US embassy cable - 04ABUDHABI4061

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 004061 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2014 
TAGS: KISL, PGOV, PREL, TC 
SUBJECT: UAE minimizing influence of Islamic extremists 
 
Ref: (A) Abu Dhabi 3783, (B) Abu Dhabi 3319, (C) Dubai 
3033, (D) Abu Dhabi 2524, (E) Abu Dhabi 1766, (F) USDAO IIR 
6 931 0014 04, (G) 03 Abu Dhabi 3565, (H) 02 Abu Dhabi 5813 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Over the past several years, senior UAE 
ruling family members have shared concerns with us about a 
small, yet potentially harmful Islamic extremist movement 
in their politically and socially moderate federation, and 
they have outlined their efforts to minimize this extremist 
influence before it gains a foothold.  We expect that 
Western-leaning ruling family members such as Abu Dhabi 
Crown Prince and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Zayed will continue to promote moderate Islam, 
principally by tightening security and reforming education. 
End Summary. 
 
Overview of Political Islam in the UAE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) In the UAE, there is no dominant school of Sunni 
Islam; the Malaki, Hanafi, Salafi, and Hanbali schools all 
have followers among the Sunni population (85 % of the 
total Emirati population).  There is also a small 
indigenous Shi'a community (15% of the total Emirati 
population).  There is an acknowledged Salafi (highly 
conservative and Wahhabi-influenced) presence in the UAE 
(Ref. G).  Senior Abu Dhabi ruling family members, 
including Sheikh Mohammed and his brothers Hamdan bin Zayed 
(Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs), Hamdan bin Zayed (Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs), and Hazza bin Zayed 
(Director, State Security Department), and Dubai Crown 
Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum (Defense 
Minister) have told us that they are very concerned about 
the potential influence of extremists on UAE society, which 
they have worked to minimize. 
 
3. (C) The poor economic conditions in the Northern 
Emirates (Sharjah, Ajman, Ras Al Khaimah, Umm Al Qaiwain, 
and Fujairah), compared to the wealth of Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai, may be a factor in breeding resentment among some 
UAE nationals who have limited opportunities for gainful 
employment, academics and journalists have told us.  These 
conditions may make some who feel disadvantaged more 
susceptible to the messages of extremists.  As of yet, 
there is no identifiable or cohesive Islamist political 
movement, although some of our contacts say that the number 
of Emiratis with religiously conservative views is 
increasing.  Political science professor Ebtisam Al Kitbi 
warned that the combination of backward economic conditions 
and extremism in certain parts of the UAE could present a 
potent threat.  Al Kitbi said there is another dimension to 
consider: "People are turning to fundamentalism as they see 
what the U.S. is doing.  They see an attack on their 
culture and their religion." 
 
UAEG Strategies to Combat Extremism 
----------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) The UAEG has long employed a quiet but focused 
strategy for identifying Islamic extremists and then acting 
to reduce their ability to engage in political activities. 
In the year after the 9/11 attacks, those efforts were 
dramatically expanded, and the government rounded up 160 
individuals suspected of ties with extremist groups (Ref. 
H).  Most of them have since been released. In addition, 
the UAEG has monitored groups and individuals deemed to be 
Islamist and/or affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Ref. G).  On the religious front, the Ministry of Justice 
and Islamic Affairs has required preachers to adhere to 
sermons with themes that have been pre-approved by the 
Ministry.  In education, teachers deemed extremists have 
been quietly dismissed or given non-teaching positions.  On 
the security front, there has been an intensification of 
border surveillance.  And in their diplomatic activities, 
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed and his brothers Hamdan and Hazza 
rarely fail to tell high-level USG interlocutors about the 
threat to stability posed by the "Muslim Brotherhood," 
their generic term for extremists. 
 
5. (S) On the religious front, the UAE is closely 
monitoring the activities of mosques.  Justice and Islamic 
Affairs Minister Mohammed bin Nukheira Al Dhaheri talked 
about the need for even greater oversight of Friday sermons 
in an interview with Al Ittihad newspaper on September 18. 
He acknowledged that some recent sermons had deviated from 
the Justice Ministry's pre-approved topics.  The government 
has removed some clerics for re-education purposes after 
they used their Friday sermons inappopriately (Ref. F). 
Speaker after speaker at an international conference on 
Islam organized by the UAE Ministry of Justice, Islamic 
Affairs, and Awqaf on October 25-30, condemned extremism. 
The conference was "a wake-up call for Muslims to return to 
the true essence and teachings of Islam," scholar Mansoor 
Al Minhali, Director of Islamic Affairs at the Ministry of 
Justice, told the press. 
 
