US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1852

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001852 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  NORWEGIAN ENVOYS' VISIT BRINGS NO 
FRESH INITIATIVES ON THE PEACE FRONT--BUT A HINT OF A WAY 
FORWARD? 
 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) The November 10-11 visit of Norwegian Foreign Minister 
Jan Petersen, Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen and 
Special Envoy Erik Solheim has brought much talk about the 
peace process but little actual progress.  There were no 
major breakthroughs, but the Tigers might respond positively 
if the President can issue a statement of support for resumed 
talks endorsed by her entire government--including the JVP. 
The Foreign Minister is working hard on the JVP to bring them 
around to accept a common position.  Helgesen noted to 
Ambassador that there is no sign of a desire by either the 
Government or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to 
return to war.  Both, in fact, want to return to talks.  The 
difference is that the Government is more eager than the 
LTTE, and wants a broader agenda, while the LTTE is less 
eager and wants an "ISGA-only" agenda.  For the first time in 
Sri Lankan history, the Opposition supports the Government in 
entering negotiations--a unique opportunity.  The Ambassador 
also met November 11 with Opposition Leader Ranil 
Wickremesinghe and Peace Secretariat Head Jayantha Dhanapala. 
 Wickremasinghe had a cordial meeting with the President on 
November 2 and reaffirmed his support for peace talks based 
on the ISGA and the Oslo Declaration, but continues to refuse 
to participate in the President's National Advisory Council 
on peace. Both the LTTE and the UNP question whether the 
President is committed more to peace or to a constitutional 
change which will allow her to continue in power.  End 
summary. 
 
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DHANAPALA WANTS LTTE COMMITMENT 
-------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) During a November 10 meeting with the Ambassador, 
Jayantha Dhanapala, head of the Peace Secretariat, was not 
overly optimistic regarding Petersen's visit.  (Note: 
Norwegian Foreign Minister Petersen was in Sri Lanka November 
10-11.)  He doubted that a breakthrough in returning to talks 
with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) would be 
achieved during the visit.  Dhanapala anticipated that the 
November 26 Heroes' Day speech by Prabhakaran, which will 
coincide with Prabhakaran's 50th birthday, could be an 
important policy statement.  Dhanapala said that the Tigers 
need to acknowledge their commitment to the peace process and 
its continuity between Sri Lankan governments.  To that end, 
Dhanapala said the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) is willing 
to agree that the previous government's July 2003 proposal to 
the Tigers is still on the table.  The GSL also wants the 
LTTE to reaffirm its agreement in Oslo in December 2002 to 
explore a federal solution within a unified Sri Lanka.  A 
positive statement to that effect, even by the Norwegians, 
would suffice, Dhanapala indicated.  He thought that the 
return of London-based Tiger theoretician Anton Balasingham 
for the high-level Norwegian visit was a good sign, opining 
that the LTTE leadership in the Wanni does not adequately 
understand the international situation. 
 
3.  (C) Discussing domestic politics and its impact on the 
peace process, the Ambassador mentioned that some in the 
international community have the perception that disputes 
among Sinhalese political parties in the south present a real 
stumbling block to President Kumaratunga's ability to move 
forward with negotiations.  Dhanapala noted that the 
President's November 2 meeting with Opposition Leader and 
head of the United National Party (UNP) Ranil Wickremesinghe 
had gone well.  He described the President as optimistic 
about future meetings and confident that the UNP would join 
in discussions in the GSL's National Advisory Council (NAC), 
created by the President to discuss the peace process in 
different fora.  He said the President was pleased with the 
inaugural meeting of the Council on October 4, adding that 
subsequent meetings of political, religious, and civil 
society subgroups had been substantive and productive. 
Further, Dhanapala said that Foreign Minister Lakshman 
Kadirgamar and Information Minister Mangala Samaraweera are 
working with the GSL's main alliance partner, the Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), to educate its members and lay the 
groundwork for the GSL's return to talks with the Tigers. 
 
