US embassy cable - 01JAKARTA4285

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 004285 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2011 
TAGS: PREL, EAID, PGOV, ID 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON JUSUF KALLA 
 
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL OFFICER ANDREW T. HINTZ FOR 
REASON 1.5 B, D. 
 
2. (C) SUMMARY: THE AMBASSADOR TOLD PEOPLES' WELFARE 
COORDINATING MINISTER YUSUF KALLA ON NOVEMBER 30 THAT THE 
U.S. WANTS TO HELP INDONESIA SOLVE SEPARATIST AND OTHER 
CHALLENGES.  KALLA SAID RECENTLY PASSED AUTONOMY LAWS WOULD 
ADDRESS MOST SEPARATIST DEMANDS, BUT THAT INGRAINED DISTRUST 
WOULD BE HARD TO OVERCOME. THE AMBASSADOR PRESSED KALLA ON 
COMBATING EXTREMIST GROUPS LIKE LASKAR JIHAD (LJ).  KALLA 
SAID THAT LJ WAS NOT ENTIRELY TO BLAME FOR RELIGIOUS 
CONFLICTS; HE SAID THE GOI HAD FORMED A MULTI-SERVICE JOINT 
BATTALION TO QUELL FIGHTING IN THE MOLUCCAS.  KALLA SAID TO 
FIGHT POVERTY THE GOI SHOULD FOCUS ON WEALTH DISPARITY, WHILE 
CHANNELING FOREIGN INVESTMENT TOWARD PRIVATIZATION OF 
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES.  KALLA SAID THE GOI SUPPORTS THE WAR 
ON TERRORISM, AND THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD DEFLECTED CRITICISM 
OF THE US-LED MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN.  KALLA IS A 
THOUGHTFUL INTERLOCUTOR, BUT HIS COMMENTS BETRAYED A 
RELUCTANCE (COMMON AMONG INDONESIAN OFFICIALS) TO ADDRESS 
ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES IN RESOLVING SEPARATIST AND SECTARIAN 
CONFLICTS.  END SUMMARY. 
 
US SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA AFFIRMED 
--------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) DURING HIS NOVEMBER 30 INTRODUCTORY CALL ON PEOPLE'S 
WELFARE COORDINATING MINISTER YUSUF KALLA, THE AMBASSADOR 
STRESSED US SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA'S NATIONAL INTEGRITY.  THE 
AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE USG HAS CONSISTENTLY CONVEYED ITS 
SUPPORT FOR A UNITED INDONESIA TO SEQRATIST GROUPS LIKE THE 
FREE ACEH MOVEMENT (GAM).  THE AMBASSADOR OPINED, HOWEVER, 
THAT THE PEACE PROCESS IN WEST PAPUA IS MUCH FURTHER ALONG 
THAN IN ACEH.  HE NOTED THAT THE REGIONAL AUTONOMY 
LEGISLATION FOR PAPUA WAS FAR MORE INCLUSIVE THAN THAT FOR 
ACEH THANKS TO THE PAPUAN PUBLIC'S BROADER INPUTS IN THE 
DRAFTING PROCESS.  THE AMBASSADOR OBSERVED THAT, IN ACEH, GAM 
HAD DRIVEN THE DEBATE EVEN THOUGH GAM DOES NOT FULLY 
REPRESENT THE ACHENESE PEOPLE. 
 
4.  (C) THE AMBASSADOR ALSO STRESSED THAT, WHILE UNWILLING TO 
BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN MEDIATING SEPARATIST CONFLICTS 
LIKE ACEH, THE U.S. IS KEEN TO HELP INDONESIA RESOLVE SUCH 
ISSUES PEACEFULLY.  THE AMBASSADOR ADDED HE WAS TROUBLED BY 
REPORTS THAT THE GOI WAS POISED TO PURSUE A MILITARY SOLUTION 
IN ACEH, WHERE INDONESIA WAS SAID TO BE DEPLOYING SEVERAL 
EXTRA BATTALIONS OF TROOPS.  HE ADVISED KALLA THAT THE 
POLICE, AND NOT THE ARMED FORCES (TNI), SHOULD HAVE THE LEAD 
IN RESTORING ORDER IN THE PROVINCE, AND NOTED THAT THE US 
COULD HELP STRENGTHEN POLICE CAPABILITIES THROUGH ITS LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. 
 
