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| Identifier: | 01ABUJA3093 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 01ABUJA3093 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Abuja |
| Created: | 2001-12-06 12:46:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PHUM PREL ECON NI |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 003093 SIPDIS AF FOR PDAS BELLAMY AND FOR AF/S E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2006 TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, ECON, NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA: DEMARCHE AND DISCUSSION WITH NIGERIAN SPECIAL ENVOY TO ZIMBABWE, EARNEST SHONEKAN REF: STATE 202946 Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: During a December 1 meeting with recently appointed Nigerian Special Envoy to Zimbabwe Earnest Shonekan, Ambassador Jeter raised reftel talking points while also leaving a nonpaper and a copy of the SADC Parliamentary Forum election norms. Pleased to hear our views, Shonekan said he would factor our points in his upcoming discussions in Harare next week. He promised to consult with frequency and to share information with us. Acknowledging the weight of the task before him, Shonekan thought that his good personal rapport with Mugabe would help. Shonekan stated that his new role was not to supercede Nigeria's participation in the CMAG but to complement the Commonwealth effort with subtle private diplomacy. The former Head of State commented that he would urge Mugabe to desist from inflammatory rhetoric and move deliberately toward better economic management and a level playing-field for elections. Shonekan believed that Mugabe was guilty of playing to the hard-liners but was not wedded to these extremists. Concerted diplomatic pressure, backed by incentives for good behavior, had a better chance of persuading Mugabe than the threat of sanctions, according to Shonekan. End Summary. ------------------------ Talking To Mugabe ------------------------ 2. (?) At an afternoon meeting at Chief Shonekan's colonial-era compound in Lagos appropriately named Lugard House, Ambassador Jeter delivered reftel talking points and discussed the election guidelines developed by the SADC Parliamentary Forum. Jeter stressed that the September Abuja Agreement had raised hopes that Zimbabwe would steer clear of irrational action and walk the path toward responsible land reform and democratic elections. Instead, the trajectory of events had been negative. Political intimidation and the truncation of civil liberties had intensified to the extent that credible elections were unattainable in the current atmosphere. Without a change of course, the Government of Zimbabwe risked further international opprobrium for manufacturing defective elections when the conduct of decent elections were within the GOZ, grasp but for the requisite political will. 3. (C) The Ambassador continued that mal-governance was harming the economy, now bogged down by the weight of a ninety percent inflation rate and the understandable skittishness of would-be investors. Moreover, Zimbabwe's excursion into divisive, strong-arm politics and economic brinkmanship mocked the tenets of the New Partnership of African Development (NEPAD) launched by President Obasanjo in October. Harare's misconduct presented a challenge to NEPAD credibility. Obasanjo and other leaders must do all they can to prevent an important nation like Zimbabwe from flouting NEPAD and undermining the group almost at its very inception. Mugabe, Jeter underscored, was in danger of rewriting his historical legacy from being an architect of Zimbabwe's independence to being responsible for mortgaging the country's future to misguided short-term political expediencies. 4. (C) The affable Shonekan thanked the Ambassador for sharing USG views and committed to keeping the lines of communication open to us. Shonekan observed his appointment as Special Envoy was not to supplant Foreign Minister Lamido or the Commonwealth process. His role was to complement that process by serving as a conduit for private, personalized diplomacy between Abuja and Harare. 5. (C) While acknowledging the difficult task before him, Shonekan believed he stood in Mugabe's good books and that their congenial relationship would reap benefits down the road. Recounting his days as civilian interim Head of State between the khaki-garbed Babangida and Abacha regimes, Shonekan retold his side-bar conversations with Mugabe during Commonwealth and OAU meetings. In those days, it was Mugabe sidling up to Shonekan, giving avuncular prodding to democratize Nigeria. In a twist of fate, Shonekan would now reciprocate with Mugabe. 6. (C) Shonekan mentioned he had visited Harare a few weeks ago to present a letter from President Obasanjo to Mugabe. In fact, his audience with Mugabe was scheduled immediately after the Zimbabwean leader's tense session with the EU delegation. Shonekan, sensing that Mugabe was already bilious after the EU encounter, decided to change tactics, leaving "the stick" in the antechamber. Shonekan joked that Mugabe looked surprisingly well despite the recent sparring he had been doing. After a laugh that broke the residual tension still in the President's office, Shonekan contended they held a substantive discussion free of rancor and histrionics. 