US embassy cable - 04BRASILIA2781

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRASILIA 002781 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MCAP, BR, POL-MIL Issues 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S TRIP TO 
BRAZIL, NOVEMBER 15, 2004 
 
REF: BRASILIA 2763 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Philip Chicola, reasons 
1.4 (b & 
 d) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
 
1. (C) The United States Mission in Brazil warmly welcomes 
your visit to Manaus.  Your arrival comes on the heels of a 
major shakeup in Brazil's Ministry of Defense.  The 
resignation of Minister Jose Viegas and his replacement on 
November 8 by Vice President Jose Alencar is intended to 
repair a relationship between the civilian minister and the 
force commanders that in recent months had suffered from 
tensions and disagreements.  (Reftel describes the stress 
between Minister Viegas and senior military commanders 
leading to his resignation.)  You are the first senior USG 
official to meet with Vice President Alencar in his new 
capacity as Defense Minister.  (Note: Embassy has requested 
the bilateral meeting with Alencar, but no official GOB 
response has been given as of 8 November COB. End Note) 
Being new to his posting, Alencar, we suspect, will 
appreciate words of support for the bilateral mil-mil 
relationship and will be interested in suggestions for 
enhancing those ties.  While he will be cool to our 
entreaties on Article 98, he may be interested in exploring a 
Defense Cooperation Agreement through which we may be able to 
achieve our overall policy objectives. 
 
CHANGE AT THE TOP 
----------------- 
 
2.  (C) Although Viegas' departure had been anticipated in 
President Lula's next cabinet shake-up, expected in early 
2005, the timing could not be postponed any longer.  Recent 
publication of alleged photos of prominent journalist 
Waldomir Herzog, widely thought to have been tortured and 
murdered by the military in 1975, led to a ham-handed 
Brazilian army defense of its behavior during the military 
period (1964-1985).  A communiqu released without Viegas' 
concurrence by the army appeared to justify human rights 
violations during that era and brought down the wrath of 
President Lula and other government officials -- many of whom 
had been imprisoned or exiled during the dictatorship. 
Minister Viegas' inability to control senior military 
leadership, and at the very least prevent the embarrassment 
caused by the army's letter, could not be ignored any longer. 
 
3.  (C)  In taking over the defense portfolio, Vice President 
Alencar faces some immediate challenges.  While Viegas could 
at least claim political-military expertise from a long 
foreign service career during which he held critically 
important assignments, Alencar has no such experience.  The 
Brazilian military remains totally apolitical.  However, 
senior military leadership has never been happy with the 
civilian supervision that came with the creation of the 
Ministry of Defense in 1999.  Alencar will have to assert his 
authority over the uniformed services, but he knows he must 
do it in a way that does not lead to further rancor. 
 
4.  (C) Almost immediately, the new minister will face the 
issue of possibly opening the sealed archives from the 
military period.  In light of the publicity over Herzog, 
public clamor for release of these files has risen.  The 
military asserts that many files have been disposed of 
following proper legal procedures.  A decree signed by former 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso lengthened to 60 years 
the period these archives are to remain sealed.  Changes may 
also have to be made in the senior uniformed services, 
beginning with Army Commander Francisco Albuquerque, Viegas' 
adversary.  Alencar will also have to consider how to resolve 
the long-standing $700 million competition for next 
generation fighter aircraft (F-X).  Under Viegas, an 
announcement on a decision on selection of an F-X had been 
postponed numerous times.  However, given the sticker shock 
of new F-X aircraft, the GOB may postpone a decision 
indefinitely. 
 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LANDSCAPE 
------------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) Brazil's democracy is less than two decades old, 
having succeeded the military regime that ruled from 
1964-1985. Lula da Silva, the country's first working-class 
president, took office in January 2003.  He passed important 
tax and pension reforms but has made little progress on his 
social agenda, including his flagship Zero Hunger project. 
Lula's Workers' Party (PT) leads an eight-party coalition 
that holds a majority in both houses of Congress, but the 
coalition is undisciplined, and Lula must make compromises to 
pass his legislation.  In October nationwide municipal 
elections were held to select the country's mayors and city 
councils.  The PT lost some key races, including the mayor of 
Sao Paulo, but is still in a leading position to contest the 
2006 presidential race. 
 
