proof that the 
President's efforts are supported by Sinhalese nationalists 
in the south (Reftel).  The joint statement would likely 
express support for a settlement along the lines expressed in 
the joint communique issued by the Indian and Sri Lankan 
governments following the President's November 3-7 visit to 
India (septel):  acceptable to all communities; consistent 
with democracy, pluralism and human rights; any interim 
arrangement discussed must be "an integral part" of a final 
settlement; unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity of Sri 
Lanka must be maintained.  It would be good if an agreement 
signed by the General Secretaries of both the JVP and the 
President's Sri Lanka Freedom Party were ready in time for 
the President's address to the nation, Kadirgamar said 
hopefully. 
 
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COMMENT 
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7.  (C)  The GSL invited the Norwegian Foreign Minister to 
Sri Lanka in order to ensure that Prabhakaran--whose aides, 
we suspect, filter out unpleasant or unwanted information 
from reaching their reclusive leader--heard its message 
directly.  Whether Prabhakaran understood the 
GSL-via-Norwegians message is hard to say; neither the 
Norwegians nor the GSL, at any rate, seems to have understood 
his response.  Indications are not promising for a 
breakthrough--or even some recognition of the tough messages 
reportedly given to his delegation during their European 
tour--in Prabhakaran's upcoming policy speech.  The President 
has apparently decided not to wait till November 27 to hear 
the same rehashing of Tiger talking points on the 
ISGA--especially if Prabhakaran plans to backtrack from Sri 
Lanka's hard-won support of a federal solution.  Instead, she 
seems ready to take the initiative--with JVP support, if the 
Foreign Minister's optimistic forecasts prove correct--by 
emphasizing her government's commitment to a peaceful 
political settlement.  If her address to the nation follows 
Kadirgamar's outline, she will have successfully lobbed the 
ball for resuming negotiations back into the Tigers' den, 
just a few brief days before Prabhakaran's own major address 
to his "nation." 
LUNSTEAD