US embassy cable - 04BOGOTA11548

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 011548 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, SNAR, PTER, KJUS, CO 
SUBJECT: ANDEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE COLOMBIA SCENESETTER 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Milton K. Drucker, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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1.(C) With USG assistance, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe 
has made great strides in fighting drug trafficking and 
terrorism.  The security forces have initiated a nation-wide, 
multi-phased campaign to capture or kill key FARC leaders, 
moved against the FARC in its rural strongholds, and 
reestablished a presence in the country's 1,098 
municipalities.  Inter-service and civil-military cooperation 
and Colombia's human rights record, although imperfect, are 
improving.  Uribe's support in Congress has dampened since he 
took office but he has managed to push through some important 
legislation.  Three U.S. citizens have been held hostage by 
the FARC for over 20 months now.  Their safe recovery 
continues to be one of our top priorities.  End Summary. 
 
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URIBE IS SHOWING RESULTS 
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2. (SBU) Assistance to Colombia is premised on combating the 
interrelated issues of drug trafficking and terrorism and 
includes training, material aid, and guidance to the security 
forces and other institutions.  President Uribe and Colombian 
Minister of Defense (MOD) Jorge Alberto Uribe (not related) 
have characterized U.S. assistance as key to the GOC's 
"Democratic Security Policy" and acknowledged the United 
States as Colombia's most important ally.  More than halfway 
through his four-year term, Uribe has made the country safer 
and more stable economically by implementing the following 
strategies to promote security and economic recovery: 
 
-- Plan Patriota: The military's multi-phased, joint campaign 
to re-establish control over national territory and cripple 
the FARC entered its second major stage (2B) in February 
2004, an approximately 18 to 24 month-long phase to target 
FARC-dominated regions in remote, tropical, southeastern 
Colombia.  The security forces have gained control over 
numerous FARC mobility nodes and reporting indicates that the 
FARC are feeling the effects of the campaign.  Phase 2B is 
logistically complex and supply shortages have caused 
setbacks.  The government will need to establish a permanent 
presence in newly occupied territory to prevent the FARC from 
returning.  The U.S. MILGRP has Planning and Assistance 
Training Teams (PATTs) to assist Plan Patriota.  During the 
campaign's first phase (2A) in 2003, the military dealt the 
FARC heavy blows in Cundinamarca Department, which surrounds 
Bogota, killing important mid-level commanders and destroying 
the FARC's 22nd Front and several special mobile columns. 
 
-- State Presence Established Nationwide: Upon taking office, 
Uribe pledged to establish a permanent security force 
presence in the 158 municipalities (equivalent to U.S. 
counties) that lacked a military or police garrison.  As of 
January 4, all 1,098 municipalities had a police presence. 
The USG facilitated this effort by training numerous police 
units and building hardened police stations.  Police 
commanders have reported that most communities have welcomed 
the new presence and that it has boosted the economy by 
providing safe transportation and tourist protection. 
 
-- AUC: The country's largest paramilitary group declared a 
unilateral cease-fire in November 2002; formal peace talks, 
including an agreement to begin demobilizing, began in July 
2003; and 19 senior AUC commanders with several hundred 
bodyguards concentrated in a 12 x 12 mile zone surrounded by 
police and military in June 2004.  Two small-scale 
demobilizations occurred in late 2003 and AUC violence 
continues at a comparatively low level.  The OAS is verifying 
the peace process.  On October 7, paramilitary leaders 
pledged to demobilize between 3,000 and 4,000 of their 
members between November 3 and the end of 2004.  The GOC 
remains committed to a transparent, legitimate peace process 
and has made it clear that extradition is a non-negotiable 
issue and will not hinder any U.S. extradition petitions. 
 
-- U.S. Assistance to Deserters, Demobilized: After a "no 
objection" ruling was issued by the Department of Justice in 
August, the U.S. has been able to support financially the 
child combatant program.  The U.S. is now the largest 
contributor to the program.  Justice is still working on a 
legal opinion on U.S. funding for the broader reinsertion 
program in light of provisions of the Patriot Act barring aid 
to members of terrorist groups. 
 
-- Drug Eradication On Schedule to Meet Goals: For coca, 
130,000 hectares have been sprayed and 12,000 hectares 
eradicated manually. We have sprayed 3,000 hectares of opium 
poppy and eradicated another 1,200 manually.  Manual 
eradication remains problematic, however, as is spraying in 
parks.  The Council of State recently ruled to reinstate the 
aerial spray program following a brief suspension based on 
allegations of damage to health and environment by 
glyphosate.  However, ongoing appeals still threaten the 
process. 
 
-- Drug Interdiction: We are heading for records in air, 
land, and sea interdiction; i.e., more than 140 tons have 
been seized.  There is substantial interest here about the 
Brazilian air interdiction program and the possibility of 
U.S. cooperation with it. 
 