6. (SBU) Under President Lula, Brazil has achieved a higher 
international profile, reflected in its leading role in South 
America, its push for a UNSC permanent seat, its spearheading 
of a "G-20" group of developing nations, its revitalization 
of Mercosul, and its constructive roles in Haiti and 
Venezuela.  Brazil is an important player on global issues 
such as hunger (witness the September 20 New York 
Conference), HIV/AIDS and the environment.  U.S./Brazilian 
cooperation has been key to progress on the WTO Doha round. 
Brazil and the U.S. are co-chairs of the FTAA negotiations. 
The GOB has focused on South America and developing 
countries, engaging intensively with Mercosul and forging a 
regional approach to trade talks.  Brazilians are committed 
to the UN and other multilateral institutions.  The majority 
of Brazilians oppose the war in Iraq.  Lula has voiced strong 
opposition to the war, but this has not prejudiced his 
approach to broader bilateral relations. 
 
CRIME, TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION 
---------------------------------- 
 
7. (C)  On counter-terrorism operational issues, cooperation 
between the USG and Brazilian law enforcement and security 
services is good.  The GOB remains hypersensitive to 
allegations that terrorist groups are active on Brazilian 
territory, particularly in the Tri-border region.  Senior GOB 
officials maintain that there is no evidence to support 
claims that terrorists operate on Brazilian territory and the 
GOB has repeatedly asked us for specific information to 
support such allegations.  GOB police and security officials 
acknowledge that fundraising, money laundering, and related 
criminal activities are likely ongoing, but again, they 
request solid intelligence that would link funding with 
terrorist groups.  Brazil has a sizable population with 
ethnic origins in the Middle East, including many who are 
economically and politically influential.  The USG is 
concerned that these communities contain persons who 
financially support terrorist organizations. 
 
8. (C)  Crime remains a severe problem in Brazil's large 
cities.  In Rio, where violence has become endemic, a gang 
war earlier this year in Rocinha, a favela notorious for 
crime and drugs, culminated with bloodshed and revealed the 
depth of criminal druglord control over the favelas. The 
police reacted by launching a highly publicized incursion 
into Rocinha. In the countryside, the Landless Movement (MST) 
illegally occupies land, causing confrontations with 
landowners and the GOB.  A role for the Brazilian military in 
dealing with crime and public security is being reviewed, and 
President Lula appears to favor some increased military role. 
 Recent legislation has been passed giving troops in remote 
areas of the Amazon arrest powers when apprehending someone 
committing an illegal act. Many field-grade officers regard 
some armed forces involvement in law enforcement as 
inevitable; however, most senior officers, sensitive to the 
legal ramifications that could result from civilian 
casualties, increased corruption, and the residual legacy of 
21 years of military rule, remain strongly opposed. 
 
9. (C) Brazil has recently found itself in an uncomfortable 
spotlight regarding its non-proliferation credentials.  The 
IAEA is working closely with the GOB over the institution of 
a suitable inspection regime for the new enrichment facility 
at Resende. The GOB expects to have an agreement with the 
IAEA regarding Resende in place soon. In addition, the IAEA, 
the U.S., and many other countries have asked Brazil to sign 
the Additional Protocol (AP) to the NPT, a measure the GOB 
has resisted so far. Brazil argues that the nuclear weapons 
states need to accelerate their disarmament even as the 
nonweapons states consider additional compliance measures. 
Brazil is not expected to sign the AP until at least mid 
2005. Meanwhile, Brazil is considering signing onto the 
International Code of Conduct for missile technology but 
remains unenthusiastic about the Proliferation Security 
Initiative and the Australia Group. 
 
THE ARMED FORCES IN BRAZIL 
-------------------------- 
 
10. (C)  Since the end of military rule in 1985, the armed 
services have supported Brazil's civilian leadership and 
adapted to their new apolitical status, despite the problems 
noted above with the new civilian Ministry of Defense, 
created in 1999.  The officer corps is professional and 
dedicated to defending Brazil's constitution. 
 
