US embassy cable - 01ABUJA3039

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 003039 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF: PDAS BELLAMY, PAS PERRY; AF/W BOOTH, 
AF/RA BITTRICK 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2011 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MASS, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PLAN FOR DEPLOYMENT TO BURUNDI 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter.  Reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
 
1 (C)  Summary:  During a November 23 evening meeting with 
Ambassador Jeter, Minister of State Lawal Batagarawa 
reaffirmed that the GON remained committed to deploy troops 
to Burundi to assist the implementation of the transitional 
arrangement between the Buyoya government and moderate Hutu 
politicians.  Batagarawa admitted that the work-out brokered 
by President Mandela was frail, but worth trying.  Mandela, 
according to Batagarawa, had not only arm-twisted Buyoya and 
the Hutu politicians to work with each other, but also 
cajoled Obasanjo to deploy troops into what could potentially 
be harm's way.  End Summary. 
 
 
2. (C)  Batagarawa stated that the third Operation Focus 
Relief (OFR)battalion had been tentatively ear-marked to 
deploy to Burundi, satisfying Obasanjo's commitment to 
Mandela.  (We have subsequently learned that a non-OFR 
battalion has now been selected.)  The Minister of State 
believed the Nigerian mission would be tripartite.  Pursuant 
to the Mandela-brokered agreement Buyoya would be the 
transitional President for 18 months with a Hutu Vice 
President; after that period, the offices would rotate for an 
equal duration,  with the Hutus gaining the Presidency and 
the Tutsi taking the second chair.  Given the extremist Hutu 
and Tutsi opposition to the transitional compromise, 
participating Hutu politicians, many of whom are exiles, 
required security protection once in Burundi.  This 
protective detail would be the first element of Nigeria's 
peace mission. The South African's contingent, which was 
already deployed, was focusing heavily on this aspect of the 
mission. 
 
 
3. (C)  As part of the transitional agreement, Burundi's army 
would be reconfigured to achieve equal proportions of Hutu 
and Tutsi throughout the ranks.  Given the Tutsi's numerical 
inferiority, Batagarawa termed this a "good deal" for the 
Tutsi.  If the Army's composition were to parallel the ethnic 
distribution in Burundi's general population, the Hutu's 
would predominate and eventually overrun the Tutsi, he 
suggested.  Thus, the second part of the mission would be 
restructuring and training the new, ethnically balanced army. 
 
 
4. (C)  Traditional peacekeeping would be the third element 
of the mission, according to Batagarawa.  With the army being 
drawn to the barracks for the restructuring, there will be a 
security vacuum throughout the country.  As the Nigerian, 
South African and other troops deploy to different areas of 
the country, security would devolve to them, he predicted. 
Acknowledging the upsurge in fighting that followed the 
November 1 inauguration of the transition, Batagarawa hoped 
that events on the ground would not force a change from a 
traditional peacekeeping presence to a more robust 
peacemaking posture. 
 
 
5. (C)  Given Burundi's difficult political terrain and the 
nature of the tasks assigned to the force,  Batagarawa could 
not estimate how long the deployment would last.  The figure 
of six months had been bandied about, but the Minister of 
State dismissed that as diplomatic slight-of-hand, a figure 
used to dampen opposition to the deployment and to engender 
confidence by promoting the idea that peace is on the fast 
track.  However, Batagarawa argued, the job of restructuring 
the army would be impossible to accomplish within that time 
period. 
 
 
6. (C)  Batagarawa went on to state that the EU and Belgians 
have promised to help fund the deployment of the African 
contingents to Burundi.  The Dutch had also expressed an 
interest in supporting Burundi peace deployments, he 
believed.  Batagarawa said that while Nigeria had not asked 
for any financial assistance to help fund its deployment, he 
was sure Ghana and Senegal, the other two participating 
states, would require and ask for financial and other help 
before deploying troops. 
 
 
7. (C)  While Batagarawa did not seek funding for this 
specific mission, he mentioned that Nigeria needed financial 
relief to continue active participation in multiple 
peacekeeping operations.  Batagarawa raised the idea that 
donor nations provide Nigeria debt relief in proportion to 
Nigeria's outlays for peacekeeping.  He said that Nigeria, in 
participating in these far-flung operations, not only helped 
to stabilize Africa, but was "doing the dirty work" that no 
Western country wanted to do.  While these efforts were in 
Nigeria's interest as well, he felt the West should give 
Nigeria credit for its peacekeeping endeavors.  By receiving 
debt relief, the GON could silence critics of Obasanjo's 
foreign policy by showing that Nigeria's strategic 
cooperation with the west, particularly the U.S., has 
produced practical dividends. 
 
 
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Comment 
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8. (C)  According to Batagarawa, the Burundi deployment is 
imminent.  While cognizant of the logistical and other 
challenges of such a distant deployment in a harsh, unknown 
environment, the Nigerians seem committed to fulfilling the 
President's pledge to Mandela.  This deployment is not only a 
manifestation of Obasanjo's personalized diplomacy but, with 
some prodding by Mandela also of his foreign policy vision of 
Nigeria as a leading player in advancing continental 
stability. 
Jeter