3. (C) Almost a year ago, Uribe named a new MOD and high 
command with an eye toward improving cooperation and 
rewarding operational performers.  Uribe and his security 
team have emphasized that inter-service and civil-military 
cooperation and intelligence-based operations are key to 
success.  Nevertheless, long-standing institutional rivalries 
are an on-going challenge.  Changes to the high command, 
possibly including a new Armed Forces Commander and Army 
Commander, are expected in December.  We enjoy excellent 
relations with MOD Uribe, Navy Commander Admiral Soto, and 
Air Force Commander General Lesmez.  Our ties with Armed 
Forces Commander General Ospina and Army Commander General 
Carreno, while mostly good, are sometimes strained. 
 
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INTERNAL POLITICS 
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4. (C) Executive-legislative relations have been tense. 
Uribe's presidential reelection initiative, however, has 
passed its eight required debates, and only the Plenary vote 
remains.  Most observers are guardedly optimistic about its 
passage.  The mandatory review by the Constitutional Court 
that will follow is less certain.  The Administration's 
pension reforms and a new tax on certain basic food products 
-- controversial proposals that have already provoked 
negative reactions from members of Congress )- face tougher 
sledding.  The Uribe administration and several Congressmen 
are working to revamp and reintroduce a "Justice and 
Reparations" bill -- which would allow the GOC to issue 
alternate penalties and reparations requirements on 
demobilizing paramilitaries -- before the current legislative 
session closes. 
 
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MULTILATERAL ISSUES 
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5. (C) The GOC consistently votes for U.S.-supported 
candidates for multilateral boards and commissions.  However, 
on Middle East issues, in particular Israeli-Palestinian 
matters, the GOC seldom supports our position.  The GOC was 
pleased with the United Nations Human Rights Commission (CHR) 
Chairman's Statement on Colombia and has expressed 
appreciation for our support.  We are skeptical that the GOC 
will take a stronger position on the crisis of democracy in 
Venezuela.  Recent border incidents have contributed to 
Uribe's careful diplomacy with Hugo Chavez.  Colombia is 
similarly reluctant to speak out against Cuba. 
 
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GOC Generally Attuned to Human Rights 
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6. (C) The GOC maintains an active human rights dialogue with 
NGOs, the United Nations, and foreign governments.  Human 
rights training is mandatory for all members of the military 
and police, and the Embassy vets units that receive USG 
assistance.  The State Department's 2003 Human Rights Report 
on Colombia noted that GOC efforts to improve security had 
led to major improvements in key human rights and violence 
indicators.  For example, homicides fell by 20 percent, 
kidnappings by 30 percent, and forced displacements by 49 
percent in 2003.  Less than 2 percent of human rights 
violations are attributable to government security forces. 
However, most Colombian NGOs remain severely critical of the 
GOC.  Recent missteps by the armed forces, such a 
police-military clash in Narino Department (Guaitarilla), the 
murder of three trade unionists in Arauca, and the mysterious 
circumstances surrounding the killing of a family of five by 
the Army in rural Tolima Department (Cajamarca), show a need 
for further improvement in respect for human rights by the 
security forces. 
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FARC Continues to Hold U.S. Citizens Hostage 
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7. (C) In February 2003, a DOD plane carrying four USG 
contractors and a Colombian military representative crashed 
in FARC-controlled territory in southern Colombia.  The FARC 
killed one of the U.S. contractors and the Colombian and took 
the other three U.S. citizens hostage.  We believe they are 
being held in a remote, heavily forested region the FARC has 
long controlled and to which the Colombian military has 
little access.  Since the contractors were kidnapped, we have 
worked closely with the GOC to track all leads that could 
reveal their location.  President Uribe has personally 
pledged GOC cooperation and support in any effort to rescue 
the hostages.  As part of our efforts to secure their 
recovery, we initiated the Rewards for Justice Program, which 
offers up to USD five million in exchange for information 
leading to the capture of FARC commanders or other 
individuals involved in the kidnapping.  President Uribe has 
also given personal assurances that he would insist the U.S. 
hostages be included in any "humanitarian exchange" with the 
FARC. 
 
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Economic Issues 
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8. (U) In the third quarter of 2004, Colombia's macroeconomic 
forecast showed strong growth in multiple areas. Increased 
exports, a strong peso, and low inflation led the way and 
helped to decrease the debt and increase investment. Foreign 
Direct Investment for 2004 is currently at a five year high. 
While the government is optimistic, many analysts worry that 
unemployment remains high and fiscal reforms have not been 
passed through Congress.  These factors make the long-term 
outlook less clear. 
 
9. (U) The fifth round of FTA talks finished in Guayaquil, 
Ecuador on October 29.  Slow movement overall with 
intellectual property and agriculture continue to be major 
issues, specifically patents, medications, agricultural 
subsidies and access to genetic resources. To increase public 
awareness, Colombian lawmakers have begun a robust FTA 
outreach program to compliment other FTA forums sponsored by 
the GOC with assistance from USAID. 
 
10. (U) The central bank has taken advantage of a strong peso 
by purchasing additional reserves and paying off it dollar 
denominated debt.  Analysts expect that if the peso ends 
December at its current level (instead of the 2,900 that the 
government had originally forecast) the GOC will save CP 620 
billion (238 million USD) in debt servicing.  Recently, the 
central bank has been purchasing dollars in order to curb the 
appreciation of the peso. 
DRUCKER