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| Identifier: | 04MADRID4337 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04MADRID4337 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Madrid |
| Created: | 2004-11-12 16:18:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PHUM PTER PREF SP |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 004337 SIPDIS S/WCI NEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2014 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, PREF, SP SUBJECT: SPAIN ON SUPPORT FOR IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL: "MAYBE AFTER IRAQI ELECTIONS" REF: SECSTATE 240444 Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick, reason 1.5 (B). 1. (C) Poloff met on 11/12 with Eva Martinez of the MFA's Directorate General for the Near East to encourage Spanish assistance for the Iraqi Special Tribunal. Martinez said Spain had received no request from the Iraqi Interim Authority (IIG) for assistance in preparing for the Iraqi Special Tribunal. She indicated that if such a request did come forward, the GOS would be unlikely to act on it until after the Iraqi elections, explaining that the Zapatero Government would be reticent to support the Iraqi government before it had the stamp of popular approval. 2. (C) However, Martinez was quick to point out that Spain had earmarked "very significant" assistance funds for Iraq's post-election government and that judicial assistance was an obvious area for cooperation. Looking over the areas for assistance outlined by IIG DPM Salih, Martinez said she did not see any that would be objectionable from Spain's point of view. She was skeptical about the possibility of sending experts to provide local assistance, saying the possibility of having a Spanish aid worker kidnapped or killed was "politically unviable" for the Socialist government. Martinez noted the continuing lack of security in Baghdad and said it was more likely the GOS would support training in Spain or perhaps material assistance. 3. (C) Despite the GOS boundaries on aid to the IIG, Martinez expressed appreciation for the demarche, particularly information on the precise nature of Iraqi needs. She said she would forward the Iraqi request to the MFA's international cooperation agency to give them a head start in planning for post-election assistance. Martinez offered to brief poloff on reactions by others in the MFA and by Spanish diplomats in Baghdad to the Iraqi request. //COMMENT// 4. (C) Martinez' comments on GOS unwillingness to aid the IIG track with what we are hearing from other interlocutors. The Iraqi charge d'affaires in Madrid told us recently that the GOS will not send an ambassador to Baghdad until after the elections, nor will it grant the Iraqi ambassador agrement until after the elections. Socialist opposition to the war, and especially to Spanish participation in the war, formed the basis of their electoral victory in March and Zapatero is leery of any action that would seem to lend legitimacy to either the invasion or to the current Iraqi leadership. The GOS appears to have selected the January elections as the political marker for establishing normal ties with Baghdad. ARGYROS
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