7. (C) Mugabe took issue with only one aspect of the letter he presented from President Obasanjo, Shonekan declared. Mugabe complained that Obasanjo's letter stated that Zimbabwe had not honored its Abuja commitments, when the missive also should have faulted London for not honoring its obligations. Despite Mugabe's parsing of the letter's text, Shonekan found him attentive and reasonable. Mugabe did not seem wedded to the hard-line posture he often assumed in public, Shonekan said. Much of Mugabe's hectoring was for domestic political consumption. Mugabe was playing to the hard-liners to shore up his support. Unfortunately, Mugabe had succumbed to rhetorical excess. One of the first things Shonekan said he would propose to Obasanjo was for Obasanjo to personally urge Mugabe to moderate his public statements and those of his senior officials. ----------- Elections ----------- 8. (C) Shonekan said he would review the SADC Parliamentary Forum electoral norms and standards. If Zimbabwe has signed its name to these standards, Shonekan asserted, Mugabe cannot now turn away from what he had endorsed previously. Showing particular concern about Zimbabwe's aversion to election observers, Shonekan opined that observers were necessary; elections without observers would raise a negative presumption against the credibility of the exercise. Based on his November conversations with Mugabe, Shonekan felt Mugabe would ultimately relent on the issue of international observers but would steadfastly resist an EU observer team, since he now considered Brussels his mortal enemy. ------------------------------------ The Season For Land Reform ------------------------------------ 9. (C) Shonekan did not envy the UNDP delegation's job. In Zimbabwe during the team's visit, he remembered that they were being pushed and tugged by sundry and divergent forces. The team cannot write a report that will please everyone, said Shonekan. From his talks in Harare, he knew that the report will be critical of the GOZ. The task will be to draft a non-political, technical report that, although pointing a finger at the GOZ, did not ostracize Mugabe and kept the door open to cooperation. At that point, it would be up to the diplomatic community to cajole Mugabe towards doing the right thing on land reform, and keeping him from using the report to line his wastebasket. 10. (C) Ambassador Jeter reminded Shonekan that Mugabe recently had moved faster in the wrong direction by amending the Land Acquisition Act to accelerate farm seizures, as if he wanted to rush wholesale seizures, perhaps to present them to the international community as a fait accompli. Shonekan accepted that this misguided legislation would complicate efforts to formulate a balanced reform program but said Nigeria would try to influence Mugabe to return to his pledge of cooperation with the international community on this important issue. --------------------------------------------- -------- A Little More Prodding From Its Neighbors --------------------------------------------- -------- 11. (C) Shonekan maintained that resolution of the land reform was vital not only for Zimbabwe but for the precedent it sets for South Africa. South Africa has a large political stake in Zimbabwe, he noted. Because of the historic affinity between ZANU-PF and the ANC and the volatility in South Africa regarding land reform, Mbeki has been reticent to exert pressure on Mugabe, according to Shonekan. However, the time has come for Mbeki and other SADC leaders to pressure Mugabe, Shonekan believed. Jeter concurred that a unified chorus of neighbors might generate effective political pressure that could not as easily be sidestepped by an African leader as protestations from the West. The Ambassador added that Nigeria might try to woo Namibia's Nujoma to play an active and more positive role. Mugabe would take notice if Nujoma, who at times has encouraged Mugabe's antics, would now begin to counsel accommodation, Jeter remarked. ---------------------------- Carrot, Stick, Or Both? ---------------------------- 12. (C) Shonekan felt that "positive pressure" could be most effective on Mugabe. Offering a roadmap of required actions and parallel incentives (diplomatic and financial reward) would have the best chance of getting Mugabe back into the fold. Shonekan feared that the threat of sanctions would be counter-productive at this point. He claimed sanctions would only bolster GOZ hard-liners who are already arguing that Mugabe should turn his back on Western nations because they were engineering his ouster. A proposal that highlights incentives would buoy moderates and help quiet the hard-liners, Shonekan postulated. Ambassador Jeter mentioned the proposed Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act on the Hill contained a number of potential incentives but also held out the suggestion of sanctions if Mugabe continued his undemocratic conduct. Shonekan stated that the Democracy Act seemed to strike the right balance; again, he stressed that sanctions should not feature prominently at this moment and shoul d only be applied as a last resort. (Note: Shonekan asked for a copy of the proposed Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, which we will provide on Shonekan's return to Nigeria. End note.) 13. (C) A well respected businessman, Shonekan lamented Zimbabwe's macroeconomic condition. Shaking his head after Ambassador Jeter told him the inflation rate, Shonekan stated that Zimbabwe used to export food but now needed humanitarian aid to feed many of its people. Shonekan worried that continued mal-governance and exacerbation of the political crisis eventually could lead to a meltdown. It would be a tragedy if Zimbabwe were to become a source of instability and refugees in the SADC region, he declared. Ambassador Jeter agreed that continued misrule could lead to political and economic breakdown the tremors of which would be felt throughout the region, particularly in South Africa. Not only would its economy be hard hit by a Zimbabwean collapse, South Africa would be asked to play host to thousands of refugees who would see South Africa as their haven of first resort. ------------- Comment ------------- 14. (C) Preparing to fly to London that evening for consultations with the British, Shonekan believed that Nigeria, thanks to his good offices, can exert some pressure on Mugabe. Whether that pressure will be sufficient to drown out the hard-liners and give Mugabe the guidance needed to walk out of the box in which he has placed himself is most uncertain. However, Shonekan's selection seems like a wise move on two scores. First, it increases GON bilateral communication with Zimbabwe, making it much easier to sustain diplomatic pressure than the periodic CMAG mechanism. Second, that Shonekan may have a friendly relationship with Mugabe, may make it easier for Shonekan to say some things that would cause Mugabe to bristle if heard from another source. Additionally, Shonekan likes working with the US. We anticipate that he will remain true to his promise to consult and share information with us. End comment. Jeter
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