US embassy cable - 04ANKARA6311

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UK DIPLOMATS MEET IN ANKARA TO THINK ABOUT THE WAY AHEAD ON CYPRUS

Identifier: 04ANKARA6311
Wikileaks: View 04ANKARA6311 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2004-11-08 16:17:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL CY TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T ANKARA 006311 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2014 
TAGS: PREL, CY, TU 
SUBJECT: UK DIPLOMATS MEET IN ANKARA TO THINK ABOUT THE WAY 
AHEAD ON CYPRUS 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  The UK Ambassadors to Greece and Turkey, 
Cyprus High Commissioner Parker, and FCO EU and Mediterranean 
Director Chilcott met in Ankara November 1 to discuss, inter 
alia, the way forward on Cyprus.  They assess that 
Papadopolous' demands are not yet getting any support within 
the EU and he will not cast a veto in December, but there is 
some pressure for Turkey to sign a protocol extending 
Turkey's Association Agreement with the EU to the ten new 
members (including the ROC) before the December EU Summit. 
After December, they assess that Papadopolous' leverage will 
grow stronger and Turkey's weaker as more time passes without 
a settlement, and that Turkey and the TCs should re-initiate 
the settlement process.  End Summary. 
 
Papadopolous Not Yet Getting Any Traction 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) They generally agreed that Papadopolous will continue 
lobbying for Cyprus-related concessions in the run up to 
December 17, but in the end will not veto Turkey getting a 
date to begin accession negotiations.  They predict he will 
keep pressing two main points with EU members:  Turkish 
failure to recognize a fellow EU member, and Turkish troops 
occupying an EU member's territory.  The UK diplomats agree 
that Papadopolous has not yet gotten any traction among EU 
members to impose new Cyprus-related conditions on Turkey 
before December 17. 
 
Some Pressure to Extend Association Agreement By December 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
3.  (C) While Papadopolous' demand for Turkey to recognize 
the ROC is not getting any traction, the UK diplomats think 
that before December 17 the GOT may have to sign a protocol 
extending Turkey's Association Agreement with the EU to the 
ten new member states (including the ROC).  (The EU President 
Dutch DCM and the Danish DCM told us recently Turkey has to 
do this before December 17.)  The Commission's October 6 
report said it "expects a positive reply from Turkey to the 
draft protocol on the necessary adaptations" of the Ankara 
Agreement to take account of the new members, but did not 
specify a date for Turkish compliance. 
 
4.  (C) The UK has not yet seen any member state threatening 
to veto in December if there is no extension.  However, they 
worry that lack of a protocol will negatively affect the 
strength of the EU's "yes" in December, the concomitant 
conditions, and the promptness of the date Turkey will get to 
begin negotiations.  At a minimum, the UK thinks the Turks 
should be actively talking to the Commission about extending 
the Association Agreement; MFA Deputy U/S Bozkir has told the 
UK that Turkey is in dialogue with the Commission on the 
matter. 
 
5.  (C) Turkish MFA legal adviser Bolukbasi has told UK 
diplomats that the GCs will use outright recognition to argue 
that the Cyprus issue is merely an internal ROC matter and 
the TCs merely an internal minority group.  Extending the 
Association Agreement would be one way around this, with the 
Turks adding a reservation (as they did via a letter to 
Solana when they signed the EU Constitutional Treaty on 
October 29) that the protocol does not change Turkey's 
position vis-a-vis the ROC. 
 
The Way Forward in 2005 
----------------------- 
 
6.  (C) After December, the UK consensus is that Turkey needs 
to take the initiative to re-open talks between GCs and TCs. 
They assess that Papadopolous' leverage with EU members will 
grow stronger after December; Turkey's leverage will grow 
weaker as it gets closer to actual accession without a 
settlement.  The UK sees an opportunity after the spring 2005 
"TRNC President" elections, which they believe Talat will 
win.  The UK thinks the best course for the Turks would be to 
prepare a "package" of measures they are willing to take on 
Cyprus and the concessions they would seek in return. 
(Comment:  This would also blunt criticism here about Turkey 
giving unilateral concessions.  End Comment.)  Even assuming 
the GCs reject it, this would give the Turks credit for 
continuing to seek a settlement.  At a minimum, Talat should 
try to engage Papadopolous in "talks about talks." 
 
7.  (S) UK political chief Sharma (strictly protect) told us 
that when PM Blair met Erdogan on October 29, Blair told him 
to focus the EU's "yes" in December and not get bogged down 
in language, continue the reform process, and consider what 
Cyprus concessions are doable before December in case 
Papadopolous begins to win support for his demands. 
EDELMAN 

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