US embassy cable - 04MADRID4337

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SPAIN ON SUPPORT FOR IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL: "MAYBE AFTER IRAQI ELECTIONS"

Identifier: 04MADRID4337
Wikileaks: View 04MADRID4337 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Madrid
Created: 2004-11-12 16:18:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PHUM PTER PREF SP
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


 
C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 004337 
 
SIPDIS 
 
S/WCI 
NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, PREF, SP 
SUBJECT: SPAIN ON SUPPORT FOR IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL: 
"MAYBE AFTER IRAQI ELECTIONS" 
 
REF: SECSTATE 240444 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick, reason 1.5 (B). 
 
1. (C) Poloff met on 11/12 with Eva Martinez of the MFA's 
Directorate General for the Near East to encourage Spanish 
assistance for the Iraqi Special Tribunal.  Martinez said 
Spain had received no request from the Iraqi Interim 
Authority (IIG) for assistance in preparing for the Iraqi 
Special Tribunal.  She indicated that if such a request did 
come forward, the GOS would be unlikely to act on it until 
after the Iraqi elections, explaining that the Zapatero 
Government would be reticent to support the Iraqi government 
before it had the stamp of popular approval. 
 
2. (C) However, Martinez was quick to point out that Spain 
had earmarked "very significant" assistance funds for Iraq's 
post-election government and that judicial assistance was an 
obvious area for cooperation.  Looking over the areas for 
assistance outlined by IIG DPM Salih, Martinez said she did 
not see any that would be objectionable from Spain's point of 
view.  She was skeptical about the possibility of sending 
experts to provide local assistance, saying the possibility 
of having a Spanish aid worker kidnapped or killed was 
"politically unviable" for the Socialist government. 
Martinez noted the continuing lack of security in Baghdad and 
said it was more likely the GOS would support training in 
Spain or perhaps material assistance. 
 
3. (C) Despite the GOS boundaries on aid to the IIG, Martinez 
expressed appreciation for the demarche, particularly 
information on the precise nature of Iraqi needs.  She said 
she would forward the Iraqi request to the MFA's 
international cooperation agency to give them a head start in 
planning for post-election assistance.  Martinez offered to 
brief poloff on reactions by others in the MFA and by Spanish 
diplomats in Baghdad to the Iraqi request. 
 
//COMMENT// 
 
4. (C) Martinez' comments on GOS unwillingness to aid the IIG 
track with what we are hearing from other interlocutors.  The 
Iraqi charge d'affaires in Madrid told us recently that the 
GOS will not send an ambassador to Baghdad until after the 
elections, nor will it grant the Iraqi ambassador agrement 
until after the elections.  Socialist opposition to the war, 
and especially to Spanish participation in the war, formed 
the basis of their electoral victory in March and Zapatero is 
leery of any action that would seem to lend legitimacy to 
either the invasion or to the current Iraqi leadership.  The 
GOS appears to have selected the January elections as the 
political marker for establishing normal ties with Baghdad. 
ARGYROS 

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