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| Identifier: | 04ANKARA6311 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04ANKARA6311 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2004-11-08 16:17:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Tags: | PREL CY TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T ANKARA 006311 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2014 TAGS: PREL, CY, TU SUBJECT: UK DIPLOMATS MEET IN ANKARA TO THINK ABOUT THE WAY AHEAD ON CYPRUS Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: The UK Ambassadors to Greece and Turkey, Cyprus High Commissioner Parker, and FCO EU and Mediterranean Director Chilcott met in Ankara November 1 to discuss, inter alia, the way forward on Cyprus. They assess that Papadopolous' demands are not yet getting any support within the EU and he will not cast a veto in December, but there is some pressure for Turkey to sign a protocol extending Turkey's Association Agreement with the EU to the ten new members (including the ROC) before the December EU Summit. After December, they assess that Papadopolous' leverage will grow stronger and Turkey's weaker as more time passes without a settlement, and that Turkey and the TCs should re-initiate the settlement process. End Summary. Papadopolous Not Yet Getting Any Traction ----------------------------------------- 2. (C) They generally agreed that Papadopolous will continue lobbying for Cyprus-related concessions in the run up to December 17, but in the end will not veto Turkey getting a date to begin accession negotiations. They predict he will keep pressing two main points with EU members: Turkish failure to recognize a fellow EU member, and Turkish troops occupying an EU member's territory. The UK diplomats agree that Papadopolous has not yet gotten any traction among EU members to impose new Cyprus-related conditions on Turkey before December 17. Some Pressure to Extend Association Agreement By December --------------------------------------------- ------------ 3. (C) While Papadopolous' demand for Turkey to recognize the ROC is not getting any traction, the UK diplomats think that before December 17 the GOT may have to sign a protocol extending Turkey's Association Agreement with the EU to the ten new member states (including the ROC). (The EU President Dutch DCM and the Danish DCM told us recently Turkey has to do this before December 17.) The Commission's October 6 report said it "expects a positive reply from Turkey to the draft protocol on the necessary adaptations" of the Ankara Agreement to take account of the new members, but did not specify a date for Turkish compliance. 4. (C) The UK has not yet seen any member state threatening to veto in December if there is no extension. However, they worry that lack of a protocol will negatively affect the strength of the EU's "yes" in December, the concomitant conditions, and the promptness of the date Turkey will get to begin negotiations. At a minimum, the UK thinks the Turks should be actively talking to the Commission about extending the Association Agreement; MFA Deputy U/S Bozkir has told the UK that Turkey is in dialogue with the Commission on the matter. 5. (C) Turkish MFA legal adviser Bolukbasi has told UK diplomats that the GCs will use outright recognition to argue that the Cyprus issue is merely an internal ROC matter and the TCs merely an internal minority group. Extending the Association Agreement would be one way around this, with the Turks adding a reservation (as they did via a letter to Solana when they signed the EU Constitutional Treaty on October 29) that the protocol does not change Turkey's position vis-a-vis the ROC. The Way Forward in 2005 ----------------------- 6. (C) After December, the UK consensus is that Turkey needs to take the initiative to re-open talks between GCs and TCs. They assess that Papadopolous' leverage with EU members will grow stronger after December; Turkey's leverage will grow weaker as it gets closer to actual accession without a settlement. The UK sees an opportunity after the spring 2005 "TRNC President" elections, which they believe Talat will win. The UK thinks the best course for the Turks would be to prepare a "package" of measures they are willing to take on Cyprus and the concessions they would seek in return. (Comment: This would also blunt criticism here about Turkey giving unilateral concessions. End Comment.) Even assuming the GCs reject it, this would give the Turks credit for continuing to seek a settlement. At a minimum, Talat should try to engage Papadopolous in "talks about talks." 7. (S) UK political chief Sharma (strictly protect) told us that when PM Blair met Erdogan on October 29, Blair told him to focus the EU's "yes" in December and not get bogged down in language, continue the reform process, and consider what Cyprus concessions are doable before December in case Papadopolous begins to win support for his demands. EDELMAN
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