6. (S) On the security front, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed 
told USTR Zoellick on October 14 that terrorism was a major 
threat for the UAE, and that it was important to face it 
preemptively and not wait for a major incident.  The UAE 
has been constructing a 525-mile long wall along its land 
border with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Oman to keep 
out individuals deemed a security risk, as well as 
smugglers and economic migrants.  The Emiratis are also 
deploying eight squadrons to border patrol posts to 
investigate attempted border incursions.  Members of the 
UAE armed forces are under orders to keep their facial hair 
short to demonstrate their non-secular piety.  Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Zayed said the UAE had detained closed to 30 
Al Qaida operatives, many of whom were transiting the UAE 
(Note: UAEG figure; likely includes individuals 
detained/arrested representing groups ranging from IMU to 
Ansar Al Islam.  End note)  The security services 
continuously monitor Islamists' phone conversations. 
 
Schools as ideological battleground 
----------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) The country's public schools and universities have 
seen some of the most sweeping aspects of the crackdown 
against Islamists, but they are also the arena where 
modernists hope to make the most gains.  In the mid-1980s, 
attempts to reform primary and secondary schools curricula 
met with strong resistance within the UAE, including from 
the current ruler of Sharjah, a moderate and modern 
Islamist.  Sharjah has had a conservative outlook for some 
time, requiring women to dress modestly and outlawing the 
sale of alcohol.  Sharjah's ruler has fostered close ties 
to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and may have received some 
financial support from the Saudi government.  Khalifa 
Bakhit Al Falasi, who served previously as Under Secretary, 
Ministry of Education and Youth, told Polchief that when he 
sought to replace or reassign about 300 Saudi teachers 
deemed too religiously conservative, a Saudi cleric issued 
a fatwa against him.  The government had to arrange for him 
to leave the country for his own safety, but he still 
blames the UAE leadership for sacrificing reforms for the 
sake of maintaining their good relations with Saudi Arabia. 
"The sheikhs are a little better nowadays, in large part 
because of 9/11 and the American response to terrorism," he 
said.  The Ministry's current Under Secretary, Jamal Al 
Mehairi, agreed that momentum for reform was slowed by the 
resistance from Islamists in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
conceded that reforms the Ministry is promoting today still 
face some resistance from religious conservatives. 
 
8. (C) Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed told Counterterrorism 
Coordinator Cofer Black on September 16 that he is 
convinced extremists have a plan to "hijack" the UAE 
curriculum (ref C).  He and others said the Muslim 
Brotherhood's influence in the Gulf dates back to the 1950s 
when Egyptian and Syrian teachers spread across the region. 
They have concentrated on Arabic, history, and Islamic 
religion, all key components of the UAE curriculum.  "We 
are having a (culture) war with the 'Muslim Brotherhood' in 
this country," Sheikh Mohammed said. 
 
9. (C) The Ministry of Education's Al Mehairi said critics 
of educational reform believe the UAE is reacting to U.S. 
pressure in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.  He maintained 
that the government had begun reviewing the curriculum 
before 9/11, but that the effort was given added momentum 
after the attacks.  (Note: This is a concern that extends 
beyond extremists: even non-Islamist UAE nationals in Dubai 
have expressed shock at what they claim was a recent 
decision by the Government of Oman, supposedly taken at the 
behest of the USG, to expunge politically unacceptable 
portions of the Koran from Omani religious studies 
textbooks.  End note)  Among the measures that have been 
taken, he said, are the gradual replacement of the large 
population of expatriate Arab teachers in the public 
schools with Emirati nationals.  In the summer of 2002 
alone, 90 non-Emiratis were let go (i.e. early retirement) 
or reassigned to non-teaching jobs, Al Mehairi said. 
Curriculum-wise, he cited changes in the religion syllabus. 
Before, he noted, students memorized everything without 
understanding what they were memorizing.  That has changed 
with a greater emphasis on comprehension.  Teachers of 
Islam have had to be re-trained as part of the reforms 
instituted by the Education Ministry.  Particularly 
significant is the fact that the Arabic and Islamic Studies 
curriculum was the first one to be tackled by the 
curriculum reform initiated by the consultants working at 
Zayed University.  It has been put in place for grades 1-3 
at the start of the 2004-05 school year, and the results 
thus far are satisfactory, Al Mehairi said.  Inspectors 
regularly monitor classrooms to ensure that teachers are 
following the new guidelines. 
 
