US embassy cable - 04RANGOON1445

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001445 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2014 
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, SNAR, EAID, BM, Ethnics 
SUBJECT: SHAN CEASE-FIRE GROUP WARY OF GOB INTENTIONS 
 
Classified By: CDA, a.i. Ronald K. McMullen 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY:  In the course of travel to visit an 
INL-funded project in Shan State, Emboff encountered the 
leadership of the Shan State Army (SSA), a former insurgent 
group that has concluded a cease-fire agreement with the GOB. 
Shan leaders are concerned that the post-Khin Nyunt regime 
will move against the cease-fire groups and other ethnic 
minority groups in Shan State and thwart progress toward the 
Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and SSA's 
stated objective of a federated, democratic Burma.  Among 
other things, the Shan leaders told Emboff the GOB intends 
"to crush the Wa" (i.e., the United Wa State Army - 
Burma's leading narcotics producers and drug traffickers). 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Encounter with SSA Leaders: 
 
Emboff stopped in Hsipaw, the former capital of a major 
princely state in northeastern Burma November 1st while 
traveling in the region.  He called on "Donald," the nephew 
and heir of a powerful Shan noble abducted and killed by the 
Burmese army in its 1962 coup.  Donald is the 
"brother/cousin" of Hkun Htun Oo, leader of the SNLD, 
Burma's second largest democratic party.  He also is the 
spokesman for the Shan State Peace Council, a grouping of the 
SSA and another Shan cease-fire group.  When Emboff arrived 
at the former princely estate, East Haw, he found it guarded 
by heavily armed SSA troops sporting M-79 grenade launchers 
and a variety of assault rifles.  He was welcomed by Donald 
and his wife, and found that three other individuals, the 
political and military leaders of the 9,000-strong Shan State 
Army, were also calling at East Haw. 
 
3. (S) Regime Planning to "Crush" the UWSA? 
 
The Shan leaders claimed they had recently "intercepted" a 
regime message laying out plans to deal with the multi-ethnic 
Shan State.  First, the GOB would require cease-fire groups 
to transform themselves from ethnic militias running 
semi-autonomous regions into regular political parties. 
Second, the regime intended to "crush the Wa."  Third, with 
the Wa crushed, the GOB would divide and impose its direct 
rule on the mosaic of other ethnic, military, and political 
groups in Shan State.  In reaction, the Shan leaders 
continued, the SSA and the SNLD (which often closely 
coordinate their activities) had called all Shan State groups 
to a large gathering November 3rd to see if they could find 
common ground for a joint response to the SPDC's supposed 
plans. 
 
4. (S) Shans Seek Help: 
 
As is often the case when traveling Emboffs meet ethic 
minority representatives, the Shan leaders asked for 
financial assistance.  They said they hoped to form a Shan 
State Consultative Committee as an outgrowth of the November 
3rd meeting, adding that they needed money for social welfare 
programs, as health and education infrastructures in Shan 
State "had been ignored for four decades."  HIV/AID 
information in the Shan language was badly needed, they 
added.  One SSA leader, who attended the now-adjourned 
National Convention, said, "If we decide not to go back to 
the National Convention when it reconvenes, we will need more 
weapons." 
 
5. (S) COMMENT:  There is a palpable skittishness among 
ethnic cease-fire groups in Shan State arising from fears 
that the concessions and agreements they concluded with 
former PM Khin Nyunt may no longer be honored.  The UWSA, 
with its relatively large and well-armed militia, its 
continuing close relations with the PRC, and with its coffers 
full of money from its heroin and meth business, is probably 
the key to GOB relations with ethnic minority groups in Shan 
State.  None of the ethnic Shan leaders we have spoken to, 
either in Rangoon or in Shan State, are very clear or 
optimistic about the regime's intentions, given the 
continuing confusion and fallout of the demise of Khin Nyunt 
and his Military Intelligence apparatus.  Post has and will 
continue to reiterate our support for a peaceful transition 
to democracy in a united Burma.  END COMMENT. 
MCMULLEN