11. (C)  Public esteem does not translate, however, into 
funds.  Military budgets have decreased steadily for 15 
years, with the severest cuts introduced over the last four 
years.  This has naturally had a negative impact on the 
readiness of the armed forces.  As President Lula stresses 
social priorities while working within tight fiscal 
constraints, the prognosis for the military's budget is for 
more of the same. The military grumbles that it is entitled 
to pay raises.  The lack of money dampens the force 
projection capability.  Procurement programs for new weapons 
systems to replace outmoded equipment are also starved for 
funds, while programs such as the development of a Brazilian 
nuclear-powered submarine and maintenance of antiquated 
vessels drain resources that could be better directed 
elsewhere. 
 
12. (C)  As Viegas' resignation shows, a major internal issue 
is the relationship between the armed services and the 
civilian-led Ministry of Defense.  Minister Viegas created, 
for example, a four-star level secretariat of cooperative 
studies headed by a diplomat.  Many officers felt such senior 
civilian placements within the Ministry diminished the 
military's access and rendered it less effective in fighting 
important bureaucratic battles.  In addition to the problems 
noted above with the MOD, within the Ministry there are 
problems in the chain of command.  Although the Chief of 
Defense and the Secretary for Strategy, Policy and 
International Affairs are four-star generals with direct 
advisory roles to the Minister, their positions are 
unofficially subordinate to the service commanders.  Their 
ability to impose jointness is compromised.  Morale among the 
senior military grades has been negatively affected, leading 
to transfers and some retirements. 
 
13. (C)  The services maintain close ties with counterparts 
in neighboring countries and there are no identifiable 
trouble spots in these relations.  Each service conducts 
annual or more frequent dialogue at various levels of command 
with neighboring militaries.  Army-to-army relations with 
Brazil's neighbors, for example, are conducted at the chief 
of staff, regional command, brigade, and battalion levels. 
Despite a troubled history, relations between the Argentine 
and Brazilian militaries have never been closer.  Brazil is 
also doing some regional intelligence sharing, and there is 
steady improvement in this field with Colombia and Peru. 
 
SPECIFIC ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
14. (C)  Army Issues:  Brazil's army has the lead in MINUSTAH 
and a 1200 man PKO force has been on the ground since June. 
While army leadership is confident in its ability to conduct 
such PKO missions, its troops are being stretched to the 
limit.  Foreign Minister Amorim is pressing hard for other 
countries to fill their UN commitments for MINUSTAH.  The 
army is attentive to Brazil's borders, particularly in the 
Amazon Basin where it has relocated 5,000 troops and 
established several new frontier platoons.  There continues 
to be concern with the spillover effects of  the Colombian 
conflict and some skirmishes with the FARC have been 
reported.  While the army does not anticipate a direct 
confrontation with the FARC, there is recognition that FARC 
gunrunning and narcotics smuggling activities will eventually 
have to be challenged.  While the various commands may lack 
hardware and support, they are keenly aware of their mission 
and seem prepared to carry it out. 
 
15. (C)  Navy Issues: In recent years, the navy procured 23 
A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft from Kuwait and bought the former 
French aircraft carrier Foch, renamed the Sao Paulo.  Several 
pilots have already become carrier qualified in the U.S.  The 
Navy is sending on average two officers a year to the U.S. 
for flight training.  In March 2004, the navy signed an LOA 
for the FMS LINK 11 case to upgrade their secure 
communications.  In a program plagued by technological and 
design flaws, the navy's nuclear submarine program has 
swallowed about $1 billion in R&D costs.  The navy claims it 
is still 20 years, and $500 million, away from final 
development and delivery of a nuclear sub.  (We believe it 
would be much longer and cost much more.)   Meanwhile, the 
navy is in dire need of escort vessels, and is hard pressed 
to maintain its aging fleet. Navy command is interested in 
submarine rescue, diesel submarine, and UNITAS training and 
exercises. 
 
16. (C)  Air Force Issues:  The air force desperately wants 
to replace its aging Mirages.  President Lula has continued 
to postpone a decision on a new generation fighter (F-X), an 
understandable decision given the cost involved.  New 
Lockheed F-16 Block 50 aircraft were offered in the 
competition.  However, recognizing that other competitors 
might be preferred by FAB, Lockheed-Martin also decided to 
offer used F-16s in a deal that would provide the air force 
with capable aircraft at a fraction of the cost of new 
planes.  However, FAB continues to focus on the procurement 
of new, not used, aircraft.  Regardless of the decision, GOB 
funding of the F-X will be difficult. FAB is also looking to 
replace its aging UH-1 helicopter fleet.  In February 2004, 
the FAB sent a delegation to Alabama to discuss possible 
modifications needed on the 6-10 Black Hawks they are 
interested in purchasing.  Congressional approval is expected 
this month with the final LOR valued at $166M for 10 
BLACKHAWK Helicopters.  FAB will put initial investment of 
$100M against a new FMS case for purchase of the BLACKHAWKS. 
First delivery is expected in June 2005 for two helicopters. 
 