KALLA SEES SALVATION IN LEGISLATION 
----------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) WHILE ADMITTING THAT INDONESIAN NATIONAL UNITY IS 
THREATENED BY SIGNIFICANT CENTRIFUGAL FORCES, KALLA SAID THAT 
VARIOUS REGIONAL AUTONOMY BILLS NOW BEFORE PARLIAMENT WOULD 
ADDRESS MOST SEPARATIST DEMANDS.  HE ADDED THAT THIS WAS 
PARTICULARLY TRUE FOR ACEH, WHERE HE CLAIMED THE DRAFT LAW 
ACCOUNTED FOR ALL SALIENT ISSUES, INCLUDING REVENUE SHARING 
AND IMPOSITION OF ISLAMIC (SYARIAH) LAW (HE NOTED, HOWEVER, 
THERE STILL IS NO CLEAR DEFINITION OF THE LATTER).  KALLA 
NEVERTHELESS CONCEDED THAT, IN THE CASE OF ACEH, A NEGOTIATED 
SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE STYMIED BY AN ACUTE LACK OF TRUST ON BOTH 
SIDES.  HE OPINED THAT THIS WOULD BE NO LESS TRUE OF THE 
POLICE, WHOSE HARDLINE MINDSET, HE BELIEVED, WOULD TAKE 
CONSIDERABLE TIME TO CHANGE. 
 
6.  (C) AGREEING WITH THE AMBASSADOR'S VIEW THAT GAM DOES NOT 
TRULY REPRESENT THE ACEHNESE PEOPLE, KALLA DESCRIBED MANY OF 
GAM'S MEMBERS AS RADICALIZED WAR-ORPHANS WHO HAVE TURNED TO 
BANDITRY UNDER THE GAM BANNER.  KALLA SAID THAT, BY CONTRAST, 
THE PAPUANS ARE NOT COMMITTED TO ARMED STRUGGLE, BEING LESS 
EDUCATED AND ENJOYING A RELATIVELY EASY LIFESTYLE.  HOWEVER, 
HE DISMISSED REPORTS OF AN INCREASE IN TNI DEPLOYMENTS TO 
ACEH AS "DISINFORMATION," NOTING THAT, GIVEN DEPLOYMENTS 
ELSEWHERE, THE FIGURES OFTEN CITED WERE IN EXCESS OF THE 
TOTAL NUMBER OF BATTALIONS FIELDED BY TNI. 
 
IDPS AND LASKER JIHAD 
--------------------- 
 
7.  (C) IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUERY ON THE GOI'S 
PLANS FOR HANDLING THE CHALLENGE POSED BY INDONESIA'S 1.3 
MILLION INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS), KALLA NOTED THAT 
IDPS RESULTED OF THREE TYPES OF REGIONAL CONFLICT: ETHNIC, 
RELIGIOUS, AND POLITICAL.  THE MINISTER SAID THAT, WHILE ALL 
WERE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE, RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS POSED THE 
GREATEST PROBLEMS BECAUSE THEY GENERALLY OFFERED LITTLE 
COMMON GROUND FOR COOPERATION AND RECONCILIATION.  HE NOTED 
THAT THE PROBLEM OFTEN WAS EXACERBATED BY ETHNIC AND ECONOMIC 
FACTORS, AND CITED THE MOLUCCAS AS AN EXAMPLE.  KALLA SAID 
THAT THE LOCAL MERCHANT CLASS WAS DOMINATED BY BUGINESE OR 
BUTONESE MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS, WHILE MOST LOCAL CHRISTIANS HAVE 
TRADITIONALLY OPTED FOR LESS LUCRATIVE CALLINGS AS PLANTATION 
LABOR OR IN THE BUREAUCRACY.  HE CLAIMED THE GOI WAS 
NEVERTHELESS PREPARED TO TAKE FIRM STEPS TO QUELL THE 
VIOLENCE IN THE MALUKUS, NOTING THAT A MULTI-SERVICE "JOINT 
BATTALION" HAD BEEN SPECIALLY FORMED BY TNI FOR THE TASK.  HE 
CONCEDED, HOWEVER, THAT LITTLE TRUST REMAINED BETWEEN THE 
COMMUNITIES, AND THAT DIVISIONS WOULD PERSIST INDEFINITELY. 
 