10. (C) The ideological battle is also taking place on some 
college campuses, and the UAE University in particular. 
Several Arab (including Emirati) deans, and one Arab- 
American dean, have been replaced by non-Arab Americans 
because the government deemed the Americans to be more 
qualified to implement the reforms the Education Ministry 
wanted, including instruction in English, UAEU education 
professor Khalifa Al Suweidi told Polchief.  Al Suweidi 
said the government has done the right thing by committing 
itself to reform, however, there is still a problem with 
implementation.  Islamic fundamentalists and extremists, he 
added, may be the least of the educational administration's 
problems.  As with the primary and secondary public school 
system, many conservative educators have been replaced or 
reassigned.  "The problem is that there is a lack of vision 
of how to implement the reforms.  There is a kind of 
paralysis," Al Suweidi said. 
 
Identifying the problem in diplomatic channels 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
11. (C) On the diplomatic front, Sheikh Mohammed and his 
brothers Hamdan and Hazza rarely miss an opportunity to 
talk to high-level USG interlocutors about the influence of 
the "Muslim Brotherhood" on moderate-thinking Emiratis.  In 
a meeting with Deputy Secretary Armitage on April 20, 
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed noted that UAE security forces 
had identified "50 to 60" Emirati Muslim Brothers in the 
Armed Forces, and that a senior Muslim Brotherhood 
sympathizer is within one of the ruling families - a 
reference, we believe, to Sharjah Ruler Sheikh Sultan Al 
Qassimi (see para 7), whose ties to Saudi Arabia are well 
known.  Sheikh Mohammed has told us that the security 
services estimate there are up to 700 Muslim Brotherhood 
sympathizers in the UAE.  He also said that when the Armed 
Forces discovered Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers within 
their ranks, they were arrested and given a form of reverse 
brainwashing.  All but one of the 40 military personnel 
detained were subsequently released, convinced that they 
had been led astray, he said (Ref. E). Sheikh Hamdan told 
us in October 2002 that during deliberations of a high- 
level committee to set policy on "Muslim Brotherhood" 
activity in the UAE after the events of 9/11, he had 
advocated extremely tough measures against extremists, but 
that his brothers Khalifa (recently elected President), 
Mohammed, Hazza, and Dubai Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin 
Rashid had voted in favor of a more graduated approach 
(Ref. H). 
 
12. (C) In Dubai, the authorities (including de facto ruler 
Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid) describe a more low-key 
approach to dealing with citizens who have become "misled" 
into looking at the world from an extremist perspective. 
The Dubai security services "track" individuals known to be 
sympathetic to the Islamist agenda, including those 
returning from conflict areas like Afghanistan.  When 
Dubayyans of that ilk come to the attention of the security 
services, Sheikh Mohammed often meets with them to explain 
to them the error of their ways, and to tell them that if 
they are looking for a job, or land, or any other 
assistance, they should not hesitate to ask.  Apparently, 
this approach (direct appeal from the ruler) is often 
effective, especially for younger devotees.  Those who are 
resistant to change, however, are locked up, sometimes 
repeatedly, for months at a time in hopes that this will 
dissuade them from acting on their Islamist tendencies. 
 
Comment: 
------- 
 
13. (C) The trend toward a more conservative brand of Islam 
shows no signs of subsiding.  The UAE's leadership is 
particularly concerned by the presence of Islamic 
extremists and the potential for terrorism.  The well 
established effort to check Islamist influence that began 
under Sheikh Zayed seems certain to continue under his 
sons: a government that is prepared to spend millions of 
dollars to build a security wall to keep individuals deemed 
security risks from coming over the border is not going to 
let Islamists already within the UAE to stir up trouble. 
The government is taking positive steps to prevent further 
growth of this movement, including border security, 
education reform, and aggressive action against suspected 
extremists.  A greater effort to provide economic 
opportunities to the citizens in the poorer northern 
emirates would address the discontent that can be a further 
breeding ground for extremism. 
SISON