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OPPOSITION VIEWPOINT 
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4. (C) Ambassador also met on November 10 with Opposition 
Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, leader of Sri Lanka's United 
National Party (UNP).  On his meeting with President 
Kumaratunga, Wickremesinghe said that his response to the 
President's request that he participate in the NAC was that 
he has not changed his position of withholding participation 
until peace talks with the LTTE commence.  He told the 
Ambassador that he sees the NAC as irrelevant until peace 
talks restart.  When queried whether the NAC was an attempt 
by President Kumaratunga to put pressure on the JVP, 
Wickremesinghe responded that he would support her if she 
decides to begin peace talks with or without the JVP.  First, 
however, she needs to decide on her own future. 
Wickremesinghe said again that the UNP is always available to 
talk about the peace process, but that now the economy is the 
key question--not the peace process.  He does not want the 
public to lose focus on the budget and the deteriorating 
state of the economy, which he believes will be a strong 
issue in favor of the UNP.  Ambassador told Wickremesinghe 
that based on his contacts with a wide range of Sri Lankans, 
the UNP had hurt itself by its refusal to participate in the 
NAC.  Sri Lankans do not understand why the UNP refused to 
join this process to build a national consensus for peace, 
the Ambassador added. 
 
5. (C) Wickremesinghe said he told the President that there 
are in fact two proposals on the table:  the LTTE's Interim 
Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) and the previous government's 
proposal on an interim administration.  Her government could 
simply pick up where things had been left off.  The GSL could 
start talks based on the ISGA and then introduce its own 
proposal along the way.  Wickremesinghe believes that the 
President needs to decide if she will take on the JVP--which 
opposes resuming talks on the basis of the ISGA--and create a 
bipartisan process. 
 
6.  (C)  Returning to the economy, Wickremesinghe said that 
the GSL is trapped by its own rhetoric.  He said that the UNP 
is telling the GSL it needs to implement the 70 percent 
salary increase for government employees that it promised 
during the election.  He does not see how the GSL can pay for 
a SLR 3,000 (Note:  approximately USD 30) per month increase, 
adding that even the UNP had trouble paying an increase 
one-third that size when it came to power.  He believes the 
President is in a difficult position.  Cutting spending could 
spell political disaster for her.  Increasing borrowings, on 
the other hand, would also be disastrous.  Wickremesinghe 
sees the worldwide increase in oil prices as particularly bad 
for the government's budget.  The UNP plans to begin a 
campaign against the budget, which could include street 
protests. 
 
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NORWEGIAN FM LEAVES EARLY; 
MISSES DINNER 
--------------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen met 
President Kumaratunga on November 10, helicoptered to LTTE 
headquarters in Kilinochchi to meet LTTE chieftain 
Prabhakaran November 11, met Kumaratunga again that same 
evening, but was unable to attend a dinner later that evening 
hosted by Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar for key Chiefs 
of Mission because of his early departure from Sri Lanka to 
attend Yasir Arafat's funeral.  Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar 
Helgesen and Special Envoy Erik Solheim, who had arrived 
November 9, were present at the dinner, however.  Ambassador 
asked Helgesen if Kumaratunga had given Petersen any special 
message to take to Prabhakaran.  Helgesen replied that she 
had not, and that this was a bit disappointing.  After all, 
he said, Petersen had come to Sri Lanka based on a specific 
request from Kumaratunga. 
 
8.  (C) During the dinner, Kadirgamar reprised to Ambassador 
many of Dhanapala's earlier themes.  He thought that the 
meeting between the President and Wickremesinghe had gone 
very well, noting that they had even been able to issue a 
joint communique afterwards.  He held out hope that the UNP 
would still join the NAC, saying that after the meeting, 
Wickremesinghe had held open the possibility, promising to go 
back and consult his party.  Ambassador told him that he 
believed Wickremesinghe was still firm that the UNP would not 
participate in the NAC.  He also said that he thought that 
one reason was that Wickremesinghe was concerned that the 
President might still try to implement constitutional changes 
through transforming Parliament into a constituent assembly 
operating through a simple majority.  As long as he felt 
threatened by that, he would be less eager to assist 
Kumaratunga in the peace process.  Interestingly, Kadirgamar, 
who is a prominent attorney, made no attempt to defend the 
constitutional change proposal. 
 
9.  (C)  Kadirgamar said Prabhakaran told Petersen that in 
order for negotiations to start, Kumaratunga needed to make a 
public statement which would have the full support of her 
government, i.e., including the JVP.  This should happen 
before the Heroes' Day speech.  Kadirgamar told the 
Ambassador that the GSL needs to have agreement from the 
Tigers that the negotiations, while based on the ISGA, are 
part of a broader framework.  Kadirgamar said that he was 
indeed working hard on the JVP and that they "have come an 
incredibly long way."  (Note:  Kadirgamar always says this 
about the JVP.  End note.)  He said that he had brought them 
"80 percent along" on peace issues.  It was possible that the 
President might be able soon to make an address to the nation 
on peace on behalf of the entire government with JVP 
concurrence, the Foreign Minister said. 
 
