US embassy cable - 04SANAA2869

S E C R E T SANAA 002869 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, 
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2014 
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, PREL, PTER, EAC, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - OCTOBER 26, 2004 
 
Classified By: RSO Tim Laas, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S/NF) Begin Summary:  On October 26, 2004, the Chief Of 
Mission chaired a core Emergency Action Committee meeting 
with COM, DCM, ORCA, DATT, FPD, LEGAT, SOC-Yemen, OMC, CONS, 
POLECON, PDO and RSO in attendance.  The topic of discussion 
was the possible release of 138 prisoners from Republic of 
Yemen (ROYG) custody that has been held on various charges to 
include indigenous and transnational terrorism.  EAC members 
reviewed what if any negative impact such a release would 
have on the American community and the current security 
profile.  It was the consensus of EAC members that some of 
the prisoners on ROYG,s list were particularly dangerous and 
their release could seriously and negatively impact security. 
 No new security measures have been recommended.  End Summary. 
 
2. (S/NF) EAC members reviewed the security impact of the 
Republic of Yemen,s prisoner release program noting: 
-     The release could expose western personnel to terrorist 
acts perpetrated by released detainees who are angry over the 
perceived influence that the American government had 
regarding their length stay in prison and/or driven by 
extremist ideology. 
 
-     LEGAT listed several instances where Yemen detainees 
committed terrorist acts against American citizens and 
interests after being released. 
 
-     Terrorists planned attacks in 2002 and 2003 against 
American and British interests but were interdicted by ROYG 
and US counter-terrorism efforts. 
 
-     A warden message was determined to be appropriate with 
possible modifications to Yemen,s Travel Advisory. 
 
-     The initial stand-down of various US government 
programs outside of the capital city to lower the exposure of 
US citizen contractors in remote or isolated areas. 
 
-     RSO noted soft targets within Sanaa where NGO programs 
are concentrated but EAC members did not see an immediate 
threat in the capital city not requiring Sanaa based programs 
to scale back. 
 
-     Embassy officers are unable to verify who is actually 
detained and who is moving in and out of the penal system 
despite ROYG claims regarding specific detentions. 
 
-     Travel by USG personnel should continue to be reviewed 
by RSO prior to approval to better ensure proper security 
consideration in a changing security environment. 
 
 
3. (S/NF) The EAC had no specific threat information 
associated with the release of detainees. 
 
4.(S/NF) The COM advised the EAC that follow-on EAC meetings 
would be required as the security situation unfolded in light 
of ROYG decisions on prisoner releases. 
 
5. (S/NF) RSO met with the MOI Chief of Staff Brigadier 
General Sunidar following the meeting.  BG Sunidar confirmed 
ROYG deliberations to determine who would be among released 
detainees and assured RSO that past release programs were 
successful and did not result in any recidivism by &reformed 
and released8 detainees.  (RSO:  Comment USG statistics show 
that in fact released prisoners have in the past been 
involved in terrorism following their release by Yemen 
authorities. 
 
6. (S/NF) The Ambassador concluded the EAC meeting by 
stating that follow-up EAC meetings would be held as 
necessary to adjust security programs to the impact of any 
releases by ROYG and impact to bi-lateral relations by USG 
actions in light of the releases.  The COM directed the RSO 
to ensure visible security measures as appropriate to the 
current threat environment. 
KRAJESKI