US embassy cable - 04MADRID4283

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 004283 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR/WE, WHA/AND AND WHA/CCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, SP 
SUBJECT: SPAIN: ZAPATERO TO RAISE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WITH 
CHAVEZ 
 
REF: STATE 223273 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick, 
reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C) The Government of Spain is aware of all three human 
rights issues raised in reftel demarche.  The Spanish agree 
that the possible moves by Chavez supporters threaten 
democracy, human rights and civil rights in Venezuela.  The 
Zapatero government will raise these issues with Venezuelan 
president Hugo Chavez's during his visit to Madrid November 
22-23, a visit which Chavez insisted on making, according to 
Spanish Foreign Ministry interlocutors.  However, given 
President Zapatero's  desires to build dialog with Chavez, we 
do not expect him to press Chavez hard on these questions. 
End summary. 
 
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GOS To Raise Demarche Issues During Chavez Visit 
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2.  (C) Poloff raised reftel issues November 4 with Ernesto 
de Zulueta, the MFA's deputy director general for Andean 
countries.  With respect to the arrest warrants for the 
SUMATE NGO, de Zulueta said he understands the process has 
essentially been put on hold for the moment.  De Zulueta said 
further that the Spanish government plans to address this 
matter, as well as the two disturbing proposed laws we raised 
in the demarche, with Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez when 
he visits Madrid November 22-23.  According to de Zulueta, 
the GOS has discussed all three issues with its EU partners, 
but in the end, Spain decided that direct talks between the 
Zapatero and Chavez governments would be more useful than a 
public declaration by the GOS or the EU.  We emphasized the 
urgency of these matters to Zulueta and urged the Spanish 
government to raise them with the Venezuelan government 
sooner, but de Zulueta argued the Chavez visit offered the 
best opportunity to press the Venezuelans effectively. 
 
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Chavez "Insisted" on Visit 
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3.  (C) De Zulueta took pains to emphasize that the GOS 
agreed to Chavez's visit only after lengthy, dogged 
insistence on Chavez's part.  "The impetus for the meeting 
came from Chavez, not from the Government of  Spain, I can 
assure you," explained de Zulueta.  (In late October, FM 
Moratinos' chief of staff told us the same -- Chavez insisted 
on coming to Madrid.)  Chavez will be traveling with a group 
of Venezuelan businessmen and women.  De Zulueta did not yet 
know who else would accompany Chavez or whether FM Perez 
would join trip.  The GOS's only goal for the visit will be 
to begin some form of constructive dialog with Chavez, 
something, claimed de Zulueta, that was not occurring under 
the Aznar government due to the strained relationship between 
the former Spanish president and Chavez.  The Spanish 
government has no other agenda for the meeting at this point, 
according to de Zulueta. 
 
4.  (C) De Zulueta also asserted that the Spanish government 
has no illusions about the likelihood of progress with Chavez 
-- in fact, troubling developments in Venezuela such as the 
three issues reftel demarche raised signal a weakening of 
democracy and human rights in Venezuela.  However, Zapatero 
believes Spain must at least make an attempt to build some 
sort of constructive relationship with Chavez because he won 
the August referendum and "is the only game in town."  The 
opposition remains remarkably disorganized and ineffective, 
de Zulueta  noted. 
 
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Comment 
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5.  (C)  De Zulueta's explanation of why Spain needs to open 
dialog with Chavez is nearly identical to Spain's reasons for 
wanting to do the same with Castro, though the Venezuela 
issue is much less contentious in Spain.  Although de Zulueta 
said Spain does not have high hopes for dialog with Chavez, 
Zapatero clearly thinks he can build bridges where Aznar 
could not or would not.  Zapatero believes his efforts to 
build a relationship with Chavez are consistent with his 
self-image as a "man of dialog," a phrase he has uttered 
repeatedly since the Socialists prevailed last March.  We 
expect Zapatero government to raise the issues outlined in 
reftel demarche with Chavez during his visit in late 
November, but not to press hard, because it is highly 
unlikely Zapatero will risk turning Chavez off during the 
Madrid visit. 
 
 
ARGYROS