17. (C)  SIVAM (Amazon Surveillance System):  Now essentially 
complete, the SIVAM system built by Raytheon consists of 
ground, aerial, and space-based sensors, communications and 
patrol aircraft.  Raytheon has had contractual differences 
with the GOB, but the company reports the situation has 
improved and its support for the project will not stop. 
Brazil has indicated its willingness to share data with 
neighboring countries under certain conditions. 
 
18. (C)  Article 98:  Brazil has not signed an Article 98 
agreement and is subject to ASPA sanctions.  The GOB, in 
keeping with its long-standing multilateralism, insisted it 
was committed to the International Criminal Court and that 
signing our Article 98 waiver would weaken this commitment. 
The Government also asserted that it could conceive of no 
circumstances under which it would subject U.S. citizens to 
extradition to The Hague. The GOB calculated that the 
projected loss annually under ASPA sanctions of $500,000 of 
IMET funds was tolerable.  However, the imposition of full 
FMS pricing for training, an unforeseen consequence of ASPA, 
caught the GOB by surprise and has caused additional 
frustration and friction.  Despite this additional blow, the 
loss of access to EDA grant funds, the withdrawal of the 
Spruance destroyer offer (combination sale and grant 
transfer), and the financial impact on the training portion 
of procurement offers such as the F-16, we do not expect 
Brazil to reverse its position on Article 98.  In fact, the 
MOD has indicated that it will continue training at the same 
level as pre-ASPA sanctions, just with other countries.  The 
armed services have already shifted training to Great Britain 
and France and has new programs with Russia, China, and even 
Vietnam. 
 
19. (C)  Airbridge Denial/Shootdown:  Following extensive 
USG-GOB consultations to develop strict interdiction 
parameters for protecting innocent lives, on October 17 
Brazil began implementation of its 1998 law permitting the 
shootdown/forcedown of civil aircraft suspected of illicit 
trafficking.  On October 16 President Bush signed a 
Presidential Determination to waive liability under U.S. law 
owing to the extraordinary threat trafficking poses to 
Brazil's sovereignty. 
 
20. (SBU)  Despite irritants in the relationship, we consider 
ties between the U.S. and Brazilian militaries good.  Brazil 
and the U.S. will continue to participate in joint exercises 
such as Cabanas and UNITAS. In June, the aircraft carrier 
Ronald Reagan made a port visit to Rio. In July 2005 Brazil 
will host PKO-South and the annual Unitas exercise.  The MOD 
still views the U.S. military relationship as important and 
the U.S. a dependable, if sometimes irritating, partner. 
Brazil, as a strategic partner, remains important to the U.S. 
 Beyond ASPA, there remain many areas of defense cooperation 
and interaction, as well as areas of cooperation that remain 
untapped.  Many in the Brazilian Armed Forces recognize that 
they must expand their role in counter narcotics and counter 
terrorism.  As the MOD proceeds with the development of a 
National Military Strategy for Brazil, the U.S. can offer its 
perspectives on the process. 
 
21. (C)  Maintaining the U.S.-Brazil pol-mil relationship 
requires constant attention and, perhaps, more effort than 
with any other bilateral relationship in the hemisphere. 
Within Brazil, there is no institutional propensity to curry 
favor with the U.S.  Given its size, Brazil views itself as a 
regional leader and global player, even if it sometimes 
appears to fall short of what is expected from a world power. 
 The GOB will be eager for ways to enhance the bilateral 
relationship, overcoming the obstacles created by ASPA and 
Brazil's rejection of an Article 98 agreement.  The GOB has 
expressed interest in negotiating an umbrella Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that would replace the former 
Mutual Defense Assistance Treaty, unilaterally abrogated by 
the GOB in 1980 due to our human rights policies.  But the 
GOB will also remain sensitive that it not appear too eager 
to consummate deals with us that could backfire politically. 
 
Danilovich