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| Identifier: | 04OTTAWA3048 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04OTTAWA3048 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ottawa |
| Created: | 2004-11-12 17:26:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET//NOFORN |
| Tags: | PREL MARR MCAP PTER PINR CA NATO Barbara Martin Missile Defense Canadian Military |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 OTTAWA 003048 SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR WHA/CAN AND P(HUNT) E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2014 TAGS: PREL, MARR, MCAP, PTER, PINR, CA, NATO, Barbara Martin, Missile Defense, Canadian Military SUBJECT: 214TH MEETING OF THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE, OCTOBER 20-21, 2004 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Brian Flora. Reason 1.4 (b ) and (d). 1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At its October 21-22 meeting in Ottawa, the U.S.-Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) -- recommended expeditious negotiation of an agreement to replace the current NORAD agreement expiring May 2006, with a further recommendation that the new Agreement have no termination date; -- recommended that the functions of the Bi-National Planning Group (BPG) be made permanent under a bi-national entity and that the U.S. and Canada explore the future placement of those functions during the NORAD renewal negotiations; -- recognized the need for enhanced bi-national maritime defense cooperation and recommended defining avenues to achieve that goal. Both governments were invited to provide a progress report at the next PJBD meeting; -- recommended that the long-term requirements of the North Warning System be actively considered, inviting the North Warning System Office and the Air Defense Responsibility Sharing Working Group to update on developed options at the next PJBD meeting; -- supported the efforts of the Canadian Government "to identify specific problems arising from insufficient information sharing" and encouraged both governments to "consider ways to improve information sharing"; -- agreed to expand its membership to include U.S. Northern Command and the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff on a permanent basis. 2. (SBU) Representatives from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) participated in meetings for the first time as observers and briefed the Board on the structure and mandates of their respective agencies. Canada's new co-Chairman, M.P. Judi Longfield, officiated for the first time. She voiced great appreciation for U.S. co-Chairman Jack David's service and regret that this was his last meeting. CO-CHAIRMEN'S REMARKS 3. (C) Hon. Judi Longfield, in her debut as Canada's co-Chairman and host of the meeting, spoke of the "indivisible cooperation and security" between the U.S. and Canada that she witnessed at first hand on her introductory visit to NORAD in September. She welcomed the August 5 signing of the Amendment to sanction NORAD's air warning functions (ITW/AA) in support of missile defense as reinforcing NORAD's vital role in defense of the continent. Mrs. Longfield provided assurances that formal approval of the BPG extension would be forthcoming very soon. She cited other benchmarks relevant to shared defense, including Canada's April 2004 rollout of a comprehensive national security policy and the Canadian government's commitment, over several years, of C$8 billion in support of security objectives. Similarly, she highlighted the presence of DHS and PSEPC representatives at the PJBD as a noteworthy development. Longfield added that the new government's pledge to increase Canadian armed forces by 5,000 active duty and 3,000 reserves, and C$7 billion to modernize the military, was another manifestation of Canada's commitment to continental defense and security and the desire to be more effective overseas. She alluded to the government's ongoing defense and policy review which may identify other areas for improvement. 4. (C) U.S. co-Chairman Jack David welcomed first-time U.S. participants to the PJBD. He commended the successful conclusion of ISAF V under the leadership of Lieutenant General Hillier and the Canadian contributions to stabilization efforts in Haiti. Alluding to the excellent work of the Bi-National Planning Group (BPG), Mr. David said the U.S. and Canada have a historic opportunity to transform NORAD. With reference to the "long-overdue review" of Canada's defense capabilities, the U.S. co-Chairman hoped that the review would provide Canada with resources to "project power to the farthest reaches of the globe." On the topic of missile defense, he said the U.S. is open to Canadian participation, but recognizes it is a decision for Canada alone to make and is "not pushing" on this; the U.S. would press ahead to meet necessary deadlines regardless of Canadian participation. At the same time, he concluded, the missile defense concept "makes sense for Canada and continental defense." MISSILE DEFENSE 5. (C) Barbara Martin, Acting Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) Director General for International Security, expressed appreciation for the U.S. co-Chairman's comments on missile defense. Acknowledging that political momentum for a Canadian decision on the U.S. missile defense program had slowed considerably due to domestic political developments, Martin thought that a parliamentary debate (the third this year) and non-binding vote later this Fall nonetheless would likely produce a favorable outcome. At the same time, Martin concluded, the political environment for the minority government at this time was "complex and difficult." 6. (C) Martin cited the January 2004 letter of intent to explore missile defense cooperation with the USG and the August 2004 NORAD Agreement amendment as two important milestones for Canada. She asserted the current government's rejection of Canadian opponents to MD that the program is merely "Star Wars" under another name, that the ABM Treaty prohibits establishment of national defense systems, or that a missile defense system will stimulate an arms race. Though the Canadian government continued to oppose the "weaponization of space" as a core belief, Martin concluded, Canadians also supported collaboration with the U.S. in the defense of North America. NORAD'S ROLE IN MISSILE DEFENSE 7. (C) Lt. Col. Doug McCarty presented a briefing on NORAD's role in missile defense which reviewed the operational impact of the January 2004 Letters of Intent and the NORAD Agreement amendment. Though the amendment did not explicitly enable Canadian operational training (for ITW/AA) alongside the U.S., a separate OSD policy memo subsequently