8.  (C) WHEN QUERIED BY THE AMBASSADOR ON LASKAR JIHAD'S ROLE 
IN PROLONGING THE VIOLENCE AND GOI STEPS TO REIN IN SUCH 
GROUPS, KALLA REJOINED THAT GROUP WAS NOT ENTIRELY TO BLAME. 
A BUGINESE MUSLIM HIMSELF, THE MINISTER CONTENDED THAT 
CHRISTIAN MILITANTS FROM ACROSS INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY 
SUMATRAN BATAKS, ALSO HAVE TRAVELED TO AREAS OF SECTARIAN 
STRIFE LIKE THE MALUKUS AND CENTRAL SULAWESI.  KALLA 
NEVERTHELESS EXPRESSED OPTIMISM THAT THE "JOINT BATTALION" 
WOULD NEUTRALIZE SUCH INTERVENTION IN THE MALUKUS.  HE NOTED 
THAT IN CENTRAL SULAWESI, HOWEVER, THE FIGHTING HAD RESULTED 
IN 100-120,000 IDPS IN THE VICINITY OF PALU, MOST OF WHOM 
WERE HOUSED IN MAKESHIFT CAMPS, SCHOOLS, OR WITH RELATIVES. 
KALLA SAID THE GOI WAS TRYING TO ASSIST THEM, AS WELL AS TO 
INDUCE THEM TO RETURN HOME TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH LOCAL 
RESIDENTS.  HE ADDED THAT MUCH THE SAME WAS TRUE OF MADURESE 
IDPS IN CENTRAL KALIMANTAN, NOTING THE ISSUE HAD GREATLY 
IMPROVED WITH THE RETURN TO MADURA OF MOST OF THE IDPS, AND 
THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE'S PROMULGATION OF LAWS REGULATING 
COMMUNITY RELATIONS.  KALLA SQUARELY BLAMED THE MADURESE FOR 
THE VIOLENCE THAT HAD BEFALLEN THEM, HOWEVER, DESCRIBING 
THEIR CULTURE AND PROCLIVITY TO FORM GANGS (PARTICULARLY 
THOSE "FROM SURABAYA") AS "TOO STRONG" FOR LOCAL 
SENSITIVITIES. 
 
POVERTY ALLEVIATION: A NEW TACK 
------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) KALLA RESPONDED TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION ABOUT 
GOI'S POVERTY ALLEVIATION STRATEGY BY SAYING THE GOVERNMENT 
SHOULD FOCUS PRIMARILY ON EQUITY ISSUES.  NOTING THE GOI 
PREVIOUSLY RELIED ON GROWTH-BASED DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES THAT 
ULTIMATELY BENEFITED ONLY THE ELITES, KALLA ARGUED THE 
GOVERNMENT NOW NEEDED TO CREATE EQUITY THROUGH INCOME GROWTH 
STRATEGIES: 
 
--THIS, HE EXPLAINED, COULD BE ACHIEVED AT THE "MICRO" LEVEL 
BY DEVELOPING SMALL ENTERPRISES, AGRICULTURE, AND SOCIAL 
WELFARE AND HEALTH SERVICES. 
 
--AT THE "MACRO" LEVEL, KALLA SAID, EXISTING INVESTMENT (NO 
NEW INVESTMENT WOULD BE NEEDED) COULD BE BETTER CHANNELED TO 
BENEFIT THE PEOPLE BY TARGETING SECTORS THAT WOULD SPUR 
DEVELOPMENT OF INDONESIA'S DOMESTIC MARKET, AND TAKE 
ADVANTAGE OF THE PUBLIC'S INCREASED PURCHASING POWER. 
 
10.  (C) KALLA SAID THAT FOREIGN INVESTMENT SHOULD BE DEVOTED 
TO PRIVATIZING EXISTING ENTERPRISES, RATHER THAN THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW ONES.  HE NOTED THAT THE LAST THING THE 
COUNTRY NEEDED WAS ANOTHER FIVE-STAR HOTEL.  WHILE CONCEDING 
THE AMBASSADOR'S POINT THAT THE SEMEN GRESIK SALE HAD RUN 
INTO OPPOSITION FROM LOCAL INTERESTS, KALLA NOTED THAT 
SEVERAL OTHER IBRA-MANAGED ENTERPRISES WERE PRIMED FOR SALE, 
INCLUDING BANK CENTRAL ASIA (BCA) AND INDO-TV.  THE MINISTER 
ACKNOWLEDGED THE AMBASSADOR'S VIEW THAT THE GOI MUST SELL AT 
LEAST ONE SUCH ASSET TO BOOST INTERNATIONAL INVESTOR 
CONFIDENCE. 
 