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VIEW FROM TIGERS 
----------------- 
 
10.  (U) On November 11 the pro-LTTE website TamilNet carried 
a statement from Balasingham complaining that "President 
Kumaratunga has sent no new message through the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister.  She has only reiterated her stand that 
there should be talks on a permanent political solution." 
Balasingham said that the Tigers sent a message to the 
President via the Norwegian envoys on how talks could be 
resumed.  Balasingham was also quoted in the international 
media on November 12 as saying "It is not possible to find a 
permanent solution under this government," and that despite 
the Norwegians' visit, "no progress has been made on the 
political level."  Press comments that the Norwegians carried 
a "secret proposal" from the LTTE to Kumaratunga appear to be 
based on these statements. 
 
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HELGESEN/SOLHEIM BRIEF DIPLOMATIC CORPS 
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11.  (C)  On November 12 Helgesen and Solheim briefed the 
entire diplomatic corps over lunch.  (Note:  This was a 
departure from normal practice, as the Norwegians generally 
brief only the major donors/international organizations/IFIs, 
not the entire corps.  End note.) Helgesen was studiously 
vague in his briefing to this larger group.  However, 
Ambassador was able to have semi-private discussions with 
both Helgesen and Solheim on the margins of the lunch. 
Helgesen confirmed that he had carried a message from the 
LTTE that they would like Kumaratunga to issue a statement of 
support for the negotiations (based on ISGA) on behalf of her 
entire government--including the JVP.  Would that make the 
Tigers more flexible in return, perhaps willing to make a 
commitment to explore a federal solution, Ambassador asked? 
"That is the hope," Helgesen said. He also said that he had 
conveyed two major points to the LTTE.  First, this is a 
unique opportunity for progress. The President is eager to 
move ahead, she wants to bring the JVP along, and she has the 
support of the main Opposition--a completely unique moment in 
Sri Lankan history. Second, the perception of the 
international community is that the President is being 
flexible and the LTTE is not. Combined with concern about the 
LTTE killings, this is costing the LTTE.  Nonetheless, both 
Helgesen and Solheim said, the President senses an urgency to 
return to talks, the LTTE much less so. 
 
12. (C) Ambassador asked Helgesen if the Norwegians had 
raised with the President the issue of her desire for 
constitutional change and how that could affect the peace 
process.  Helgesen said they had, and it had "provoked" her. 
She asked if the Norwegians had faith in her government.  She 
also said that the two were separate issues. She did not, 
however, answer the question directly. 
 
13. (C) Helgesen concluded his public briefing by saying that 
he had not come with any great expectations, and that 
viewpoint had been borne out. Nonetheless, there was no sign 
of a desire by either side to return to war.  Both, in fact, 
want to return to talks. The difference is that the 
Government is more eager than the LTTE, and wants a broader 
agenda, while the LTTE is less eager and wants an "ISGA-only" 
agenda.  Helgesen said that he was not overly optimistic, but 
he sensed an increasing realization by both sides that if 
they don't seize the moment now, there may be a long 
stalemate with a consequent uncertainty which may not benefit 
them. The President has a unique ability to mobilize the 
South for peace, he said--the question for concerned 
countries was how to encourage her to take the bold steps to 
do so.  Ambassador asked Solheim what would happen if the 
President issued a statement endorsed by her entire 
government showing a willingness to go back to talks based on 
the ISGA, and the Tigers then refused. Solheim looked 
startled and said: "That would be a total betrayal by the 
LTTE of the Norwegian trust." 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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14. (C) As expected, there were no breakthroughs from this 
visit. The Tiger desire to see--and Kumaratunga's apparent 
willingness to consider--a statement on behalf of the entire 
Government supporting the negotiations could show a way 
forward, if it can be pulled off.  The JVP's unwillingness to 
consider the ISGA as the "sole basis" remains a major 
sticking point, however, and we don't know if the President 
will be able to get the JVP to come around far enough for 
that to be a workable strategy.  Moreover, even if the JVP 
were to come around, the real wild card remains what it has 
always been--the dependability of the Tigers as a negotiating 
partner.  The cordial meeting between Ranil Wickremasinghe 
and the President and his continued willingness to support 
her in negotiations are hopeful signs, even if he continues 
to refuse to join the NAC. 
LUNSTEAD