paved the way. Lt. Col. McCarty noted that integration worked well up to the point of a "defendable missile event." In such a situation, a Canadian Command Director (CD) at NORAD,s Combined Command Center must defer to the senior U.S. officer on duty, who would then relay assessments to USNORTHCOM. A U.S. NORAD-assigned CD can recommend action to USNORTHCOM. State Department Representative Terry Breese reminded that missile defense execution for North America is assigned to USNORTHCOM by POTUS but questioned the interpretation given the NORAD Agreement amendment with respect to a CD's advising USNORTHCOM. He undertook to review the issue in Washington. ENHANCED NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY AND NORAD RENEWAL 8. (C) Presentations by Lt. Col. Creig Rice, from the Joint Staff, Col. Mike Hache of the Department of National Defense (DND) and NORAD Plans Director, Major General William Hodgkins, USAF, set the stage for discussion of enhanced North American security and NORAD renewal. From the Canadian perspective, issues to discuss in the renewal process included information sharing, maritime surveillance and control, land surveillance and control, defense support for civil authorities, military assistance to civil authorities, and information operations. 9. (C) Col. Hache and Major General Hodgkins noted the importance of establishing and sticking to milestones in the NORAD renewal process. Assuming extension of the Bi-national Planning Group mandate to May 2006, the expiration date of the current NORAD Agreement, milestones would include: -- government mandates to negotiate by December 2004 -- bilateral negotiations January-July 2005 -- U.S. and Canadian internal government reviews in Fall 2005 -- final NORAD Agreement ready by December 2005. ENHANCED MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION 10. (C) In the lively discussion of options for enhanced maritime security cooperation, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) representative Mr. Matthew Broderick argued that much work would be needed for Washington to agree, by Fall 2005, to give to NORAD responsibility for maritime defense threat warning and control, similar to its role in aerospace defense. While NORAD had demonstrated an unprecedented level of U.S. collaboration with a foreign government, he said, it remained unclear that this type of fusion necessarily was "desirable" in the maritime domain. Moreover, in his view an incoming vessel that posed a threat was more "homeland security" than "defense." Colonel Hache and others noted that there clearly was need to better monitor the maritime domain because the vulnerability existed and some form of bi-national cooperation was needed to address the vulnerability. BI-NATIONAL PLANNING GROUP 11. (C) In her introductory remarks on the Bi-National Planning Group briefing, Ms. Longfield regretted the delay in Canada's formal agreement to the BPG extension. The document was "in the works," she said, awaiting the signatures of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers. USAF Col. Lauri Cross and CF Col. David Fraser provided an update on accomplishments within the Enhanced Military Cooperation Agreement mandate of the BPG. These included establishment of the Bi-National Document Library; improved conference procedures; updated basic security document (and interim adoption pending completion of Canadian Defense Policy Review); progress on the blueprint for bi-national mil-to-mil support to civil authorities; ongoing work to update and further develop the existing plan for the combined defense of the CANUS region, such that it accounts for the current and future security environments and allows for synchronization across multiple domains; a range of activities in support of the mandate; and the BPG Interim Report, which captures ideas for enhanced military cooperation and identifies 42 additional areas for study. 12. (S) Col. Fraser added that the BPG was "mapping" U.S. and Canadian organizations to find gaps in the flow and coordination of information between/among them. In the ensuing discussion, Maj. Gen. Hodgkins noted that "releasability" was the biggest impediment to the flow of information, and that bureaucratic inertia must be overcome. OSD Representative Jim Townsend observed that not all classified information qualified as "intelligence." He noted that whereas the BPG had done its job in identifying gaps in the information sharing process, it was up to each of the different "communities" to implement the remedy. The BPG position was that each of the different communities needed incentives or directives to help them find remedies for sharing, not just within their communities but across agencies and the border, from senior leadership to action officers. 13. (C) Mr. Victor Tise, of the BPG, guided Board members through a table top exercise designed to increase awareness of CANUS bi-national challenges and issues that can be expected while confronting asymmetric threats. His notional scenario centered on two events in the Puget Sound area: the sinking of a ferry with 2,500 passengers on board by an explosive-laden fast boat, and the attack on a nuclear submarine at Bangor Submarine Base by two seaplanes. Within this context, the Board discussed the likely response, both by civilian and military authorities; measures for ensuring that necessary intelligence/information sharing was available for Dod and DND elements to act; and a responsive public affairs strategy to calm fears and ensure that Canadian and American national authorities send the same or complementary messages to the public related to these acts of terrorism. CANUS THREAT ASSESSMENT 14. (C) Yves Levesque, DND Directorate of Strategic Intelligence, briefed on the cruise missile threat to North America, arguing that cruise missiles today pose the greatest missile threat to the continent. He noted that there is little difference in the technology for a 1000-KM cruise missile and that of a short-range missile; and while there are more than 200 documented types of UAV in some 85 countries, only 22 of those countries are members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Moreover, most of the MTCR controls are geared to ballistic missile proliferation. Though the MTCR covers the guidance systems used for cruise missiles, monitoring and control of the latter poses a serious challenge due to ready availability of components. Levesque said that the future asymmetric threat to the continent lay in the use of unconventional platforms for missile launches, proliferation behavior by state and non-state actors, and dual use technologies. Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa CELLUCCI
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