INDONESIANS LOVE AN UNDERDOG 
---------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) KALLA ENDED THE MEETING BY ASKING THE AMBASSADOR TO 
UNDERSTAND THE INDONESIAN PUBLIC'S HOSTILITY TO US-LED 
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN.  THE MINISTER CONTENDED 
THAT MOST INDONESIANS DO NOT CONNECT THE US CAMPAIGN WITH THE 
SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES.  HE NOTED HE OFTEN 
HAS RESPONDED TO PUBLIC QUERIES ABOUT HIS VIEWS ON "US 
AGGRESSION" IN AFGHANISTAN BY COUNTERING THAT THE ISSUE IS, 
MORE ACCURATELY, THE "US RESPONSE TO THE WTC ATTACK."  KALLA 
ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT INDONESIAN PUBLIC'S POSITION ON 
THE ISSUE ONLY REFLECTS ITS TENDENCY TO SIDE WITH THE 
UNDERDOG. 
 
12.  (C) THE MINISTER ALSO USED THE DISCUSSION TO HIGHLIGHT 
HIS PERSONAL PARTICIPATION IN DELIVERING GOI HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN.  KALLA NOTED HE HAD ACCOMPANIED AN 
AID CONSIGNMENT VIA C-130 TO PAKISTAN ON NOVEMBER 1, AND HAD 
MET WITH PRESIDENT PERVEZ MUSHARRAF.  THE PAKISTANI LEADER 
HAD SAID THAT THE TALIBAN HAD SET ISLAM BACK 500 YEARS, 
ACCORDING TO KALLA, WHO ADDED THAT HE SHARED MUSHARRAF'S 
OBSERVATION WITH THE INDONESIAN PUBLIC AT A SEMINAR FOLLOWING 
HIS RETURN HOME. 
 
COMMENT: SOME CAUSES FOR CONCERN 
-------------------------------- 
 
13.  (C) KALLA'S APPEAL THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE BASIS AND 
LIMITED EXTENT OF INDONESIAN PUBLIC ANTIPATHY FOR THE US-LED 
MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN ECHOES A NOW-FAMILIAR 
REFRAIN BY SENIOR GOI OFFICIALS, WHO ARE KEEN TO ASSURE OF US 
THE GOI'S FUNDAMENTAL SUPPORT FOR THE WAR ON TERRORISM. 
HOWEVER, MANY OF KALLA'S OTHER COMMENTS AND OMISSIONS RAISE 
CONCERNS ABOUT THE DIRECTION OF GOI POLICY.  WE NOTE THAT, 
WHILE HE EXPRESSES PROFOUND CONFIDENCE THAT JAKARTA CAN 
LEGISLATE AWAY SEPARATIST THREATS IN ACEH AND ELSEWHERE, 
KALLA JOINS OTHER GOI OFFICIALS IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE 
NEED TO ACCOUNT ALSO FOR TNI AND POLICE ABUSES AGAINST 
CITIZENS IN THE OUTER PROVINCES.  THE MINISTER SIMILARLY 
JOINED MANY OF HIS COLLEAGUES IN FAILING TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE 
NEED TO DECISIVELY REIN IN PARAMILITARY RELIGIOUS MILITANTS 
LIKE LASKAR JIHAD, WHICH ALSO POSE AN IMMEDIATE THREAT TO 
INDONESIA'S STABILITY.  INDEED, KALLA'S DEFENSIVE RESPONSE 
CITING EXTERNAL CHRISTIAN INTERVENTION IN AREAS ROCKED BY 
SECTARIAN VIOLENCE, WHILE DOWNPLAYING THE LASKAR JIHAD'S 
PROMINENT ROLE, SUGGESTS A SUBJECTIVE POSITION ON THE ISSUE. 
THE MINISTER'S READINESS TO TAKE SIDES IS SHOWCASED ELSEWHERE 
BY HIS QUICKNESS TO BLAME THE (MADURESE) VICTIMS OF COMMUNAL 
VIOLENCE IN KALIMANTAN. 
 
14.  (C) COMMENT CONTINUED:  SIMILARLY, NOTHING ABOUT KALLA'S 
APPROACH TO POVERTY ALLEVIATION STRIKES US AS HOPEFUL. 
INDONESIA NEEDS NEW INVESTMENT TO CREATE JOBS.  PEOPLE WITH 
JOBS CAN CLIMB OUT OF POVERTY.  THE REASON THAT THE 
GROWTH-LED DEVELOPMENT BENEFITED THE ELITE IN THE PAST WAS 
DUE TO GOVERNMENT-DIRECTED POLICIES.  SOEHARTO FREQUENTLY 
SPOKE OF THE NEED TO SUPPORT COOPERATIVES AND SMALL AND 
MEDIUM BUSINESS.  KALLA'S ATTEMPTS TO DIRECT FUNDS TO THE 
SAME ENDS ARE LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THE SAME RESULTS. 
 
BOYCE