US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS4758

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 004758 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/ERA 
S/WCI FOR AMBASSADOR PROSPER 
SARAJEVO FOR AMBASSADOR MCELHANEY AND JENIFER MOORE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PHUM, BK, NATO, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: DSACEUR'S EU POLAD CLARIFIES DELINEATION OF TASKS 
ISSUES 
 
REF: A. MEMORANDUM ON "DECONFLICTION AND DELINEATION OF 
        TASKS (HQ EUFOR AND NHQ SA" FROM 
        COMEUFOR TO DSACEUR DATED OCTOBER 24 
     B. AND SUBSEQUENT REVISIONS. 
 
Classified By: Col. Michael Ryan, USEU Defense Advisor for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
1. (U) This is a retransmission of Brussels 4731. Paragraph 4 
has been corrected for clarity. 
 
2.  (C) Summary: EU Council Secretariat planners are unhappy 
with a number of points in the Delineation of Tasks between 
COMEUFOR and Commander Nato Headquarters (COMNHQ), but they 
will not raise further  objections.  Some aspects of the 
agreement between commanders on the ground contravene the 
guidance given by the EUMC to COMEUFOR.  End summary. 
 
3. (C) USEU pol-mil officers met November 4 with DSACEUR's EU 
POLAD for Operation ALTHEA, who is also a lead planner in the 
EU's Council Secretariat, to get the Council Secretariat 
views on progress between COMEUFOR and Commander Nato 
Headquarters (COMNHQ) Sarajevo on working out arrangements on 
the ground for delineating tasks between EUFOR and NHQ 
Sarajevo.  DSACEUR intends to submit a letter November 4 to 
both the EU Military Committee and the NATO Military 
Committee laying out the agreed way forward in the document 
"Deconfliction and Delineation of Tasks (HQ EUFOR and NHQ Sa." 
 
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Reporting to the Military Committees 
------------------------------------ 
 
4. (C) DSACEUR Reith's original intention was to ask the 
Military Committee's to "note" this agreement between the 
respective commanders.  Our contact pointed out that this 
"note" might cause problems within the EUMC, since the agreed 
way forward at this point is not in line with the EUMC 
Military Guidance of 27 Jul 04 on the subject; specifically, 
the "Agreed Mechanism" for task number G2 "Import and export 
of weapons and ammunition" states "Dual signature by (both 
COM's) on all import / export decisions."  The preferred EU 
language, which was transmitted to DSACEUR yesterday, is 
"COMEUFOR will decide, following appropriate consultation and 
coordination with NATO SMR Sa."  The EU Council Secretariat 
sees this as a compliance issue only and, therefore, as an 
EUFOR-only decision.  The EU Council Secretariat asked that 
General Reith instead simply say that, as directed, the 
relevant commanders have developed implementation mechanisms 
for the delineation of tasks that in their view will work 
well, and that DSACEUR as Operational Commander has full 
confidence in the agreed procedures.  In the Council staff's 
view, asking the EUMC to "note" the agreement would cause 
political friction since it would require the EUMC to sign up 
an agreement that is in some respects contrary to their 
guidance. 
 
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Consultation Mechanism 
--------------------- 
 
5. (C) The second possible point of contention for the EU is 
item G-9 "AFBiH Commanding Generals and General Staff 
Officers (ACGS)".  Our contact reports that the EU side has 
absolutely no problem with this consultation taking place 
informally and on a regular basis.  He did note, however, 
that this forum runs the risk of presenting opportunities for 
BiH participants to misperceive the relationship between 
COMEUFOR (compliance) and COMNHQ Sa (defense reform).  To 
that end, they asked DSACEUR to add the following note under 
Agreed Mechanism:  "Co-chairmanship runs the risk of allowing 
the ACGS to exploit a perceived weakness in the structure. 
Therefore, for reasons of clarity and reflecting the EU lead, 
this should be an EU chaired group with NHQ Sa full 
participation. (EUMC 11560/3/04 dated 28 Jul 04)."  Having 
made that recommendation, their clear preference is to remove 
the item altogether on the "quite acceptable" understanding 
that the commanders on the ground would normally employ such 
a mechanism in any case for its intended purpose. 
Highlighting it in this document, in their view, only results 
in increased tensions internally in the EU. 
 
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No Problems on PIFWC Language 
----------------------------- 
 
6. (C) On PIFWCs and CT the EU Council Secretariat has no 
problems with the recommendations.  Clearly, they are 
concerned that COMEUFOR might not be adequately informed 
regarding operations that could potentially involve forces 
under his command. At the same time, they are confident that 
the agreed arrangements will prevent such an occurrence. 
Specifically, their suggested language for item P-1 under 
Factors strikes out the phrase "NATO and EUFOR have similar 
mandates for support to the ICTY with PIFWC related 
operations" replacing it with "EUFOR will provide support to 
ICTY and relevant authorities, including the detention of 
PIFWCs.  NATO will continue to provide support to the ICTY 
and will also have authority to detain PIFWCs."  In addition, 
they would like to strike the word "troops" from the second 
bullet.  Our interlocutor did note that the word "mandate" 
has a particular connotation -- hence their disagreement with 
the phrase as originally written.  The EU Council Secretariat 
does not believe they have, nor do they seek, a mandate for 
EUFOR in PIFWCs. 
 
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The Way Ahead 
---------- 
7. (C) The EU side does not/not intend to raise any issues 
regarding the agreement.  They will, rather, place their 
confidence in DSACEUR as the person charged with executing a 
vague political agreement.  It is clear from talking with the 
EU staff that any political gain at this point would come at 
an operational cost; a trade-off they are unwilling to make. 
In the end, they don't really like the outcome, but in the 
interest of a successful operation, they are willing to live 
with it. 
 
8. (C) In the event the EUMC does not accept the document, a 
re-drafting exercise will be necessary.  The EUMC guidance, 
which this document apparently contravenes on the issue of 
dual-signatures on arms export/import authorizations, is not 
repeated in either EU political documents or NATO documents, 
but it was, however, repeated in references in the CONOPS and 
OPLAN according to our source. 
 
Schnabel