US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1845

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001845 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2014 
TAGS: PTER, MOPS, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  CEASEFIRE MONITOR SEES NO EVIDENCE OF 
RECENT LTTE BUILD-UP IN TRINCOMALEE 
 
Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C)  Summary:  In an October 28 meeting with poloff, 
Hagrup Hauckland, Deputy Head of Mission of the Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM), said his organization has found no 
evidence to support Government allegations, widely reported 
in the press, of a significant Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) build-up in the eastern district of Trincomalee. 
 While speculating that the Tigers may well have increased 
their positions deep in Trincomalee's jungles, Hauckland 
emphasized that the SLMM has been unable to corroborate 
Government security forces' charges of substantial new LTTE 
positions in coastal areas near Government-controlled 
territory.  In a separate meeting, Neville Wijesinghe, the 
senior police official for the Eastern Range, echoed 
Hauckland's views, adding that he believes the Sri Lankan 
Navy publicized the finding of a recent LTTE transit camp 
"for PR purposes."  That said, both Hauckland and Wijesinghe 
described Trincomalee, with its volatile mix of ethnic groups 
and porous, ill-defined boundaries between cleared and 
uncleared territories, as a potential flashpoint.  End 
summary. 
 
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NO "SMOKING GUN" IN TRINCO 
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2.  (C)  In an October 28 meeting with poloff, Hagrup 
Hauckland, Deputy Head of Mission of the Sri Lanka Monitoring 
Mission (SLMM), said his organization has found no evidence 
to substantiate Government allegations, prominently reported 
in the press, that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) have significantly built up new positions in the 
eastern coastal district of Trincomalee, especially around 
the harbor.  (Note:  Hauckland's report of no findings tracks 
closely with information provided by then-Army Spokesman Col. 
Sumedha Perera in a separate meeting one week earlier.  End 
note.)  The existence of Tiger camps near the harbor predates 
the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement, Hauckland noted, and 
actually began when the Tigers moved into positions in Sampur 
(near the harbor) vacated by Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) 
troops in 1995.  In fact, Hauckland said, some of the 
installations identified by the military as purported new 
LTTE camps or fortifications have actually turned out, upon 
inspection, to be Sri Lankan Army installations. 
 
3.  (C)  While the SLMM has found no evidence of a permanent 
and significant new LTTE presence near the harbor, Hauckland 
pointed out that surrounding areas include two dense jungles 
that are next to impossible to control and survey.  The LTTE 
could be hiding camps, arms, personnel--almost anything--in 
those jungles, Hauckland acknowledged, but quickly added that 
the SLMM had been unable to confirm any such build-up. 
Unlike in Jaffna, boundaries between GSL-controlled and 
LTTE-controlled areas in the east were never clearly 
demarcated before the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was signed, 
leaving significant "gray areas," he noted.  Moreover, 
GSL-controlled territory is interspersed with pockets of 
LTTE-controlled areas, leaving the GSL without (again, unlike 
in Jaffna) a continuous, discrete Forward Defense Line behind 
which it can secure contiguous blocs of territory.  The lack 
of clear demarcations, coupled with the dense jungle terrain, 
makes moving cadres (and, presumably, arms) in and out of the 
east relatively easy for the Tigers, he concluded.  (Note: 
In an earlier meeting with poloff and DATT on October 20, 
then-Army Spokesman Perera offered a similar description of 
problems in the east.  The military has "never had clear 
Forward Defense Lines from the beginning" in the east, he 
said, and Tiger cadres can easily pass through "gaps" in 
GSL-controlled territory.  End note.) 
 
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TRINCO TENSE 
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4.  (C) While the SLMM had found nothing to confirm the Sri 
Lankan military's suspicions of a Tiger build-up in 
Trincomalee, Hauckland said that the GSL nonetheless has 
ample reason for concern.  Existing Tiger positions already 
give the LTTE a clear view of harbor activity and could put 
LTTE guns within reach of Navy ships.  (Note:  In fact, the 
Tigers likely already have such capability.  End note.)  The 
ease of movement possible under the CFA makes it fairly 
simple for the LTTE to transfer cadres from the north to the 
east and to infiltrate GSL-controlled territory, Hauckland 
observed.  Moreover, the ethnic diversity in Trincomalee, 
with its Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese populations, increases 
tensions.  In general, the situation in Trincomalee is 
"fragile," he concluded.  "If trouble happens, it will be 
there." 
 
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TIGERS TRANSITING TRINCO 
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5.  (U)  On October 30, according to local press reports and 
the Sri Lanka Army website, naval troops brought SLMM 
monitors to the site of an apparent LTTE transit camp in a 
jungle area near the Naval Head Works sanctuary in central 
Trincomalee.  The troops recovered two hand grenades, one 
LTTE flag, one VHF antenna, tarpaulins and four axes from the 
camp.  Five temporary huts were also discovered near the 
camp.  Reports of the find, with accompanying photographs of 
disassembled tarpaulins and poles--and very pointed reference 
to SLMM monitors being shown the remnants of the camp--were 
given prominent front-page coverage in the local press on 
November 2. 
 
6.  (C)  In a November 8 conversation with poloffs, Neville 
Wijesinghe, Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of Police for the 
Eastern Range, dismissed the discovery of the camp as 
relatively insignficant.  Echoing earlier comments by Perera 
and Hauckland, Wijesinghe observed that it must be assumed 
that the Tigers are moving cadres into the east from the 
north.  Camps like the one found October 30 are intended to 
be used for short-term purposes only--usually just a 
night--while cadres wait for nightfall before they attempt to 
travel. Because of the discovery of the two grenades, 
Wijesinghe speculated, the Navy had decided to exploit 
finding the camp "for PR purposes."  Nonetheless, the porous 
"borders" between GSL- and LTTE-controlled areas in the east 
benefit the Tigers, he acknowledged, agreeing with 
Hauckland's assessment of Trincomalee, with its strategically 
sensitive harbor and its potentially volatile ethnic mix, as 
a particular area of GSL concern. 
 
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COMMENT 
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7.  (C) The GSL and Sri Lankan military periodically raise 
the spectre of an LTTE build-up in Trincomalee to highlight 
perceived inequities and deficiencies in the CFA.  Another 
obvious problem is the relative strength, including strategic 
positioning, of the LTTE that existed before the CFA.  While 
most observers, including the SLMM, agree that the GSL has 
cause to be concerned, so far the evidence to support such 
claims just is not there.  Nonetheless, the intense public 
scrutiny focused on the east by the GSL's recurrent 
complaints to the SLMM heighten speculation and increase 
concerns that, as Hauckland said, "if trouble happens, it 
will be there." 
LUNSTEAD